The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“U.S. FOREIGN POLICY” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S761-S774 on Feb. 24, 2000.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, it is an honor to be here today with my distinguished colleague from Kansas, Senator Pat Roberts. We want to institute a process by which this body can increasingly come to grips with some of the challenges that persist in our foreign policy and continue to be, in terms of our defense, a challenge to us and to the young men and women of America.
It is an opportunity for us to continue our dialog which we started in the Armed Services Committee over the last 3 years as we have encountered difficulties in the Middle East, southwest Asia, and as we see problems around the world. He and I have more and more come to an understanding that we have more in common than we do in disagreement.
One of the things we have in common is that we asked some very important pertinent questions about our foreign policy and our defense as we go into the 21st century. We are delighted today to kick off, not so much a debate on American foreign policy but a dialog which we hope will develop a consensus of some basic first principles by which we ought to engage the world.
We have the post-cold-war world, as it is called. I was with Madeleine Albright today, our distinguished Secretary of State, and she said it is probably not the post anything; it is just a new era. We have gone through the cold war and the terrors of that period, but we are certainly in a new era, and it does not even really have a name.
We hope to provide for our colleagues in the Senate--and we hope they will join us--over the course of this year, an understanding of key national security issues and begin building the building blocks of a bipartisan consensus on the most appropriate priorities and approaches for our country in today's international environment.
In launching this endeavor, I am very mindful of both the enormity of the undertaking and of my own limitations in addressing such a subject. Having been only 3 years, beginning my fourth year in the Senate, I certainly do not claim to have a solution to these problems about which we are going to talk, but I hope to ask some pertinent questions.
American foreign policy is challenged because of the end of the cold war, and Senator Roberts and I approach these questions on the road to the future with great humility and certainly with far more questions of our own than answers. Yet I believe this dialog is one the Senate must have. We owe it to the other nations of the world, including those that look to America for leadership, as well as those that make themselves our competitors, and certainly we owe it to those that make us their adversaries. Even more, we owe it to those who serve our country in the Armed Forces and in the Foreign Service, whose careers and sometimes very lives can be at stake. Perhaps most of all, we owe it to our children and our grandchildren.
I was with Senator Nunn last night at the State Department. He was being honored by the State Department. I always learn something from him whenever I am with him. We were talking about a particular country, a particular challenge in American foreign policy. He said: Yes, what happens there will affect our children and our grandchildren.
It is astounding that the consequences of the decisions we make today will, indeed, affect future generations, so we must make these decisions wisely.
Uncertainty, disunity, partisanship, and overstatesmanship will not serve this country well. We need to seriously consider what our global role in the 21st century is and what it should be. That decision will affect future generations more than we can possibly understand.
One more point: I do believe a meaningful, bipartisan dialog on the U.S. role, which many believe is vital to our national interest, is also imminently doable even in this election year. While the subject matter is very important to our country and our future, it is not an issue of great use on the campaign trail. This great body is the place to discuss these great and momentous issues where we can lay it all out and talk about it in a way that does not impinge on anybody's particular partisan views. Simply put, neither the Presidential race nor the elections for the Congress will be determined by who has the partisan upper hand on foreign policy.
Over the course of the year, Senator Roberts and I--and we hope a number of other Senators--will be engaging in a series of floor dialogs relating to the general direction of U.S. foreign policy and national security policy in the 21st century.
We have actually chosen to sit together. We are on different sides of the aisle, but we chose to come from our back-bench positions to show that we stand actually shoulder to shoulder in this regard. We are all Americans, and we hope we can do something good for our country.
Our current game plan is to begin today by considering frameworks for the U.S. global role with respect to priorities and approaches. In the weeks to come, this will be followed by sessions on U.S. national interests. Of course, the first question about American engagement in the world should be: Is it in our vital strategic national interest? That is question No. 1. The next session will be on U.S. national interests, what are they.
Another phase of our discussion will be the use of our military forces. Quite frankly, this should be question No. 2 because if we do not have a military objective following America's strategic vital interests, why commit the military?
Next is we want to engage the question of our relationship with multilateral organizations. We realize the United States is the world's foremost military and economic power, but that does not necessarily mean we can go it on our own everywhere. The issue of multilateral organizations and our relationship to them is an important one.
After multilateral organizations is the foreign policy roles of the executive and legislative branches. One of the first things that came to my attention when I came to the Senate 3 years ago was something called the U.S. Constitution. Senator Byrd was kind enough to give me an autographed copy of the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, which I proudly carry with me. Quite frankly, if you read the Constitution carefully, it gives the Congress the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy. That is a responsibility we have, along with a unique role in the Senate of advising and consenting, particularly on treaties into which the executive branch may enter.
The executive and legislative branches have to work together for foreign policy and defense policy in this country to actually work.
Next is economics and trade. One can hardly separate economics from defense issues anymore. Economics and trade are absolutely mixed up with our foreign policy and defense issues. Arms control is certainly an issue we need to confront.
Then there will be a final wrapup at the end of the year, probably in September.
However, this is just a preliminary outline, and we want these discussions to be flexible enough to go wherever the dialog takes us--
that is the beauty of the Senate--and to include a wide array of viewpoints and illustrative subjects.
We encourage all our colleagues, of whatever mind on the topics under consideration, to join in so we can have a real debate in this Chamber, one in which we, indeed, ask each other hard questions, not in order to score partisan points and not in a particularly prearranged set of choreographed responses between like-minded individuals but to seek a better understanding of each other's thoughts.
That is exactly what we are after. We have determined that we will not tie this dialog, this debate, to any particular administration, any particular issue, any particular commitment, any particular budget item, any particular legislative proposal. We hope for a freewheeling dialog that we think can benefit the country.
What we are hoping for is not to find final answers, for surely that would probably be too ambitious an objective, but, rather, to bring this body, which has a key constitutional role in the conduct of American foreign and national security policy, to the same kind of serious examination of our foreign policy goals and assumptions as is now underway among many of our leading foreign policy experts.
I was thinking about this dialog today. I was thinking, how does this dialog differ from what might be termed, shall we say, an ``academic undertaking''? There are many seminars. There are thousands of courses on American foreign policy. There are numerous reviews of our defense strategy going on in this country and around the world.
What makes this different? I think what makes this dialog different is that we are the ones who ultimately have to make the decision. This is not an academic exercise. I can remember voting for NATO expansion. It was an incredible experience for me to know that by the raising of my hand I could extend the security of NATO to three nations on the face of the globe that did not have that security before. That was an incredible experience for me.
So we do not participate just in some academic exercise here. We are the leaders. We are the ones who have to ultimately bite the bullet and make the decisions. Therefore, we need to think these things through. That is the point.
One of my favorite lines from Clausewitz, the great German theoretician on war, is: The leader must know the last step he is going to take before he takes the first step. That is the spirit of these discussions. At some point, and in some fashion, a bipartisan consensus on America's global role must emerge because our national interest demands it. It may not be as pure as in World War II when Senator Vandenberg said: Politics stops at the water's edge, but certainly at some point statecraft should overtake politics.
If these dialogs can assist that effort, in even a small way, they will be time well spent. We hope our discussions will not be tinged with particularly partisan or highly personalized considerations because the subject matter clearly transcends the policies and views of any one individual or certainly any one administration. The challenges will be the same, no matter which party controls the White House next year or which party controls the Congress.
With that, I yield to my good and distinguished friend and colleague, the Senator from Kansas. Let me say, in the time I have been in the Senate, I have found him to be a great source of reason and thoughtful pronouncements on national security matters. He has a marvelous sense of humor, which will come out whether we want it to or not in the dialogs. It is my pleasure to turn the discussion over to my distinguished friend and colleague, the great Senator from Kansas, Mr. Pat Roberts.
Mr. ROBERTS. First, Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, for the opportunity to join together in what we both hope will be a successful endeavor.
As Senator Cleland stated, our objective is to try to achieve greater attention, focus, and mutual understanding in this body on America's global role and our vital national security interests and, if possible, begin a process of building a bipartisan consensus on what America's role should be in today's ever-changing, unsafe, and very unpredictable world.
At the outset, I share Senator Cleland's sense of personal limitation in addressing this topic. As he has said, even the finest minds and most expert American foreign policymakers have had considerable difficulty in defining both what role the United States should play in the so-called ``New World Disorder'' or reaching a consensus on what criteria to use in defining our vital national interests.
Now having said that, I do not know of another Senator better suited to this effort than Max Cleland. He brings to this exchange of ideas an outstanding record of public service, of personal sacrifice, and of courage and commitment. On the Senate Armed Services Committee, he has demonstrated expertise and a whole lot of common sense in addressing the quality of life issues so important to our men and women in uniform and, in turn, to our national security.
As members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, we both share a keen interest in foreign policy and national security. In my own case, I was privileged to serve as a member of the 1996 Commission on America's National Interests. It was chaired by Ambassador Robert Ellsworth, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser, and was sponsored by the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, and the RAND Corporation. The Commission was composed of 15 members, including Senators John McCain, Bob Graham, and Sam Nunn. In brief, our Commission focused on one core issue: What are U.S. national interests in today's world?
The conclusion in 1996, 4 years ago--and the Senator, I think, will see some real similarities to some of our concerns as of today--in the wake of the cold war, the American public's interest in foreign policy declined sharply, and our political leaders have focused on domestic concerns. America's foreign policy was adrift.
The defining feature of American engagement in the world since the cold war has been confusion, leading to missed opportunities and emerging threats.
The Commission went on to say there must be a regrounding of American foreign policy on the foundation of solid national interests. They went on to conclude that there must be greater clarity regarding the hierarchy of American national interests and, with limited resources, a better understanding of what national interests are and, just as important, are not.
Then the Commission prioritized what we felt represented vital national interests. It is interesting to note that the conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo did not make the priority cut at that time. That was 4 years ago.
However, the real genesis for this forum that Senator Cleland and I have tried to initiate resulted from frustrations over continued and increasing U.S. military involvement and intervention both in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf and all around the world. Absent was what we consider to be clear policy goals, not only from the executive, but also from the Congress.
We found ourselves on the floor of the Senate, and in committee, coming to the same conclusion reached by the esteemed and beloved longtime chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, who said this, following the war in Vietnam:
I shall never again knowingly support a policy of sending American men in uniform overseas to fight in a war where military victory has been ruled out and when they do not have the full support of the American people.
Yet we continue to see our military becoming involved and taking part in peacekeeping missions, and other missions, where incremental escalation has led to wars of gradualism, where our vital national interests are questionable, and where the unintended effects of our involvement have been counterproductive to national security.
We met in Senator Cleland's office and discussed at length the proper role of the Senate in regard to the use of American troops. We talked about the War Powers Act. We talked about the future of NATO. We talked about our policy in the Persian Gulf. We noted, with considerable frustration, that Senators seemed to be faced with votes, but votes that were already foregone conclusions.
Few were willing to oppose funding for U.S. troops--not many in the Senate or the House will do that--yet many Senators had strong reservations and questions about U.S. policy, our military tactics, and the lack of what some called the end game.
We instructed our staffs to research the War Powers Act and any other possible alternatives that would provide an outlet for future policy decisions.
Senator Cleland persevered, and along with Senator Snowe of Maine, authored and won passage of an amendment mandating that the administration report to the Congress on any operation involving 500 or more troops, and that report would include clear and distinct objectives, as well as the end point of the operation.
