The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“REALITY CHECK ON BALLISTIC IMAGING” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Justice was published in the Senate section on pages S10666-S10667 on Oct. 17, 2002.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
REALITY CHECK ON BALLISTIC IMAGING
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the Washington, DC, area is in the midst of a terrible crisis. As we all know too well, a murderer has gunned down nine people in cold blood during the past two weeks. Two other victims, including a child, have by the grace of God survived these sick and senseless attacks. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the bereaved, even as we try to comfort and reassure our own families and communities.
I am confident that the deranged person or persons causing all this suffering will be caught. The attempt to hold this area hostage to fear and intimidation will fail, and law enforcement officers will bring the guilty to justice.
As investigators are running down tips and testing forensic evidence, a sudden cry has gone up in some quarters demanding the dramatic expansion of a process known as ``ballistic imaging.'' This technology is a tool employed to assist law enforcement in the analysis of crimes committed with a firearm.
I would like to take a moment to talk about this technology and make sure all our colleagues understand its benefits and limitations. It is easy for good people in the heat and emotion of these troubled times to be swept away by apparently easy solutions to enormously complex problems, and I believe that before we begin to think about expanding ballistic imaging in the United States, we should first take stock of what we do know.
Ballistic imaging technology can be a useful tool in the investigation of crimes committed with firearms. As currently used, forensic experts are able to electronically scan into a database a shell casing recovered from a crime scene to determine if that case matches those from other crime scenes. The technology can serve as a starting point in assisting law enforcement in determining if the same firearm was involved in multiple crimes.
The Federal Government has worked for nearly 10 years on developing an imaging network. The National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, NIBIN, administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, BATF, provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials with critical ballistics information on crimes committed with a firearm. This system matches shell casings recovered from crime scenes to ascertain if a firearm has been used in multiple assaults. By focusing strictly on cases recovered from crime scenes, NIBIN cannot be used to build a database of firearm owners, thereby guaranteeing the security and legal rights of millions of Americans who are law-abiding gun owners.
How does it work? When a firearm is discharged, both the shell casing and the bullet traveling down the barrel of the gun are imprinted with distinctive marks. The bullet takes on marks from the barrel's rifling, and the casing is marked by the gun's breech face, firing pin and shell ejector mechanism. Some guns, such as revolvers or single-shot rifles, might not leave ejection marks. These imprints are distinctive to a firearm. A ballistic imaging program can run a casing through its database and select those that offer a close match. A final identification is made visually by a highly trained ballistic examiner. This process does not lend itself to examining bullets from a firearm. Often, bullets are severely damaged on impact. Bullets recovered are usually examined visually by experts.
It is critically important to understand that this is not ``ballistic DNA'' or ``ballistic fingerprinting.'' Unlike DNA or fingerprints that do not change over time, the unique marks that can identify a particular bullet or shell casing can change because of a number of environmental and use factors. Barrels and operating parts of firearms change with use and wear and tear over time. Moreover, a person can, within minutes, use a file to scratch marks in a barrel or breech face, or replace a firing pin, extractor, and barrel thereby giving a firearm a completely ``new'' ballistic identity. In other words, imaging remains a tool, but not a silver bullet, in criminal investigations.
Legitimate concerns have been raised about creating a national database that would store ballistic images from all firearms sold. We know that such a database would involve huge costs to the government, firearms manufacturers, and customers. Furthermore, it raises questions about a legal ``chain of evidence,'' i.e., how to handle and store hundreds of millions of bullets or shell casings without exposing all such evidence to attack by defense lawyers. It could also break existing law by creating a database of law-abiding firearms owners and prove much less effective than NIBIN.
A recent study completed by the California Department of Forensic Services on creating a ballistic imaging network merely on a statewide level stated: ``When applying this technology to the concept of mass sampling of manufactured firearms, a huge inventory of potential candidates will be generated for manual review. This study indicates that the number of candidate cases will be so large as to be impractical and will likely create logistic complications so great that they cannot be effectively addressed.'' The study pointed out that when expanding the database of spent shell casings, the system will generate so many ``hits'' that could be potential matches, it would not be of any use to forensic examiners. Other problems included guns making different markings on casings from different ammunition manufacturers; the shipping, handling, and storage of spent shell casings; the fact that some firearms do not leave marks that can be traced back to that particular firearm; and the requirement of highly-trained personnel for proper operation.
What about the success rate of statewide systems already in operation? Maryland introduced its own ballistic imaging system in 2000. Every new handgun that is sold in the State must be accompanied by spent shell casings for input into the imaging network. According to Maryland budget figures, approximately $5 million has been spent on the system. According to Maryland law enforcement officials, it contains over 11,000 imaged cartridges, has been queried a total of 155 times and has not been responsible for solving any crimes. Meanwhile, in New York, there have been thousands of cartridges entered into their database and, according to reports, no traces have resulted in criminal prosecutions.
Let me raise one more concern. It is clear that any ballistic imaging network would only be as good as the records it contains. While all the proposals put forward deal with compiling information from new firearms, today in the United States, it is estimated that there are more than 200 million firearms in private hands. It would be impossible to retrieve these firearms for ballistics documentation without violating the constitutional rights of millions of law abiding firearms owners.
All of these considerations should be food for thought to anyone seriously contemplating a national ballistic imaging network. At the very least, they support the conclusion that we should look, and look carefully, before we leap into this system. President Bush is calling for a study of the ballistic imaging technology, and so are some members of Congress. For example, the Ballistic Imaging Evaluation and Study Act, introduced in both the House and Senate by the bipartisan, bicameral team of Representative Melissa Hart and Senator Zell Miller, would order the Department of Justice to contract for a study by the National Academy of Sciences, which would examine the many questions surrounding imaging technology and provide a list of recommendations to policymakers and Congress. Enacting legislation to begin a study of this technology should be a priority. The proper allocation of dollars to fight crime is critical to ensuring safe communities, and we should obtain firm scientific conclusions on which to base decisions on how best to deploy this technology.
____________________
