The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ``SCIENCE AT ITS BEST, SECURITY AT ITS WORST''” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Energy was published in the Senate section on pages S7237 on June 17, 1999.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ``SCIENCE AT ITS BEST,
SECURITY AT ITS WORST''
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, earlier this week the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board released its report on security and counterintelligence operations at the nuclear weapons laboratories of the Department of Energy.
The report's title--Science at its Best, Security at its Worst--
neatly encapsulates the Board's findings. This report reiterates and clearly delineates problems within our nuclear laboratories that other reports have also detailed. No one should be surprised.
Let me simply list a few of this newest report's more compelling conclusions:
At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling record of security administration. Twenty years later, virtually every one of its original problems persists.
The nuclear weapons and research functions of DOE need more autonomy, a clearer mission, a streamlined bureaucracy, and increased accountability.
More than 25 years worth of reports, studies and formal inquires . . . have identified a multitude of chronic security and counterintelligence problems at all of the weapons labs.
Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance--both at DOE headquarters and the labs themselves--conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to happen.
The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven incapable of reforming itself.
Lastly, the report states: Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems with security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire Department.
These findings are nothing new.
When Senators Kyl, Murkowski, and I introduced our amendment to the Defense Authorization calling for reorganization and streamlining within the Department of Energy, one of the charges leveled against us was that no hearings had been held on this issue. That old, tired claim that ``we need more hearings'' is used every time Congress tries to act on an urgent matter.
Sometimes that may be true. In this instance, we have undoubtedly destroyed a major forest with all the paper documenting DOE mismanagement in just the past 15 years. We have done studies; we have held hearings; the House has held hearings; we have asked for a review by the GAO, by the CRS, by outside groups, and we must have 25 pounds of recommendations gathering dust right now.
Today, my friend Secretary Richardson is implementing a new round of reforms at DOE. Mr. President, you should know that, while I have been critical of some past Secretaries for failing to give sufficient attention to these matters, Secretary Richardson is clearly indicating a willingness to tackle these issues.
However, Secretaries come and go. Reforms introduced during any specific tenure of a Secretary often do not endure after their departure. The Rudman report states, and I quote, ``the Department of Energy is incapable of reforming itself--bureaucratically and culturally--in a lasting way, even under an activist Secretary.''
I can tell you from my own experience that it is sometimes hard to figure out just who is responsible in any given situation at DOE. Under the current structure the programs within one office, comply with policies set by a second office, in accordance with procedures set by a third office, verified by a fourth office. When I look at something like that, I have to wonder, ``Who is in charge?''
The experts involved in producing the Rudmann Report asked a number of DOE officials to whom they report, who whom they were responsible. The most common response was ``it depends.''
This myriad of oversight and review does not improve performance. To the contrary, in some cases it diminishes performance. It is my view that it is frequently easier to be an overseer than the responsible party. As overseers have multiplied, the line between oversight and responsibility has been blurred and sometimes disappears. The frequent result is that, when mistakes are made, everyone thinks they were an overseer, and nobody takes responsibility.
Mr. President, the national laboratories, especially the ones in my state, literally saved millions of lives through their work in World War II and during the cold war. They abound with dedicated, patriotic, and truly gifted men and women, working for this nation's security as their top priority. We should not make the labs a scapegoat for an ineffective bureaucracy. We need a fundamental re-emphasis on the nuclear weapons work at DOE, recognizing that the rules and regimes that govern the rest of the DOE cannot be entirely used in the nuclear weapons complex.
I would like to show you an organizational chart of DOE's current structure as it pertains to our nuclear weapons program. This chart is found on page 17 of the new report. As one can readily discern, it's a toss up who or what office might have oversight in a given situation in a maze such at this. Just one glance at this chart makes the point.
The PFIAB Report demands legislative changes. Again, I quote, ``The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven incapable of reforming itself.'' The PFIAB Report makes some very specific recommendations as to what changes are necessary. The authors recommend that Congress pass and the President sign legislation that:
Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency for Nuclear Stewardship.
Streamlines the Nuclear Stewardship management structure.
Ensures effective administration of safeguards, security, and counterintelligence at all the weapons labs and plants by creating a coherent security/CI structure within the new agency.
The organizational chart outlining this new organization looks something like this. This can be found on page 50 of their report.
Creation of a semi-autonomous agency for our nuclear weapons work is precisely what I have been pushing over the last several weeks. Indeed, what I and my colleagues Senator Kyl and Senator Murkowski have proposed boils down to a true ``Chain of Command'' approach, with all the discipline this entails. I truly believe, and today's report confirms, that this approach, if it had been used in the past, may have avoided some of the security problems and will help us avoid them in the future.
The Rudman Report is a significant, timely contribution to the accumulating evidence that we must act to ensure that brilliant science and tight security are compatible within our nuclear weapons infrastructure.
I would like to congratulate Chairman Rudman and the members of the PFIAB for the tremendous contribution their findings will make to the dialog on how to best preserve our nuclear secrets and still maintain the greatest scientific research centers in the world.
The recommendations made in this report parallel what I and my colleagues tried to do several weeks ago. Perhaps this additional evidence will persuade others that it is long past time for Congress to take decisive action. I encourage my colleagues to read the report and draw their own conclusions about the need for organizational reform at DOE.
____________________