In my own case, I authored and won approval of an amendment stating no funds could be used for deployment of troops in the Balkans until the President reported to Congress detailing the reasons for the deployment, number of military troops to be used, the mission and objectives of the forces, the schedule and exit strategy, and the estimated costs involved. Again, these amendments were after the fact, but they at least represented a bipartisan effort on the part of Senators who realized then and realize now that we simply must do a better job of working with the executive and searching for greater mutual understanding in the Senate in regard to foreign policy and our national security interests.
In saying this, let me stress that this body and our country are fortunate to have the benefit of Senators with both expertise and experience with regard to foreign relations and national security. That certainly doesn't reside only with the two Senators here involved. When they speak, we listen. But the problem is, they do not speak enough, and when they do, many do not listen.
The unfortunate conclusion I have reached is that too many Americans are not only uninterested in world events but uninformed as well. More and more today in the Congress, it seems to me that foreign policy, trade, and national security issues are driven by ideology, insular and parochial interests, protectionism, and isolationist views. Both the administration and the Congress seem to be lacking a foreign policy focus, purpose, and constructive agenda.
The one notable exception has been the hearings held by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, who has held extensive hearings on ``Lessons Learned'' with regard to Kosovo. It is a paradox of enormous irony that the vision of knitting a multiethnic society and democracy out of century-old hatreds in Kosovo is in deep trouble. The danger of Kosovo is the fact that it may become another Somalia. These hearings have attracted little more than a blip on the public radar screen and little, if any, commentary or debate in the Senate.
So as Senator Cleland has pointed out, over the course of the coming year he and I will engage in a series of floor dialogues relating to the general direction of U.S. foreign and national security policy in the 21st century. We begin today by discussing the framework for the U.S. global role. In the following months, as the Senator has said, we will discuss the defining national interests, deployment of U.S. forces, the role of multilateral organizations, the role of the Executive, Congress and the public, and the role of trade, economics, and arms control. As Senator Cleland has stressed, this is just an outline.
We invite all Senators to engage in this series. The concept is one of a forum, a dialogue, that will and should include a wide variety of viewpoints. For instance, given the flashpoint situation today in Kosovo, with about 5,000 to 6,000 American troops at risk--and we may be calling in the Marines. I believe that topic certainly demands attention and discussion, however, in a different and separate forum. There should be some discussion and consideration in the Senate in that regard.
As Senator Cleland has pointed out, we all know that foreign policy and national security are legitimate concerns that should be addressed in the Presidential and congressional campaigns; at least I hope they are addressed. But beyond this election year, the Senate will again be faced with our constitutional responsibilities in shaping this Nation's role in global affairs, national security, international stability, and peace. Simply put: Our national interest depends on reaching a bipartisan consensus. My colleague and I both hope this forum will contribute to achieving that goal and, in doing so, also contribute to greater public support and understanding.
I thank the Senator for yielding and understand he has some additional remarks, as I do following his remarks.
Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Senator. We appreciate working with him on this quite challenging and daunting task, but it is worth doing. It is an honor to be with him today and work with him. One of my key staff people, Mr. Bill Johnston, has done a momentous job of research for the speeches, the addresses, the facts, the figures, and the quotes I will be using in this dialog. I want to make sure he gets proper credit at this time.
Mr. President, I will now set the stage for today's discussion by sketching a brief outline of the evolution of the main currents of U.S. foreign policy and, then, by providing a short look at what some leading voices are currently proposing for how America should make its way in the post-cold-war world.
As in any transition period, we are feeling our way for the appropriate strategy and policies with which to maintain and enhance our national security interests in this period of a ``new world disorder.'' As the debates on NATO enlargement, Kosovo and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty revealed, those leading voices on American foreign policy currently offer divided counsel on this issue. It is obvious that no clear consensus has yet formed as to America's post-cold-war strategy, and that, or course, is what we are looking to address in these discussions.
Until the 20th century, it would be fair to sum up our general philosophy on foreign policy as an attempt to continue to follow President Washington's recommended approach contained in his Farewell Address of September 17, 1796:
Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. . . . Steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world. . . . There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real flavors from nation to nation.
Then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams further elaborated on this approach when he proclaimed in 1821 that:
Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.
As Henry Kissinger, a modern day commentator, has put it, this policy, augmented by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which sought to prevent European interference in the Western Hemisphere, made imminent good sense until early in the 1900s:
In the early years of the Republic, American foreign policy was in fact a sophisticated reflection of the American national interest, which was, simply, to fortify the new nation's independence. . . . Until the turn of the twentieth century, American foreign policy was basically quite simple: to fulfill the country's manifest destiny, and to remain free of entanglements overseas. America favored democratic governments whenever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences. . . . Until early this century, the isolationist tendency prevailed in American foreign policy. Then two factors projected America into world affairs: its rapidly expanding power and the gradual collapse of the international system centered on Europe.
Woodrow Wilson took this increased American power and the shattered European order, added to it the traditional American view of our exceptional role in the world and developed what has become the dominant approach of modern American foreign policy-making. As he said in 1915:
We insist upon security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national development. We do more than that. We demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right.
Thus, for the first time in American history, the notion that it was our right and our duty to . . . wherever they might arise was established. While the details have changed from time to time, with some variation in the degree of enthusiasm for foreign interventions, this is still today the foundation in defining our role in the world. It was elaborated somewhat in the famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article penned by ``X''--later disclosed to be George Kennan--which guided our ultimately successful conduct of the cold war by urging, ``a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.''
To be sure, there has rarely been a time in American history when all voices have been united behind the dominant approach to the U.S. global role. Many in this body, including myself, participated in one way or another in the national turmoil over the application of the containment policy in Southeast Asia, in a place called Vietnam. But, while there was vigorous debate on the advisability of specific implementations of Wilsonian ``idealism'' there has never been a serious challenge since the Second World War to what might be called an ``internationalist interventionist'' model for the United States in its national security policies.
Yet, as we begin the year 2000, the world has changed in significant ways from the one we have known since World War II. The Soviet Union is no more. The Communists did not, in the end, bury us, but with a few notable exceptions who currently survive in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea, it is they who have been buried by historical inevitability. Again, to quote, Dr. Kissinger:
The end of the Cold War produced an even greater temptation to recast the international environment in America's image. Wilson had been constrained by isolationism at home, and Truman had come up against Stalinist expansionism. In the post-Cold War world, the United States is the only remaining superpower with the capacity to intervene in every part of the globe. Yet power has become more diffuse and the issues to which military force is relevant have diminished. Victory in the Cold War has propelled America into a world which bears many similarities to the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to practices which American statesmen and thinkers have consistently questioned. The absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national interest.
Just as the very different international environment facing America at the start of the 20th century--with growing American strength accompanying a collapse of the European order--occasioned the need for a fundamental reassessment of the U.S. place in the world, so the end of the 20th century--with an end to the bipolar cold war and the emergence of multiple, if not yet super at least major, powers--
necessitates another thoroughgoing review and evaluation of where we are and where we should be headed.
And if one has been reading the foreign policy journals and white papers during the last few years, one finds a vigorous and thoughtful debate underway on just such questions. I'd like to take just a few minutes to provide the Senate with a small bit of the flavor of this dialog among American foreign policy commentators.
In a 1995 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, Richard Haass of the Brookings Institute provided I think a useful starting point for our consideration by separating the debate on America's global role into two parts: the priorities or ends of American policy, and the approaches or means currently available to achieve those ends. As possible priorities, he lists Wilsonian idealism with its emphasis on promotion of democratic values, economism which--as the name suggests--
gives primacy to economic considerations, realism which is often associated with the traditional diplomatic concepts of balance of power and international equilibrium, humanitarianism which focuses more on alleviating the plight of individuals, and minimalism which could be thought of as ``neo-isolationism'' but accepts the need for selected and limited U.S. engagement in global affairs. On the side of means, Haass lists unilateralism which provides the dominant country--the United States--with largely unfettered freedom of action in pursuit of its goals, neo-internationalism or ``assertive multilateralism'' which relies on multilateral organizations and approaches to international problem-solving, and regionalism which he defines as U.S. leadership within alliances and coalitions.
Writing in the Spring 1996 issue of Strategic Review, Naval Postgraduate School Professor of National Security Affairs Edward A. Olsen presented a view which might be termed as minimalism when he advocated a return to our pre-World War II approach which he characterized as one of ``abstention, benign neglect, and non-
interventionism within a policy of highly selective engagement.'' Professor Olsen distinguished his proposed policy of disengagement and non-intervention--which would be marked by less military intervention, less foreign aid, and fewer international entanglements--from isolationism because his approach would allow the U.S. ``strategic independence'' to determine for itself, independent of other countries or multilateral organizations, when and how to engage abroad.
In almost direct opposition to the Olsen prescription, with goals akin to Wilsonian idealism and employing a largely unilateralist approach, William Kristol and Robert Kagan used a summer 1996 edition of Foreign Affairs to argue for a U.S. role of benevolent global hegemony in the belief that, ``American principles around the world can be sustained only by the continuing exertion of American influence,'' including foreign aid, diplomacy, and when necessary military intervention.
In his 1994 book, entitled Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, provides a contemporary, updated version of the realist balance of power view:
America's dominant task is to strike a balance between the twin temptations inherent in its exceptionalism: the notion that America must remedy every wrong and stabilize every dislocation, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself.
. . . A country with America's idealistic tradition cannot base its policy on the balance of power as the sole criterion for a new world order. But is must learn that equilibrium is a fundamental precondition for the pursuit of its historic goals.
A quote that comes to mind for me is when President Kennedy said,
``There is not necessarily an American solution for every problem in the world.''
I think that is the real issue. Former Congressman Stephen Solarz espoused the humaniarianism goal in the Winter 2000 edition of Blueprint Magazine:
Some, of course, will object to humanitarian intervention as a violation of the principle of sovereignty, which precludes military interference in the internal affairs of other nations. . . . Yet it is clear today that the non-interference doctrine no longer trumps all other considerations. This was obvious when the United Nations sanctioned interventions during the 1990s in Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Where crimes against humanity or genocide are involved, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is increasingly accepted as a justification for violating the otherwise inviolable borders of sovereign states.
A particular variant of the regionalism approach is contained within Samuel P. Huntington's 1996 work, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order.
I know that is a favorite of the good Senator from Kansas.
In the aftermath of the cold war the United States became consumed with massive debates over the proper course of American foreign policy. In this era, however, the United States can neither dominate nor escape the world. Neither internationalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism, will best serve its interests. Those will best be advanced by eschewing these opposing extremes and instead adopting an Atlanticist policy of close cooperation with its European partners to protect and advance the interests and values of the unique civilization they share.
These are just a very few of the many ``think pieces'' which have been coming out of the American foreign policy community since the end of the cold war. Even this brief glimpse reveals a wide divergence in expert opinions on the preferred priorities and approaches for post-cold-war U.S. global engagement. To further evaluate the current debate among individuals with strongly held views on where we should be headed I asked the outstanding Congressional Research Service to provide me with a ``review of the literature'' on U.S. global role options.
I ask unanimous consent that this CRS document be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
A Review of Literature on U.S. Global Role Options
1. Abshire, David M. ``U.S. Global Policy: Toward an Agile Strategy.'' Washington Quarterly, v. 19, spring 1996: 41-61.
Since the end of the Cold War, which was marked by the U.S. promotion of a policy of containment, the U.S. and other powers have entered a strategic interregnum (44) in which foreign policy strategies have not been fully defined. Abshire states that the U.S. should strive toward a policy of agility: ``an agile strategy for the use of power and the achievement of peace'' (41) which is characterized by flexibility in action and long-range goals and is guided by vital national interests. This strategy is proactive rather than reactive and aims to ``return to classical formulations of the proper uses of power to influence the behavior of U.S. opponents, and indeed allies'' (46). Realism (49) forms the foundation of a strategy of agility, acknowledging that military conflict and economic competition are features of world affairs. At the same time, this strategy recognizes the importance of idealism (50) and the role U.S. democratic ideals should play in international relations. Specifically, this strategy represents a balance between short-term realism and long-term idealism (48): In the short run, the U.S. should defend its interests from immediate threats; in the long run the U.S. should strive to promote U.S. ideals such as democracy and free trade. This policy is opposed to isolationism (51), but expects U.S. leaders to set clear boundaries in U.S. foreign policy.
2. Albright, Madeleine K. ``The Testing of American Foreign Policy.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 77, Nov.-Dec. 1998: 50-64.
Albright describes a four-part strategy for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. should encourage continuing relations with other leading nations (51), aid transitional states in playing a larger role in the international system (52), help weaker states that are trying to overcome economic and political problems (52), and ward off threats that affect world security (51-53). This strategy is driven by vision and pragmatism: U.S. foreign policy should incorporate a vision of future policy concerns and should be shaped by pragmatic approaches to foreign policy issues (54-59). The will and resources to carry out policy are essential to implementing this strategy (59-62). In the final analysis, U.S. foreign policy is tested by ``how well our actions measure up to our ideals . . . we want our foreign policy to reflect our status as the globe's leading champion of freedom'' (63).
3. Arbatov, Georgi. ``Eurasia Letter: A New Cold War?'' Foreign Policy, no. 95, summer 1994: 90-103.
The institutions of the West have supported Russian plans for reform despite the plans' shortcomings and disastrous results. Russia has not made progress toward building democracy, and the West is partly responsible for Russia's current woes. The West's role in supporting economic policies unsuitable for Russia has spurred new distrust of the West and notions of a Western conspiracy to introduce policies that will harm the Russian economy (91-96). The West should take part in stopping human rights violations against ethnic Russians living in former Soviet republics (98). The U.S. must recognize that Russia should play an important role in international affairs (102). Both countries are responsible for Russia's future and should seek cooperation (103).
4. Blumenthal, Sidney. ``The Return of the Repressed Anti-Internationalism and the American Right.'' World Policy Journal, v. 12, fall 1995: 1-13.
Isolationism has been revived in a new form as an
``inchoate anti-internationalism'' (2) on the part of the Republican Right. This new anti-internationalism is marked by vigorous opposition to the role of the United Nations and is closely related to growing anti-government and xenophobic sentiments. Although isolationist views were espoused by members of both the Right and the Left in pre-World War II America, by the end of the war, isolationism had become strictly a cause of the Right and was combined with its anticommunist movement (4-5). Advocates of this policy viewed containment as a poor compromise and advocated a unilateral military approach to Cold War threats. Unilateralism (6) remained an important cornerstone of this policy up to Reagan's terms in office, although Reagan eventually disillusioned supporters with his policy of engagement with Gorbachev. George Bush was criticized for his emphasis on foreign affairs. As Clinton's first term in office progressed, he paid more heed to anti-internationlism and initiated policies to limit the U.S. role in multilateral peacekeeping (9). The Republican platform, Contract with America, advanced several anti-international principles, and
``[f]or the first time since the inception of the Cold War, tenets of anti-internationalism have become official dogma of the Republican Party'' (10). Republicans who oppose anti-internationalism have not challenged this position within their party. Idealist and realist approaches (11) to foreign policy will be affected by this anti-internationalism if it continues to flourish. Blumenthal identifies several versions of realism. Augmented realism, or realism plus, (11) sees conviction as a driving force in obtaining a leadership role. Washington realism (11) focuses on international affairs at the expense of domestic ones. Republican realism fails ``to explain how internationalism can coexist with a social policy that radically widens class, racial, and gender divisions . .
.'' (11).
5. Calleo, David P. ``A New Era of Overstretch? American Policy in Europe and Asia.'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, spring 1998: 11-29.
Clinton downplayed foreign policy when elected in 1992 and in his first term ``quietly'' took on ``a sort of devolutionist foreign policy'' (12-13). Clinton encouraged the Europeanization of NATO and seemed to promote a foreign policy in which the U.S. would serve as a balancing power in a multipolar arena and would not aspire to Bush's vision of the U.S. as the only superpower in a unipolar world (13). Muted elements of Wilsonianism could be detected in some Clinton policies to ``[prod] the world toward universal democracy'' (13). Clinton began to take a more active role in foreign policy in his second term and initiated efforts to reassert American hegemony in NATO (14). U.S. interests in NATO expansion suggest that the U.S. is adopting a maximalist stance (16) and is ready to take a hegemonic role in Europe. The U.S. has continued its long-standing role as a strong presence in Asia. Calleo describes three proposed models for a future security structure in Asia--``China the regional hegemon, America the region's hegemonic balancer, and a multipolar regional balance made up of China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States'' (19).
6. DeSantis, Hugh. ``Mutualism: An American Strategy for the Next Century.'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, winter 1998-99: 41-52.
DeSantis describes the views of various foreign affairs professionals: Liberal-internationalists, or neo-Wilsonians, expect the value systems of various countries to move toward each other; realists promote persuading other powers to support U.S. policies; American nationalists, or neo-Reaganites, promote a unilateral policy in which the U.S. strives to promote an ``enlightened empire;'' neo-isolationsists, including America Firsters, libertarians, and pacifists, oppose U.S. involvement abroad (41). DeSantis says that these seemingly different views are all versions of American exceptionalism, the myth that the U.S. is the natural model for other countries and should be the leader of an unpredictable world (41-42). He promotes as an alternative a ``non-American centered framework'' called mutualism: ``an interest-based rather than value-driven concept of international relations''
(44) that avoids hegemony. Economies will be interdependent and national and regional communities will be emphasized in order to curb violent frustrations of peoples ``marginalized by the process of globalization''
(47). A cornerstone of mutualism is cultural tolerance and the recognition that the American way is not the only way to a free and harmonious society (48). Security operations must be shared in order to avoid dependence on the U.S., and Americans must ``abandon their triumphalism'' and recognize the need for cooperation with other peoples
(51).
7. Diamond, Larry. ``Why the United States Must Remain Engaged: Beyond the Unipolar Movement.'' Orbis, v. 40, summer 1996: 405-413.
The end of the Cold War has forced the U.S. to reexamine its role in the world, and a new trend in favor of isolationism has emerged. This neo-isolationism takes many forms. Some of its supporters advocate free trade and foreign aid while others reject any type of foreign involvement. Other neo-isolationists want the U.S. to become ``a normal nation in normal times'' (406). Despite variations on this theme, all neo-isolationists call for the end of America's role as a superpower. Scholar Eric Nordlinger, in his book Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) has articulated a new type of neo-isolationism that calls for varying degrees of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs and recognizes the usefulness of multilateral cooperation. Nordlinger's ``liberal isolationism'' provides a thoughtful approach to foreign policy but is problematic. He mistakenly believes that the U.S. is insulated from outside threats; that U.S. allies could compensate militarily for the loss of a U.S. military presence abroad; that it is better to deal with conflicts as they arise rather than try to predict future conflicts; and that the U.S. would be able to defend itself in the unlikely scenario of a threat to U.S. interests. In fact, spillover from faraway conflicts prevents true insulation; our allies would have difficulties meeting military challenges without U.S. aid and might be forced into bad compromises due to lack of power; the benefits of predicting and deterring conflict can exceed the cost; and, were the U.S. to become as isolationist as Nordlinger proposes, it is unlikely it would be prepared to meet true threats to security (407-411). The best strategy for the next century is liberal internationalism (413).
8. Gilman, Benjamin A. ``A Pacific Charter: A Blueprint for U.S. policy in the Pacific in the 21st Century.'' Washington Heritage Foundation, 1997 (Heritage Lecture no. 579).
Asia will be the most important region to the U.S. in the future, and the U.S. has the greatest power to influence Asian affairs. As in the past, U.S. interests in Asia are:
``regional stability; access to markets; and freedom of the seas,'' (3) and, more specifically, ``the promotion of democracy and the rule of law; human and religious rights; market economies; and regional security for all'' (11). Although the U.S. is ``responsible for the peace and much of the prosperity'' (3) of post-WWII Asia, the U.S. role in Asia is being challenged. The Clinton administration, through base closings, has sent an ambiguous message to Asia, and most Asian nations, which desire a strong U.S. presence in the region, fear the U.S. will retreat to isolationism. The U.S. must maintain a strong role in Asia and thwart the emergence of a regional hegemon that could threaten Asian security. The Clinton administration does not have a good policy to meet these needs. Gilman proposes a ``Pacific Charter'' (7) to outline the U.S. role in Asia. The U.S. must maintain strong relations with Japan, increase relations with India, and curb threats from China.
9. Haass, Richard N. ``Paradigm Lost.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 74, Jan.-Feb. 1995: 43-58.
The post-Cold War world is in a period of ``international deregulation,'' marked by ``new players, new capabilities, and new alignments'' but lacking ``new rules'' (43). Clinton has advocated a new foreign policy centered around international reregulation (44) and characterized by the expansion of market democracies, but this strategy serves more as an ideal than as pragmatic policy. In fact, no one doctrine can encompass every aspect of foreign policy, but the U.S. should strive toward a foreign policy ``that is clear about ends--America's purposes and priorities--as well as about means--America's relationship with and approach to the world'' (45). Haass critiques five approaches to foreign policy that are evident in the current administration. Wilsonian promotion of democratic values is a ``luxury'' that should not take precedence over other interests, such as promoting security in the Middle East, even with non-democratic allies (46). Economism places undue emphasis on the primacy of economics and can be similar to neomercantilism (47). Realism correctly acknowledges threats to the U.S. but neglects the ``internal evolution of societies'' (48). Humanitarianism, which is almost ``post-ideological'' downplays immediate concerns and threats (49). Minimalism ignores factors that affect U.S. security and could lead to long-term problems that greatly threaten U.S. interests (49). Haass describes three types of means to U.S. foreign policy. Unilateralism allows the dominant country freedom of action, but can be imitated and abused by other powers and can break down international order (50). Neo-internationalism, also known as ``assertive multilateralism,'' distributes power and responsibility, but this power may clash with U.S. foreign policy interests (51). U.S. leadership would position the U.S. as the leader of alliances and coalitions, but could lead to problematic compromises (52). Clinton has incorporated each mean and end in some form, resulting in an inconsistent foreign policy. Haass promotes ``augmented realism,'' or ``realism plus,'' which would concentrate on threats to security but would be broader than traditional realism. Haass states that U.S. leadership is the most viable means to meet this form of realism (55-56).
10. Haass, Richard N. ``What to do with American Primacy.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 78, Sept.-Oct. 1999: 37-49.
U.S. foreign policy should promote multipolarity,
``characterized by cooperation and concert rather than competition and conflict'' (38). Post-Cold War society will have four cornerstones: ``using less military force to resolve disputes between states, reducing the number of weapons of mass destruction and the number of states and other groups possessing such weapons, accepting a limited doctrine of humanitarian intervention based on a recognition that people--and not just states--enjoy rights, and economic openness'' (39). The U.S. should maintain its role as the only superpower and should model itself after nineteenth-century Great Britain (41). The U.S. should persuade other powers through consultations rather than negotiations (42-43). Regionalism, which involves regional cooperation, would serve as a good balance between the extremes of perfect internationalism and unilateralism (44), but is problematic because many regions do not agree on the definition of regional order. An American world system involves external influences, but the U.S. must play an active and discriminating role in deciding when humanitarian intervention is necessary. Finally, America must overcome its indifference to foreign affairs (49).
11. Hillen, John. ``Superpowers Don't Do Windows.'' Orbis, v. 41, spring 1997: 241-257.
The U.S. should encourage a new security system which recognizes the differing interests and military capabilities of different countries and is founded on the principle that the U.S., as the superpower, does not do the little jobs that distract it from its larger role. Because U.S. resources are limited, the U.S. should concentrate on broad security issues and leave regional problems to its allies who will serve the roles of ``local doctor and cop'' (243). The downsizing of the U.S. military places strains on the U.S. military when it acts in regional disputes, such as the Bosnia conflict, and few post-Cold War conflicts have truly required heavy U.S. involvement. The U.S. role in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South America is one of collective defense, which focuses on cooperative efforts to
``defend against threats to the balance of power in a region,'' rather than one of collective security, which responds to a broad range of issues not limited to immediate threats (251). In alliances with European countries, the U.S. must preserve its role as a leader and needs to readjust the division of labor in organizations such as NATO. The U.S. should, however, be cautious in increasing Japan's responsibilities in Asia. Within the Middle East, ``de facto alliances'' serve the U.S. better than ``de jure alliances'' that exist with European countries (255). No other regions demand a U.S. presence.
12. Huntington, Samuel P. ``The Erosion of American National Interests.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 76, Sept.-Oct. 1997: 28-49.
American identity has been defined by culture and creed, ideals such as liberty, constitutionalism, limited government, and private enterprise. This identity has been constructed vis-a-vis a foreign ``other,'' which for much of this century has been communism. The end of the Cold War will affect American identity and has led the U.S. ``not to find the power to serve American purposes but rather to find purposes for the use of American power'' (35). Ethnic and commercial interests now overshadow national interests in shaping foreign policy. ``Commercial diplomacy'' (37) has become a cornerstone of Clinton's foreign policy. Ethnic groups now play a major role in shaping U.S. international involvement; the drive for multiculturalism and an increase in new immigrant groups who have resisted assimilation have influenced the actions of the U.S. government toward immigrants' native countries. The combined influence of commercial and ethnic interests has led to a
``domesticization of foreign policy'' (40). America's strength is reflected in military, economic, ideological, technological and cultural spheres, but America is ineffective in influencing other countries (42-43). This paradox is partly the result of a gap between American resources and governmental power. The nature of American power has changed. Immediately after WW II America directly expanded its influence to other parts of the world. From the 1970s, U.S. power has shifted to ``the power to attract''
(44), as illustrated by the power of the U.S. to raise money from other countries for the Persian Gulf War and a shift toward widescale lobbying by foreign governments. U.S foreign policy, with its attention to special interests, is turning into a policy of particularism. A policy of restraint (48), which would limit attention to special interests, would better position the U.S. to ``[assume] a more positive role in the future . . . and to pursue national purposes'' supported by the American population (49).
13. Hutchings, Robert L. ``Rediscovering `The National Interest' in American Foreign Policy.'' Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996.
The end of the Cold War has left the U.S. struggling to redefine its global role. Encompassing principles like
``democratic enlargement'' and ``new world order'' fail to fully address U.S. foreign policy needs; ``new world order,'' for example, has been ambiguous on the relationship between principles and interests and has been constantly redefined and reformulated (2). Foreign policy should not pit principles against interests. Principles alone fail to solve foreign policy problems. Interest-based policies should be tied to U.S. capabilities (2-3). The U.S. placed top priority on Eastern Europe in relations with Moscow and thus helped contribute to ``an international environment conducive to'' the success of Eastern European democracy movements (4). The U.S. recognized the importance of German affairs to European security. In other parts of Europe, the U.S. ``continued to cling instinctively to a dominant role that [it was] no longer ready to play and so found it difficult to cede leadership gracefully to the Europeans'' (5). These approaches to Western and Eastern Europe together helped bring about the end of the Cold War, but the U.S. failed to develop suitable policies to support post-Communist countries. The Cold War should teach the U.S. that a stable Europe, more than a stable Asia, is vital to U.S. security, and U.S. leadership is necessary for European unity (6-7). A stable Eastern Europe is most vital for a stable Europe. The U.S. should not assume responsibility for Russian reform; the task should fall into Russian hands (8). The U.S. should
``invite'' Russia into the international arena and encourage Russia to pursue peace (9).
14. Joffe, Josef. ``How America Does It.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 76, Sept.-Oct. 1997: 13-27.
No alliance in history has persisted long past victory, and yet the U.S. continues to build its alliance system even after the end of the Cold War. Organizations like the EU could challenge U.S. power, and Russia, China, and France have paid lip service to ending U.S. hegemony, but allies of the U.S. have yet to truly turn against America. The reason for ``America's unchallenged primacy'' lies in the uniqueness of America (16). The U.S. ``irks and domineers, but it does not conquer'' (16). During WWI and WWII, the U.S., like Imperial Britain, maintained a strategy of checking hegemonies. More recently, U.S. policy has come to resemble the policies of Bismarck's Germany; the U.S. has built a ``hub and spoke'' relationship with other countries in which
``association with the hub [Washington] is more important to them than are their ties to one another'' (21). As a result, other countries cannot form old-style alliances against the U.S. (24). The U.S. bears a great deal of responsibility in upholding security for other countries, but this benefits and provides for America's own security (27).
15. Kagan, Robert. ``The Benevolent Empire.'' Foreign Policy, no. 111, summer 1998: 24-34.
Although foreign countries complain about U.S. global leadership, many countries nonetheless have grown to rely on American dominance. Although European and other nations call for ``multipolarity,'' U.S. dominance in fact provides the best option for global affairs (26). U.S. hegemony is a benevolent hegemony (26). The U.S. has risked its own safety for the safety of other countries, and Americans have believed since WWII that ``their own well-being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others'' (28). It is in the best interest of the nations that benefit from this benevolent hegemony to support rather than criticize U.S. power. Advocates of multipolarity, and the similar balance-of-power theory of global parliamentarianism, or world federalism (30), fail to recognize that no other country would be willing to truly take on the responsibilities and sacrifices multipolarity entails. Countries like France and Russia have not adopted measures that would enable them to shoulder the burdens of multipolarity; what these countries truly want is an
``honorary multipolarity'' (32): ``the pretense of equal partnership in a multipolar world without the price or responsibility that equal partnership requires'' (32). The growth of neo-isolationism in the U.S. satisfies European calls for less U.S. involvement in international affairs, but the U.S. must continue to recognize the ultimate importance of its dominance (34).
16. Kennan, George F. ``On American Principles.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 74, Mar.-Apr. 1995: 116-126.
Kennan defines a principle as a ``general rule of conduct by which a given country chooses to abide in the conduct of its relations with other countries'' (118). This principle should provide a framework for policy and, with special exceptions, should be ``automatically applied'' (119). A principle should be set forth by a political leader who can reflect the views of the population he represents. Despite wide differences among Americans, most Americans agree on certain ideals. In choosing when to intervene in other countries' affairs, the U.S. should respond only to events that truly threaten U.S. interests (124). U.S. policy must embody John Adams' principle of foreign policy that the best way to help other countries is through ``the benign sympathy of our example'' (125) rather than through direct intervention.
17. Kennedy, Paul. ``The Next American Century?'' World Policy Journal, v. 16, spring 1999: 52-58.
For much of the early twentieth century, America looked inward in its foreign policy. By the end of WWII, however, America's role as the world's leader was clear; the twentieth century had become the American century. Later, the Cold War suggested that world affairs were dominated by a bipolar system of Russian and American power, and anti-Americanism abroad and domestic crises at home lent further doubts to the primacy of America. The appearance of an ``America in relative decline,'' however, was not fully accurate (55). The U.S. held many advantages over a Soviet Union constantly plagued with problems, and despite domestic difficulties, the U.S. demonstrated its ability to renew its economic power in the 1980s. The U.S. is influential in its ``soft power''
(American culture) and ``hard power'' (military resources)
(56), and is a leader in finance and technology. These advantages place America ``in a relatively more favorable position in the world than at any time since the 1940s''
(56). It is uncertain, however, whether the U.S. will sustain its number-one position throughout the 21st century. The spread of American influence could lead to a backlash against the U.S., and other nations have the potential to develop into superpowers.
18. Khalilzad, Zalmay. ``Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War.'' Washington Quarterly, v. 18, spring 1995: 87-107.
The U.S. must develop a foreign policy for the post-Cold War world in order to maintain its strength. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's ``Regional Defense Strategy,'' (88) which focused on strengthening alliances, preventing the rise of regional hegemons, and eliminating sources of instability, never took root under the Bush administration. Clinton Administration foreign policy, outlined in National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (88) stresses similar points but also emphasizes peacekeeping efforts, economic issues, and the expansion of democracy. But the Clinton strategy fails to prioritize foreign policy issues, and Clinton's handling of foreign affairs has been controversial. Possible alternatives for foreign policy are neo-isolationism
(89-91), a return to multipolarity (91-94), and global leadership (94-106). Although neo-isolationism offers short-term benefits, in the long term it is likely to lead to power struggles and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A return to multipolarity and balance of power would allow the U.S. to reduce defense spending and concentrate on economic concerns, but depends on other major powers ``[behaving] as they should under the logic of a balance of power framework''
(93). Global leadership, in which the U.S. would maintain its position and prevent the rise of rival powers, provides the best option. For this policy to work, it must ``maintain and strengthen the `zone of peace' and incrementally extend it; preclude hostile hegemony over critical regions; hedge against reimperialization by Russia and expansion by China while promoting cooperation with both countries; preserve U.S. military preeminence; maintain U.S. economic strength and an open international economic system; be judicious in the use of force, avoid overextension, and develop ways of sharing the burden with allies; and obtain and maintain domestic support for U.S. global leadership and these principles'' (95).
19. Kristol, William and Robert Kagan. ``Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 75, July/August 1996: 18-32.
Kristol and Kagan advocate a conservative, ``neo-Reaganite'' foreign policy, in which American exceptionalism is celebrated and in which America ``cheerfully'' takes on the international responsibilities that come with its role as the benevolent global hegemon (32). They assert that
``American principles around the world can be sustained only by the continuing exertion of American influence'' by such means as providing foreign aid and playing a role in conflict control or resolution in its diplomatic and/or military capacity when appropriate; they further assert that ``most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement''
(20-28). Neo-Reaganite foreign policy differs from the neoisolationism of the ``America First'' variety in that it is a policy of engagement for the purposes of maintaining peace and international order, as well as national benefit
(21-23). In addition, unlike the pragmatist foreign policy under the Bush administration, neo-Reaganite foreign policy justifies its engagement not only with practical or material interests (such as jobs), but also with the goal of upholding and ``actively promoting American principles of governance abroad--democracy, free markets, respect for liberty'' (27-8). America ought to reassume that sense of responsibility for global ``moral and political leadership'' which underlay the ``overarching Reaganite vision that had sustained a globally active foreign policy through the last decade of the Cold War'' (28).
20. Layne, Christopher. ``Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, summer 1998: 8-28.
Layne favors the balance of power strategy over the strategy of preponderance (synonymous with hegemony) that has prevailed in U.S. foreign policymaking circles since after World War II. The ``essence'' of the strategy of preponderance is the creation of ``a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, and on American values'' (9). Preponderance is unsustainable for several reasons: one, hegemonic power instigates its own demise--states that feel threatened will endeavor to emerge as new great powers to balance against the hegemon, thus destroying the unipolar situation(13); second, the U.S. is at risk of strategic overextension when it must defend its extensive interests throughout the world in order to maintain its hegemonic status (17); and third, preponderance as a strategy will be obsolete in the emerging multipolar world, China, Japan, Germany and Russia being the potential new great powers. The balance of power alternative to preponderance is ``offshore balancing''(20). The premise of the offshore balancing strategy ``is that it will become increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and control over, the international system'' (21). As an insular great power geostrategically shielded from most foreign threats, the U.S. is in position to disengage itself from many of its military commitments and global leadership role, thus avoiding overextension. Offshore balancing lets the U.S. stand to the side and achieve relative gains while other, less insulated powers quarrel amongst themselves; it also lessens the U.S. risk of war by allowing the U.S. to act last, when the situation is clear (20-22). Geostrategic concerns are paramount in offshore balancing; other issues such as
``market and global economic welfare imperatives'' are to be subordinate (24). U.S. power and strategic choice are maximized through offshore balancing (24).
21. Mastanduno, Michael. ``Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War.'' International Security, v. 21, no. 4, spring 1997: 49-88.
Mastanduno offers a discussion of realism and its two major variants, the balance of power theory and the balance of threat theory, and how these theories apply to different aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Realism is not itself a theory, but instead a ``research program that contains a core set of assumptions from which a variety of theories and explanations can be developed'' (50). Realist assumptions include an anarchic international system and that states are
``like units'' (52). Balance of Power theory states that a hegemonic state will ``stimulate the rise of new great powers'' or the formation of coalitions that will balance against its preponderance (54). The rational course of action under this theory is to accept the ``inevitability of multipolarity'' and make the most of it, by adopting the position of offshore balancer (see Layne)(56). Balance of Threat theory assert that states are not threatened by power
(aggregate resources) alone; the presence of other considerations such as ``geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions'' is necessary to constitute a threat (59). The rational strategy under this theory would be to ``pursue policies that signal restraint and reassurance''--be nonthreatening, in other words (59). Balance of power guides U.S. foreign economic policy while balance of threat informs U.S. security policy, and the two theories thus applied has worked together in the scheme to preserve U.S. global primacy (51). To ``dissuade'' and delay challenges to U.S. hegemony, the U.S. must not allow economic conflicts to undermine security relations; the U.S. must be willing to shoulder the costs of a ``global engagement strategy'', and the U.S. must consult and get the cooperation of its allies (a multilateral approach) and refrain from preaching and imposing U.S. values (87-8).
22. Maynes, Charles William. ``America's Fading Commitments.'' World Policy Journal, v. 16, summer 1999: 11-22.
Maynes traces the American attitude toward multilateralism since the Second World War. Multilateralism and international institutions like the UN have fallen out of favor among the U.S. political elite since the 1980s, due to the restrictions multilateralism places on America's freedom of action. To maintain that freedom, America has moved toward unilateralism
(``American isolationism in another form'') by acting alone or through dominating its alliances (17). Maynes argues that the multilateral experiment cannot be abandoned (21). Globalization brings new transnational problems that must be dealt with multilaterally, and the balance-of-power approach to foreign policy is too prone to catastrophic failure to be completely relied upon (20-21). America's unilateral approach also creates resentment among other states (22). Despite appropriate concerns about the erosion of sovereignty and the erosion of democratic control, America must revive the Wilsonian commitment to international organizations and international law (also liberal internationalism), for ``the hope for a more orderly and peaceful world lies in the commitment to progressive multilateralism . . . [a hope which] will never be fulfilled unless the most powerful country in the world does its share'' (22).
23. Maynes, Charles William. `` `Principled' Hegemony.'' World Policy Journal, v. 14, fall 1997: 31-36.
America has the ability to deter attacks against itself, but often lacks the will and resources to compel other states to act in accordance with its wishes (35). Maynes suggests limiting the obligations of principled hegemony (specifically in the human rights area) by restricting the U.S. role to providing logistical and political assistance and acting as an example, instead of taking over other states' responsibilities, acting as global or regional policeman, or imposing American views (35-6)
24. Maynes, Charles William. ``The New Pessimism.'' Foreign Policy, no. 100, fall 1995: 33-49.
Influential authors informed by Hobbesian realist assumptions express an unwarranted mood of pessimism for America's future, Mayne asserts. The state of the world is better than it has been for decades and there is much America can do for a better future. The international system is
``structurally sound'' because no great power is seeking the hegemonic position (a goal repudiated by the Bush administration)(44). Wars and conflicts are now more numerous but on a much smaller scale--war doesn't pay like it used to; there is also no ideology fueling a drive for world supremacy
(43). The U.S. should use this ``moment of unusual structural stability in world affairs'' to ``found a structure of peace for the future''(44), by devising a European structure that would involve both Germany and Russia and to fully integrate China into the international system (45-6). The American goal must not be to counter the power of these emerging great powers, but ``to channel it in directions that are more benign and that respect the rights of [their] neighbors''
(46).
25. Maynes, Charles William. ``The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America.'' Foreign Policy, no. 111, summer 1998: 36-48.
America leads the world economically, militarily, and politically (37). It already carries the burden of ``a totally disproportionate share of the expense of maintaining the common defense'' as well as being the ``world economic stabilizer'' (37). Yet America should NOT go further and attempt to pursue a policy of world hegemony, for four reasons: ``domestic costs, impact on the American character, international backlash, and lost opportunities'' (39). Since there is ``no clear geographical limit to the obligations'' imposed on an aspiring hegemon, America, should it elect to pursue world hegemony, must be prepared for huge increases in military and non-military spending, in dollars and in bloodshed (40). Hegemony can be attempted ``only by using the volunteer army,'' which would exacerbate the social fragmentation between those who reap benefits from globalization, and those who have to pay the price (42). Dangerous too is the arrogance supreme power brings, and from which America already suffers. Unilateral actions such as economic sanctions and dictates to the U.N. and other countries provoke alienation and resistance, making other countries less cooperative (44). A policy of hegemony ``will guarantee that in time America will become outnumbered and overpowered'' (46). America should not waste this post-Cold War moment on pursuing hegemony, but use the opportunity to try to forge a new relationship among great powers.
26. ``Old Challenges in a New Era: Addressing America's Cold War Legacy, Defense, Economic & International Security Concerns.'' Washington, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1995.
During the Cold War, ideology was the dominant factor governing international relations. But economic considerations have taken the place of ideology with the collapse of the Soviet Union and following globalization. Unlike during the Cold War era, the transfers of arms and defense technologies to other states are being made largely on the basis of economic considerations, not ideology. A laissez-faire approach to arms transfers might have negative impacts on regional stability and detrimental effects on future international commercial relations and overall political stability in the long term (Chapter 1).
Even though the U.S. was the leader of the globalization of the international economic system, it failed to adopt internal policies to maintain its competitiveness in the world market. In reality, however, the United States considerably depends on importation. Consequently, it is demanded that the United States continues to improve its economic competitiveness in international markets if it is to reverse the trend of dependency. (Chapter 2)
The increasing competition incurred from internationalization and interdependence of trade transformed the structure of the U.S. economy. For example, wages of U.S. workers were adjusted to the equilibrium of global wage levels. This structural transfiguration of the U.S. economy from industrial era to information age resulted in U.S. defense downsizing. The U.S. defense drawdown appears prima facie to have negative impacts on the national job market. The impact upon the U.S. job market as a whole is, however, minimal in the context and also can be ameliorated with continued economic growth. (Chapter 3)
Today's defense industrial base was formed during World War II, and evolved during the quasi-warlike period of the Soviet Union threat. The strategy of the U.S. military against Soviet quantitative military advantages was technological innovation with qualitatively superior weapon systems. This also demanded large-scale industrial production of products and a massive modernization of industry. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary role of defense industry disappeared and left dichotomous problems; ``how to reduce the size of the US defense industrial establishment without losing the capability to support the armed forces in the near-term surge by major powers such as Russia and China, or to respond to provocations from major regional states and to concurrently facilitate futuristic armaments production needed for long-term security needs.'' (Chapter 4)
Regarding the direction of U.S. military industry, ``the key objective of U.S. defense industrial policy must be the preservation of critical design, engineering, and production skills in the United States economy.'' Moreover, ``long-term U.S. defense production is rooted in maintaining a robust manufacturing base within the United States. Failure to preserve a diverse manufacturing base will eventually result in increased U.S. vulnerability to foreign veto over U.S. security-related decisions.'' (Chapter 5)
U.S. foreign dependency on military production will naturally increase as the United States moves toward a unified commercial/defense industrial base and prime manufacturers continue to reorganize their supplier networks. Within this framework, long lead-time products such as aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, and tanks are not vulnerable to foreign suppliers who might prove reluctant to provide parts for U.S. defense production if tensions develops in selected international relationships. The United States currently has the technology to reestablish industries if required but at a cost. The United States is more vulnerable to stoppage of critical parts and components for electric equipment and combat consumables needed for quick-response intervention operations. In the long-term, U.S. vulnerability will depend on the scope and diversity of the United States industrial base.'' (Chapter 7)
Preserving international stability is of great importance to the U.S. political, economic and military capabilities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security condition of the world has been transformed, triggering a dispute about how much military capability should be retained under the new uncertain world order. The Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) postulated the United States must be able to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). But the U.S. force structure planning has been complicated along with the continuous change of the World and the diversity of potential missions unlike during the Cold War. ``As a result of the changes in global stability and Allied force levels, three questions need to be reexamined. 1) what are the critical international interests of the United States, 2) what are the emerging threats to international stability, and 3) what military capability does the United States need to defend those interests.'' (Chapter 8)
``The twin goals of maintaining a viable U.S. defense industrial base and promoting international stability are not mutually exclusive. As long as discretion is exercised, transfers of U.S. arms to non-aggressive states is more desirable than the alternatives of allowing other arms-exporting states to dominate the trade, or cutting off international arms supplies and encouraging the development of indigenous arms industries.'' (Chapter 9)
27. Olsen, Edward A. ``In Defense of International Abstention.'' Strategic Review, v. 24, spring 1996: 58-63.
Olsen advocates the return of American foreign policy to its pre-Second World War program of ``abstention, benign neglect, and non-interventionism within a framework of highly selective engagement'' (58). The U.S. was pulled into a collective approach to security by the special circumstances of the Second World War and the Cold War, and even now retains this ``anachronistic'' pursuit of world leadership with little concern for national self-interest (58-9). Now that the Cold War is over, the U.S. should return to a more
``normal'' role in world affairs by disengaging itself from the ``permanent allies'' and ``entangling alliances'' frowned upon by the Founding Fathers (59-61). A policy of disengagement and non-intervention is not isolationism; non-intervention merely provides the kind of ``strategic independence'' that allows America to get involved ``when Americans--not other countries or international organizations'' decide it is wise (59). Less intervention overseas, less foreign aid, and fewer entanglements will let the U.S. shed burdens its allies can and should carry on their own, and ``maximize U.S. geo-economic influence through a demilitarization of U.S. involvement overseas,'' as well as grant the U.S. a ``more benign and unprovocative image'', facilitate ``trade and investment, and permit a wholesale reduction in obligations without calling into question American prestige and credibility'' (63).
28. Pfaff, William. ``The Coming Clash of Europe with America.'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, winter 1998/99: 1-9.
The Atlanticist dream of an American-European political, economic, and security union is unlikely to be realized due to the oncoming Western European versus American clash over economic and industrial competition (1). The euro (EU common currency), if successful, will draw investments away from U.S. securities as well as become a ``powerful rival for denominating international trade products'' (3). Europe is also expected to resist the globalization trend of mergers in strategic industries such as aerospace and other high-technology sectors to achieve and maintain the ``industrial and economic guarantees of sovereignty'' (5). European economic and industrial interests serve to make European countries more economically and politically integrated as a union, as EU institutions and policies develop to maintain these interests; further, these same interests will become a
``new and fundamental factor of U.S.-EU rivalry and competition,'' forming an obstacle to transatlantic integration (3). Europe does not wish conflict with the U.S., but these vital interests render conflict almost inevitable
(1). On a slightly different note, Pfaff argues against an American claim on hegemony, because hegemony is an
``inherently unstable'' position that provokes resistance, because most of the world does not accept the idea of American exceptionalism, and because American public opinion does not support the kind of expenditure necessary for hegemonic pursuit. (6-7).
29. Rielly, John E. ``Americans and the World: A Survey at Century's End.'' Foreign Policy, no. 114, spring 1999: 97-113.
The latest quadrennial foreign policy opinion survey of the American public and leadership, sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, finds three major trends (1). First, the American public prefers a multilateral approach in U.S. response to crises abroad, while the leadership is more willing to take unilateral action (112,100). Second, although the public recognizes many vital American interests around the world, it is disinclined to send troops or money overseas except to defend national self-interests--a position Rielly calls ``guarded engagement'' (105). Altruistic internationalist causes (such as promoting human rights and democracy and defending allies' security) are low priority. Guarded engagement ``could prove problematic if global leadership requires the United States to make tougher choices in the next century'' as the ``world's only superpower''
(113). Third, there is a marked contrast between public pessimism (major concern being international violence) and leadership optimism for the 21st century world (112). The survey also finds that both the public and leadership groups are upbeat about globalization (105), and that both are viewing ``economic rather than military power as the most significant measure of global strength'' (97).
30. Rosati, Jerel A. ``United States Leadership into the Next Millennium: A Question of Politics.'' International Journal, v. 52, spring 1997: 297-315.
The ``constraints and political uncertainty faced by
[American] presidents in today's domestic political environment does not bode well for a strong proactive foreign policy in the future'' (310). No longer do presidents have the ``automatic or long-lasting'' support behind their foreign policy like they did in the Cold War era (307); now they must deal with a contentious public (307) and a more assertive Congress which increasingly involves itself in foreign policy (308). In addition, presidential policies are constrained by what bureaucracies, usually more oriented to the past than the present, are ``able and willing to implement'' (309). Finally, the personal qualities of the president also determine the success of presidential foreign policy--whether the president has the persuasive power, professional reputation, public prestige, and ability to make good choices (311). The result of these combined factors is that U.S. foreign policy ``has tended to become increasingly reactive--as opposed to proactive--and, hence, incoherent and inconsistent over time,'' rendering the exercise of the much-advocated sustained U.S. global leadership very difficult
(306).
31. Rosenthal, Joel H. ``Henry Stimson's Clue: Is Progressive Internationalism on the Wane?'' World Policy Journal, v. 14, fall 1997: 53-62.
Rosenthal explicates and distinguishes the philosophies of conservative and progressive internationalism, and concludes that ``a realist foreign policy and a `progressive' social agenda did not have to be mutually exclusive'' (61). Conservative internationalism is ``conservative in that it sought modest, incremental change in international relations'' and maintains the state-centered model in which nations have sovereign control over their own territories and domestic policies (56). Conservatives are concerned with promoting American geopolitical and mercantilist interests, not radical world reformation (56). Progressive internationalism takes its cue from the American Progressive movement and ``sought to extend the ideals and achievements of the Progressive movement'' to the world, as reflected in its emphasis on political democracy, and social and economic justice worldwide (55-7). Progressives also envision a ``One World'' international structure. Rosenthal then writes that ``the story of American internationalism is a history of how `national interests' grow out of and are defined by domestic considerations''
(54). Citing Morgenthau's idea that ``international power depended on domestic power and that a key factor in determining domestic power was the presence or absence of moral principles,'' Rosenthal observes that even realists, of whom Morgenthau is a prime representative, accept that power rests not only on military and economic might, but also has a moral basis--legitimacy (54). Working for and achieving social progress at home is ``a prerequisite'' in the extension of American power and interests abroad (61). Thus although conservative internationalism is the more mainstream policy, ``progressive aspirations cannot and should not be jettisoned,'' for these aspirations of equality in freedom and opportunity constitute the
``purpose of American politics . . . [and] for various historical, geographic, cultural and technological reasons, `the area within which the United States must defend and promote its purpose [had] become world-wide''
(61). It is the American purpose and ethical obligation to deliver on the progressive philosophy, domestically and globally (the latter by example), in its role as the
``indispensable nation'' (62). In short, moral principles cannot be ignored in foreign policy.
32. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. ``The New Moralists on a Road to Hell.'' Orbis, v. 80, spring 1996: 277-295.
American policy on aid to needy nations and especially on military intervention against political injustices (like ethnic violence) has come under the negative influence of a group Rubinstein calls the ``new moralists'' (277). The new moralists are a ``disparate group of influential notables in the media, academy, and think tanks,'' who want to use U.S. military power to ``spread democracy, protect the victimized, and promote economic development,'' even where the U.S. has no strategic stake (277). New moralists assume that the U.S., as the sole world superpower, must shoulder global leadership; that the international community is willing to follow its lead; that civil and ethnic conflicts must be stopped before ``they lead to great-power wars'' and that the U.S. has a ``moral responsibility'' to promote democracy and defend the downtrodden (278). They view national interest through a moral, not strategic, framework (278). Rubinstein criticizes the new moralists for misusing historical evidence and for wrongly claiming international support (286-7). Foreign policy ``must be affordable, supportable, and demonstrably in the best interests of the country at large,'' and based on ``sober calculations of fundamental U.S. strategic, economic and political interests'' (293). ``Except in cases of direct threats to the survival or vital interests of the United States, the determination of which moral goal(s) to emphasize is a matter of choice'' (294). Further, the moral dimensions of foreign policy must be carefully handled with the proper perspective and sound priorities, in order to prevent trivialization, indifference, and self-righteousness (292).
33. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. ``NATO Enlargement vs. American Interests.'' Orbis, v. 42, winter 1998: 37-48.
NATO enlargement is not in the U.S. interest. The decision to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO was based on Clinton's bid for votes from voters with strong ties to Central and Eastern Europe, and not on a cost-benefit policy analysis (37). NATO enlargement will cost the U.S. money, add to NATO's security burden, and force the new members to divert money from economic and social development in order to upgrade their defense system to NATO standards
(38-40). Given the new challenges and uncertainties facing the U.S. in East Asia, it is unwise for the U.S. to take on
``unnecessary responsibilities'' in Europe, where the situation is stable (43). Introducing new elements into NATO will disrupt its ``secure strategic environment'' by affecting power structures and member cohesion, possibly resulting detrimental consequences
(44). The key concern here is Germany. Admitting the Central and Eastern European members will once again put Germany in the center of Europe, with the potential for rekindling adversarial Franco-German and Russo-German relationships, as well as undermining European integration as France and Britain assess Germany's new, more important status (45). The addition of new members, all ``heavily dependent on Germany,'' may affect intra-NATO politics (45). Finally,
``any geopolitical development . . . that transforms Germany from an ordinary nation-state into a strategic hub . . . will pose problems for America's presently unchallenged dominance''; in an enlarged NATO where Germany has NATO members as a buffer against Russia (thus reducing its security reliance on the U.S.), America may well lose its leverage in NATO to Germany (45).
34. Ruggie, John Gerard. ``The Past as a Prologue?'' International Security, v. 21, Spring 1997: 89-125.
Ruggie uses three past reconstruction periods in international policy, 1919, 1945, and post-1947 to predict future trends (109). He contends that in all three instances American leaders advocated ``multilateral organizing principles . . . to animate the support of the American public'' (117). He states that these principles are embedded in American nationalism and by their nature appeal to the public. ``Multilateral organizing principles are singularly compatible with America's own form of nationalism, on which its sense of political community is based'' (109). However the author is hesitant to define these acts as ``mere rhetoric'' or idealism (117). He asserts that various factors must be taken into account depending on the complexity of each situation, with special focus on ``strategic interests and collective identity'' (124). Ruggie argues that the outlook for American foreign policy should be not simply defined by historical instances or past successes but in terms of the existing situation and political climate.
35. Schild, George. ``America's Foreign Policy Pragmatism.'' Aussenpolitik, v. 46, 1st Quarter 1995: 32-40.
Schild discusses American foreign policy transition from isolationism (33) to internationalism (34). The author states that isolationism ``does not mean the complete decoupling of the United States from Europe and from the world'' but rather
``refusal to enter into lasting political commitments'' (33). The change in U.S. foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism was a result of four factors. The era of isolationism between the two world wars caused a belief in the American population that it left the country unprepared for attack, as in the case of Pearl Harbor. The policy failed to provide economic growth and the development of new weapons expanded defense borders beyond American coastlines. Finally, the Cold War created an adversary in which the general public accepted the Soviet Union as an enemy (34). The combination of these factors led to the emergence of internationalism, defined as universal or transnational interests (34). However, Schild declares that since the end of the Cold War the trend toward isolationism has re-emerged, a trend he calls ``pragmatic foreign policy'' (33).
36. Schwabe, William. ``Future Worlds and Roles: A Template to Help Planners Consider Assumptions About the Future Security Environment.'' Rand Corporation, 1995.
Schwabe discusses nine possible future roles for the U.S. concerning international security. He explains the origin of his roles by distinguishing between possible future worlds and possible U.S. roles. Possible future worlds include ``new era'' denoting improvements in economic and political structures, ``baseline'' referring to status quo levels which continue in the same fashion as it has since World War Two and ``Malthusian'' meaning deterioration in which the international system is failing and all countries struggle
(2). Potential roles for the U.S. encompass leadership, co-equal, and second tier (3). The leadership function maintains that the U.S. will continue the role it has assumed for the past half century, dominating in many aspects of international relations and security. The co-equal option posits that the U.S. will maintain its comparative advantage in some aspects but recognize equivalent or superior ability of other first tier countries. In this respect the U.S. will
``abandon the modern version of manifest destiny and comes to see greater value and security in not having to lead'' (6). The second tier role presumes that the U.S. will decline in status, falling below other leading industrialized nations. Schwabe does not hypothesize on which of these possibilities will occur.
37. Schwenninger, Sherle R. ``Clinton's World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy is Hastening--by accident--Arrival of the post-American Century.'' Nation, v. 266, Feb. 1998: 17-20.
Since President Clinton has taken office a ``new global order'' has taken shape (17). Schwenninger states that Clinton's policy of ``political isolation and economic strangulation have hardened into an ideological commitment''
(18). The author explains his theory through examples of U.S. economic trade agreements and various attempts at sanctions. He notes that American sanction policies especially have done more to strain U.S.-European relations than they have altered behavior of condemned countries. Schwenninger continues by saying, ``It (the Clinton Administration) has mismanaged this period of U.S. dominance in world affairs by pushing ideologically driven initiatives (like NATO expansion), which will bring little if any lasting benefit to U.S. interests or the larger cause of a stable world order'' (20). The author promotes U.S. foreign policy that includes labor and environmental protections, more extensive domestic measures to insure the majority of Americans benefit, and when needed international regulatory structures needed to oversee international capital flows (19-20).
38. Shain, Yossi. ``Multicultural Foreign Policy.'' Foreign Policy, no. 100, Fall 1995: 69-87.
In the past century America's population has expanded considerably. Ethnic groups living in America have altered the shape and function of U.S. foreign policy. Those involved in U.S. foreign political affairs have recognized this wave of influence and have acknowledged the resurgence of Wilsonianism (70). However, this presents a foreign policy conundrum: foreign policy- makers must take into account the demands of citizens but avoid undermining national cohesiveness due to ethnic strains. With increasingly powerful ethnic influences such as diasporic lobbies, ``one should expect to see strong ramifications in U.S. foreign affairs, including a redefinition of U.S. national interest''. (73) Shain states two ideologies that ethnic communities encounter when compelled by ethnic and U.S. interests. Isolationists consider their culture superior to American culture and reject cultural assimilation in the U.S.
(75). Integrationists endorse a vision of pluralist democracy that includes cultural and political recognition from main stream institutions (78). American policymakers will have to carefully consider these factors when creating and implementing foreign policy.
39. Sloan, Stanley, R. ``The U.S. Role in the Twenty-first Century World: Toward a New Consensus?'' Foreign Policy Association, 1998: 64 p.
Sloan contends that U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era must be directed by executive leadership with the acknowledgment of scholars, analysts, and Congress. A crucial element in comprehending America's new role is to understand world interdependency. Sloan proposes U.S. interests can be
``affected by developments in any region of the globe'' (5). Sloan suggests that the U.S. has been experiencing an
``escapist'' period in foreign policy (36). He contends that escapism is a result of America's uncertain international role in the future and a misunderstanding of U.S. foreign objectives. He recommends the current Administration explicitly defining America's foreign policy agenda based on common values, goals, and interests (59). The author reveals that this endeavor would ``reflect post-cold-war realities and would restore flexibility to U.S. policymaking'' (59).
40. Travers, Russell, E. ``A new Millennium and a Strategic Breathing Space.'' Washington Quarterly, v. 20, Spring 1997: 97-114.
In a reevaluation of threats against U.S. security Travers suggests eight general policy prescriptions to succeed during the post Cold War period. Included in his recommendations are rejection of isolationist and instant gratification policies which he depicts as being two major mistakes in U.S. history
(110-111). He promotes the use of newly defined sovereignty combined with neo-Wilsonian ideals ``because it is in the U.S. national interest to help build such a world'' (112). The author also suggests minimizing future threats by addressing potential vulnerabilities including possible domestic problems. He states that this can be accomplished by creating a exceptional intelligence community with early warning systems to thwart domestic and international threats. Military preparedness should include readiness in low intensity conflicts with small force packages of highest-end U.S. technology integrated with 1980s- and 1990s-vintage weapons (112). Essentially, Travers concludes that the U.S. maintains a favorable strategic position in the post Cold War era.
41. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.
``U.S. National Goals and Objectives in International Relations in the Year 2000 and Beyond.'' Hearing, 104th Congress, 1st Session, July 13, 1995. Prepared Statement by Henry Kissinger, 12-22.
Kissinger states that every major nation finds itself in a transitional stage. ``The current world contains six or seven major global players whose ability to affect nonmilitary decisions is essentially comparable'' (13). For this reason Kissinger believes that there are two stable options for U.S. policy makers: hegemony or equilibrium. Hegemony would allow the U.S. to dominate in the international sphere but has been recently rejected by the American public (13). The equilibrium or ``balance of power'' approach has also been dismissed by U.S. society due to endless tension that many feel it causes (13). However, Kissinger maintains that
``the reality is that the emerging world order will have to be based on some concept of equilibrium . . . among its various regions'' (13). He also argues that the U.S. will be forced to impose a variety of foreign policy initiatives, based on U.S. relations and each nation's political agenda. Concerning countries with which we share common values and principles, Kissinger suggests emphasis on democratic principles to usher in the new world order
(17). In the case of nontraditional U.S. allies he asserts that we must avoid containment policies of a generation ago. Containment may allow or possibly promote unified defiance. (21). Kissinger stresses the need for a well developed and supported international policy, blind to partisanship. ``The national interest of the United States does not change every four years; foreign leaders judge our country by its insight and its constancy'' (22).
42. Van Heuven, Marten. ``Europe in 2006: A Speculative Sketch.'' Rand, 1997: 16 p.
U.S. foreign policy with respect to Europe in the next decade should be founded on ``the fact that a secure, stable, and prosperous Europe is vital to American security and well-being'' (13). Europe and America have had a long record of cooperation as a result of similar interest and values. For this reason political, financial, and social stability in Europe is essential to prosperity in America. Van Heuven stresses that because of our historical partnership bipartisanship should not muddle U.S. foreign policy objective in the region (15). Emphasis on pragmatic policies such as those concerning the EU and open markets should continue to be the American objective (15). In closing the author states that there is a need for greater public discussion about what the U.S. role should be concerning Europe.
43. Weston, Charles. ``Key U.S. Foreign Policy Interests.'' Aussenpolitik, v. 48, no. 1, 1997: 49-57.
Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has remained the only influence capable of international influence. Changes in America politically and domestically have influenced U.S. foreign policy decisions. Weston states that the current Administration's policy combines ``idealism with pragmatism and emphasizes democracy and human rights'', a reflection of public sentiment (52). Despite international engagements such as Bosnia, ``Washington is not at all keen about the idea of an offensive and worldwide interventionism'' (52). The author concludes that to overcome international challenges faced in the 21st century the U.S. must lead alliances with examples of coordination and cooperation (57).
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, James Lindsay of the Brookings Institution, I think, well summed up where we in Congress are today in this great debate on America's proper role in the world in the Winter 2000 Brookings Review, where he wrote:
Much like friends who agree to dine but can't agree on a restaurant, foreign policy elites agree that the United States should do something, just not what. Congress naturally reflects this dissensus, which makes it difficult for the institution to function. Divided by chamber, party, ideology, region, committee, and generation, Congress lists toward paralysis whenever a modicum of agreement and a sense of proportion are absent.
In a nutshell, attempting to overcome this ``dissensus'' and
``paralysis'' is what Senator Roberts and I are trying to do in these dialogs. I'd like at this point to yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas for his comments.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. President, Senator Cleland has very effectively outlined the evolution of our nation's foreign policy, from Washington and Adams
(chary of foreign involvement and alliances) to the Monroe Doctrine to Wilson's idealism and all of the so called ``ism's''--economism, realism, humanitarianism, minimalism, unilateralism, regionalism, isolationism with intervention and non intervention tossed in. Now, that is quite a foreign policy tossed salad.
But, the point is, discussion and definition must preface clarity, purpose and consensus and Senator Cleland has done just that along with a Clelandism, a new concept he will define in his closing remarks,
``Realistic Restraint.''
In setting the framework for discussion on the global role our nation will play in the 21st century, the benchmark used by virtually all observers is the post-cold-war period.
Ashton Carter, professor of science and international affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in the first Clinton administration, put it very well when he recently wrote:
The kindest thing that might be said of American behavior ten years into the post-Cold War world is that it is A-STRATEGIC, responding dutifully to the (crisis du jour) with little sense of priority or consistency.
A less charitable characterization would be that the United States has its priorities but they are backwards, too often placing immediate intervention in minor conflicts over a
``preventive-defense strategy focused on basic, long term threats to security.
This formula has become awkward, even embarrassing, as the years go by. It is an admission that we do not know where we are going strategically, only whence we have come. It is time to declare an end to the end.
In his recent article, ``Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs,'' Professor Carter has recommended identifying an ``A-list'' of security priorities to fill the current strategic vacuum. I was struck by the similarity between Professor Carter's A, B, and C lists determining threats to our national security and the recommendations by the Commission on America's National Interests four years previous that I mentioned in my opening remarks.
And, Professor Carter did us another favor in his article by quoting George Marshall at the time of America's previous great strategic transition following the Second World War. In 1947 at Princeton University, General Marshall said:
Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible, there is a natural tendency to relax and to return to business as usual. But, I feel that we are seriously failing in our attitude toward the international problems whose solution will largely determine our future.
The report by the Commission on America's National Interests in 1996 expressed a similar view:
The confusion, crosscurrents, and cacophony about America's role in the world today is strikingly reminiscent of two earlier experiences in this century: the years after 1918 and those after 1945. We are experiencing today the third post-war transition of the twentieth century. In the twenty years after 1918, American isolationists forced withdrawal from the world. America's withdrawal undermined the World War I peace settlement in Europe and contributed mightily to the Great Depression, the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, and the resumption of war in Europe after what proved to be but a two-decade intermission. After 1945, American leaders were determined to learn and apply those lessons of the interwar period. Individuals who are known now as the ``wise men,'' including Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, fashioned a strategy of thoughtful, deep American engagement in the world in ways they judged vital to America's well-being. As a result, two generations of Americans have enjoyed five decades without world war, in which America experienced the most rapid economic growth in history, and won a great victory in the Cold War.
To address this historical challenge and responsibility, what did the Commission recommend? We recommended the following:
Challenges to American national interests in the decade ahead. Developments around the world pose threats to U.S. interests and present opportunities for advancing Americans' well-being. Because America's resources are limited, U.S. foreign policy must be selective in choosing which issues to address. The proper basis for making such judgments is a lean, hierarchical conception of what U.S. national interests are and are not. Media attention to foreign affairs tends to fixate on issues according to the vividness of a threat, without pausing to ask whether the U.S. interest threatened is really important. Thus second- and third-order issues like Bosnia or Haiti become a consuming focus of U.S. foreign policy to the neglect of issues of higher priority, like China's international role or the unprecedented risks of nuclear proliferation.
Based on its assessment of specific threats to and opportunities for U.S. national interests in the final years of the century, the Commission has identified five cardinal challenges for the next U.S. president: To cope with China's entry onto the world stage; to prevent loss of control of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable materials, and to contain biological and chemical weapons proliferation; to maintain sound strategic partnerships with Japan and the European allies; to avoid Russia's collapse into civil war or reversion to authoritarianism; and to maintain singular U.S. leadership, military capabilities, and international credibility.
Note the similarity in agreement in regard to Professor Carter's recent article in which he says, 4 years later:
The public imagination, reflected in the press, abhors the post-Cold War's conceptual vacuum. Under CNN's relentless gaze, and in the absence of any widely accepted strategic principles, the accumulation of a decade's worth of telegenic events has begun to furnish the public with a conception of strategic priorities that differs from an A-list as defined here. Citizens watching the news (and even those few who still read it) can be forgiven if they have begun to get the impression that the security challenges of the new era (the post-Post-Cold War era) arise in such places as Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia. These are the issues that have dominated the security headlines in the 1990s. Indeed, there is even talk of the post-Cold War's first presidential doctrine, the so-called ``Clinton Doctrine'', dealing with precisely this issue. According to President Bill Clinton: ``Whether you live in Africa or Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.''
The Kosovos and their ilk are undoubtedly important problems: they represent not only atrocities that offend the human conscience, but if allowed to fester can undermine the foundations of regional and international stability. However, it is also true that such problems, while serious, do not threaten America's vital security interests.
Carter went on to say there are four dangers that he puts on the A list, the top priority concerns in regard to vital national security interests: No. 1, the danger that Russia might descend into chaos, isolation and aggression as Germany did after the First World War; No. 2, the danger that Russia and other Soviet successor States might lose control of the nuclear and chemical and biological weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union; No. 3, the danger that, as China emerges, it could spawn hostility rather than becoming engaged in the international system; the danger that the weapons of mass destruction will proliferate and present a direct military threat to U.S. forces and territory; and finally, the danger that catastrophic terrorism of unprecedented scope and intensity might occur on U.S. territory.
Professor Carter indicated these A-list problems do not take the form of traditional military threats and they have not, as a general rule, made headlines or driven our defense programs during the decade-old post-cold-war era. While neither imminent nor certain, the A-list problems will, to quote Marshall again, ``largely determine our future.''
Both Professor Carter and the commission report go on to stress many additional policy recommendations. I commend both the report and the article to my colleagues.
In trying to better prioritize our national security obligations, I think we are faced with two clear policy alternatives: The first I call the so-called Powell doctrine, named after retired Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Colin Powell, who focused on the dangers of military engagement and recommended limiting commitments that put America's men and women in uniform in harm's way to absolutely vital national interests; the second being the so-called Clinton doctrine, which emphasizes more of a global policing role for the United States.
This debate does recall others. It was 40 years ago that President Eisenhower's emphasis on strategic deterrence was challenged by President John Kennedy's advocacy of something called ``flexible response.'' However, the difference is that once in office, the Kennedy administration increased defense spending, while in the last 10 years after engagement and sending more American service men and women overseas than any other President took place in tandem with cutting our military by one-third.
Our current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry Shelton summed up the situation very well when he told the John F. Kennedy School of Government recently:
The military makes a great hammer in America's foreign policy tool box, but not every problem we face is a nail.
He went on to say:
As a world superpower, can we dare to admit that force cannot solve every problem we face. I think that the decision to use force is probably the most important decision our nation's leaders can make. The fundamental purpose of our military forces is to fight and win the nation's wars.
General Shelton went on to echo what both the commission on America's interests and Professor Carter have said: Military intervention should be used for vital national interests, important national interests, and they have been used for humanitarian efforts. But the general cautioned that such efforts should be limited in duration and clearly defined.
The general referred to the Dover test, named after Dover Air Force Base, the point of entry of the bodies of service members that are killed in action overseas. The general said: The question is, Is the American public prepared for the sight of our most precious resources coming home in flagged-draped caskets into Dover?
He said this should be among the first things raised by Washington decisionmakers. Both Senator Cleland and I agree very strongly.
The historical analogies aside, there is one clear difference in today's global world and what faced our political and military leaders of yesterday. That is what I call the information age of the CNN effect. Joseph S. Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, said in a recent article:
Today the free flow of information and shortened news cycles have a huge impact on public opinion, placing some items at the top of the public agenda that might otherwise warrant a lower priority. Our political leaders are finding it harder than ever to maintain a coherent set of priorities on foreign policy issues that determine what is in the national interest.
The so-called ``CNN effect'' makes it harder to keep some items off the top of the public agenda that might otherwise warrant a lower priority. Now, with the added interactivity of activist groups on the Internet, it will be harder than ever for leaders in democracies to maintain a consistent agenda of priorities.
In closing, let me say that while this forum is intended to focus on debate and discussion, events of the day have a way of forcing the agenda.
I paraphrase from the distinguished admiral who heads up the Defense Intelligence Agency when he said before a recent hearing: We must pay attention to uncertainties in regard to Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and Korea. They must be addressed. We must deal with rogue states and individuals who do not share our vision of the future and are willing to engage in violence. Rapid technology development and the proliferation in information technology, biotechnology, and communications, tactical weapons, weapons of mass destruction, pose a significant threat. A 50-percent reduction in global defense spending means both our adversaries and allies have not kept pace with the United States, but as we see after the war in Kosovo, it will result in asymmetric threats from our adversaries and reduced help from our allies. Demographic developments will stress the infrastructure and leadership in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Disparities in global weather and resource distribution will get worse. The reaction to the United States and western dominance will spur anti-U.S. sentiments now more pronounced since Kosovo, the law of unintended effects. International drug cultivation and production and transport and use will remain a major source of crime and instability. And lastly, ethnic and religious and cultural divisions will remain a prime motivation for conflict.
To be sure, the Senate of the United States cannot solve all the problems, but these problems do indeed comprise current and emerging threats to our national security, international stability, and to peace. The question is, Can we reach consensus in this body to address them in a rational fashion as the leader in the free world?
I think my colleague has some closing remarks, as I do.
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, may I say my colleague from Kansas, as he so often does, put his finger right on it. The question is one of priorities. I appreciate him pointing out the CNN effect. The extent to which this country can respond to each and every problem in the world is limited. We have to recognize that; therefore, we must insist on dealing with our top priorities.
I deeply appreciate the wonderful quote of General Shelton which I first heard at an Armed Services Committee hearing, that we have, in effect, a great hammer, but not every problem in the world is a nail. What a great way to phrase that particular point of view.
I appreciate Senator Roberts' mentioning General Powell, one of my personal heroes. I once had the pleasure of visiting him in the Pentagon when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We spoke about the purpose of the American military. He said: My purpose is to give the President of the United States the best advice I can on how to use the American military to stay out of war; but if we get in war, win and win quickly.
That is still probably the finest definition of the mission statement of our military forces I have ever heard.
So I thank the Senator from Kansas for his insight and for his timely remarks.
I will now conclude my prepared remarks today by offering some preliminary thoughts as we begin this dialogue on the U.S. global role. As I said at the outset, I certainly do not have any final judgments or answers to this critical question. In my view, no one has, or can have, all of the answers right now because so many of the elements of the post-cold-war world--including its geopolitical alignments,
``rules of the game'' in dispute resolution and trade, and the role of non-national actors, including non-governmental organizations, the news media and unfortunately transnational terrorists--are in flux. But we cannot let this lack of certainty and finality deter our efforts to find the best set of policies we can now develop, not when challenges or potential challenges to our national interests continue to arise, not when the people of America are asked to sustain whatever policy we here espouse.
I might say, as a Vietnam veteran who almost came back in a body bag, the Dover test, the Dover, DE test, or the ability of this country to measure the rightness of our actions based on the price we are willing to pay, is a powerful one.
When our sons and daughters in the military are asked to put their family life on hold and their lives on the line in support of whatever the civilian authorities determine, they have a right to ask us if those policies are worth it.
I have been deeply disturbed by the tenor of our recent debates in the Congress and with the administration on a host of important national security issues. Most recently, the Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty after little meaningful debate and no Senate hearings. This was one of the most consequential treaties of the decade, and it was sadly reduced to sound-bite politics and partisan rancor.
In addition to the CTBT, the Senate has made monumental decisions on our policies in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, funding for the Wye River Accords and the future of NATO and the United Nations, all without a comprehensive set of American goals and policies. Simply put, I do not believe we can afford to continue on a path of partisanship and division of purpose without serious damage to our national interests.
In addition, as the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, I have been heavily involved in trying to improve the quality of life for our servicemen and women through such steps as increasing pay and enhancing health and education benefits. It is my deeply held view that not only do we need to take such action to address some disturbing trends in armed forces recruitment and retention, but we owe these individuals nothing less in recognition of their service.
However, as important as these other factors are, the ultimate quality of life issues center on decisions made by national security decisionmakers here in Washington relating to the deployment of our forces abroad. It is these deployments which separate families, disrupt lives, and in those cases which involve hostilities, endanger the service member's life itself. This is not to say that I believe our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are not fully prepared to do whatever we ask of them. But we on this end owe them nothing less than a full and thorough consideration each and every time we put them into harm's way.
There are thirteen military installations in Georgia, and I visit the troops whenever I can. When I go to these bases, I see weary and beleaguered families who are doing their best to make it through the weeks and months without their husbands or wives. They are, indeed, on the point of the spear of this Nation's military force. They are paying a heavy toll for our military engagements around the world. It is a price they are ready to pay, but one I want the Senate to understand and appreciate as we continue in our commitment of troops aboard.
For what it is worth, based on what I have seen and heard to date, I believe we in positions of foreign policy making responsibility in the United States need to be much more mindful of such traditional realist diplomatic precepts as ``balance of power'' and ``equilibrium.'' This is not to say that I believe our distinctly American approach to foreign policy, dominated throughout by idealist considerations and in most of the 20th century by what is often called Wilsonian internationalism has been wrong-headed or unfounded. Clearly, for the most part, it has served us well in advancing our vital national interests, whether those were securing our national independence, promoting the spread of self-determination and democracy, or defeating Soviet communism.
But the post-cold-war period is a new day for America as well as the world. In my view, we need not, and certainly will not, renounce our ideals, but in this new era, those ideals must be grounded in a policy which realistically gauges what price Americans can or should pay in support of our global role.
We have to ask the Dover, DE test: How many body bags do we want to see coming home? We have to ask what price we are going to pay for our military. We cannot continue to downsize our American military by a third and increase our commitments abroad by 300 percent, whether or not our commitments abroad are actually sustainable over a period of time.
Last, I am struck by the words of the conservative editor of the National Interest, Owen Harries:
I advocate restraint because every dominant power in the last four centuries that has not practiced it--that has been excessively intrusive and demanding--has ultimately been confronted by a hostile coalition of other powers. Americans may believe that their country, being exceptional, need have no worries in this respect. I do not agree. It is not what Americans think of the United States but what others think of it that will decide the matter.
Mr. President, I appreciate the indulgence of the Senate for our discussion here, and I thank my colleague for his tremendous insight and his marvelous research into the challenges we face in America's global role today. I look forward to continuing this discussion and this dialog in the coming weeks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald). The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, in closing, I again thank my colleague for undertaking this effort. As usual, his remarks have been on point. They have provided focus. They have been very thought provoking.
I would like to recount a personal experience. Last spring, Senator Stevens led a Senate delegation to the Balkans, to Macedonia. Obviously, we didn't go into Kosovo at that particular time. Along with other Senators, we visited the Albanian refugees and the various refugee camps. This one was Brazda.
Standing in the cold and in the mud amidst a circle of refugees, there came an old man with a stocking cap. It was pulled over his head. He was recounting, through his interpreter, his tale of human misery. He had refused to join his wife and family in fleeing their home. He didn't want to leave home. He urged them to leave the home because of his worry about their safety.
Two sons had fled to the mountains. He did not know, since he fled at the last moment, where his family was. He was wearing the shoes of a long-time friend who was killed in the violence. His home was burned. His savings and life's wherewithal were destroyed. And with tears in his eyes he grabbed me by the lapels and he said: ``I believe in God, I believe in America, and I believe in you.'' That face will always be with me.
Yet today, we see the continuing ethnic violence so prevalent in that part of the world. The Senator from Georgia mentioned Samuel P. Huntington's book, ``The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of the World Order.'' The central theme of that book is that culture and cultural identities, which we see so prevalent in the Balkans and in other places around the globe, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflicts in the post-cold-war world.
We should focus on that. I recommend his book to every Senator. It should be required reading. He has five corollaries to his main point which will help us shape our future foreign and defense policy:
One, in the post-cold war world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar, multi-civilizational; Westernization is not producing a universal civilization--a shock, perhaps, to many who call themselves decisionmakers in regard to Western civilization.
Two, the balance of power among civilizations is shifting. The West is declining in relative influence. Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength. The Nations of Islam are exploding demographically, with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors, and nonwestern civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
Three, a civilization-based world order is emerging. Societies sharing cultural affinities tend to really cooperate with each other. Efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful. And countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization. The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations.
Finally, the survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and westerners accepting their civilization as unique but not universal, and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from nonwestern societies. Avoidance of global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.
Simply put, Samuel Huntington says, leaders in Western nations, Members of the Senate, the President of the United States and his Cabinet, maybe we ought to concentrate on strengthening and preserving our values where they are cherished, they have been nourished, and they work well, instead of trying to impose them on countries where they are not welcome. If we do that, we will take a giant step in trying to set appropriate priorities in regard to our vital national security interests.
I thank the Senator from Georgia. We have concluded our remarks. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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