The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“DISMANTLING THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Commerce was published in the Senate section on pages S9471-S9472 on June 29, 1995.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
DISMANTLING THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I have been a longtime advocate of streamlining government and making it more effective to address the challenges of the global economy and information age as we move into the 21st century. While I have focused on these issues for many years as chairman and former ranking Republican of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I have never witnessed as great an interest in this critical issue than I have this Congress. I welcome this interest because I believe it offers great opportunity to achieve major and overdue structural reform of the executive branch. We can and will achieve the goal of smaller, better, and less costly government.
Most recently, attention has centered on eliminating the Commerce Department. It is endorsed as part of the budget resolution. The proposal introduced recently by Senator Abraham, the majority leader, and others provides a specific plan on how to dismantle the Department.
I have long endorsed the idea of dismantling the Commerce Department in the context of elevating, streamlining, and reconfiguring major trade functions in the executive branch. It is very difficult to defend the status quo as it exists today at the Commerce Department, and I believe the initiatives that have been introduced are an important step toward the establishment of a government that is structured to deal effectively with the challenges of tomorrow, not yesterday.
I have worked on organizational issues for many years and I realize how difficult it is to bring about needed and constructive change. Turf usually overwhelms the process, whether it is in the administration or Congress, and the private sector is often either unexcited about the issue, or they don't want to upset those with whom they have to work in the current structure. So it is not surprising that the recent legislation is controversial and that the trade provisions have engendered the greatest amount of concern. I, too, have concerns about certain provisions.
I would like to turn briefly to some of the trade concerns that have been raised in the initial debate on this issue so far. First, I firmly believe a vast majority of us agree on the vital importance of trade to this Nation and recognize that our Government plays a crucial role in this area. This role includes performing key functions as negotiating agreements to open markets, enforcing and implementing trade agreements, administering trade laws and facilitating exports.
For many years now, I have called for significant reform of executive branch trade functions and the case for reform has never been stronger than today. Uniting major trade responsibilities under the clear leadership of one person and establishing a more effective trade voice for our Nation is the direction in which we should head. It is time to recognize that much of the Commerce Department's trade activities are integrally involved with those of the USTR. There is no clear dividing line between them, except for the divided lines of authority. This has caused, and continues to cause, wasteful duplication of effort, confusion as to who is in charge, serious turf battles, and divide-and-
conquer tactics by our trading partners. It is time that they become part of the same team with one coach in charge.
I have heard some disturbing accounts of how our trading partners take advantage of our
divided trade leadership. For example, I've been told of instances where the lead trade negotiator from one of our fiercest trading partners would play the USTR and Commerce trade negotiators off one another by telling one that the other was willing to agree to something that the other would not agree to.
Ambassador Kantor's recent testimony before a House Appropriations subcommittee demonstrates the blurred nature of responsibilities between the International Trade Administration [ITA] and the USTR. He stated that the USTR's three top priorities are to ensure that the Uruguay round agreements are implemented fairly, to enforce trade agreements, and to expand trade to new markets that offer the greatest potential for increased exports of American products. That sounds a lot like what much of the ITA is doing.
I have an extremely high regard for the dedicated and talented staff at the USTR, but it is unrealistic to expect that they can continue to manage effectively a trade agenda that is ever more demanding and complex, under the current structure of divided trade leadership and responsibility. The fact that there are some 40 detailees at the USTR--about 25 percent of its current size--is indicative of the burdens the current structure is working under. Furthermore, it is my understanding that two major components of ITA--the international Economic Policy and Trade development offices spend about one-half of their time on trade negotiations and policy development.
While we need to maintain a coordinating function on trade that allows for input from different parts of our government that may be impacted by a particular trade matter, the USTR relies mostly heavily on ITA for negotiating support and backup. Even Commerce's main export promotion entity, the U.S. And Foreign Commercial Service, is actively supporting the USTR. For example, it plays an important role in the USTR's annual National Trade Estimates Report. There is logic behind bringing Commerce and USTR trade functions together under one cabinet-
level voice.
I would like to comment briefly on some of the concerns that have been raised with respect to merging these functions. One major concern is related to moving import Administration functions to the USTR because of possible trade-offs that might be made between trade negotiations and administration of our trade laws. I would simply make two points in this regard. The first point is that the administration of antidumping and countervailing duty laws is a quasi-judicial process and must be implemented strictly according to law. The second point is that these functions are already part of a department that has trade advocacy as one of its primary function, something which one could argue would exert more pressure for trade-offs than would negotiations. It is my understanding that Commerce's Office of Import Administration is kept separate from other trade functions and that is how it should remain under any single trade structure. At the same time, we should recognize that, while the administration of these laws must be isolated from other primary trade functions, these issues are in fact part of trade negotiations--they were a major issue in the WTO and are an active part of past and current free trade talks.
Other strong concerns have been raised about the USTR's role as an honest broker and interagency coordinator. While I appreciate some of the concerns that have been raised, and I agree that there must be an honest broker in the White House at the highest levels on major trade decisions, it is not the USTR that seems to be performing that role. As far as I can tell, every President has created his own small White House office to broker controversial trade
decisions. Ambassador Kantor has himself testified that of the three tiers of the interagency coordinating mechanism, and I quote, ``(a)t the highest level is the National Economic Council (NEC).'' At the lower levels, there is no reason why the USTR or a single cabinet trade structure should not perform the lower level interagency process that exists.
Things have dramatically changed since the USTR, then the STR, was created in 1962. We are no longer simply negotiating occasional GATT rounds of tariff talks. While we have made some organizational changes along the way, they have been relatively limited in scope, and the last time we made any significant change was in 1979. Since then, our trade negotiating agenda has taken center stage and has grown tremendously. The issues are much broader and more complex than ever before, and the implementation of trade agreements has also grown enormously in significance. Our Government's foreign commercial presence is often on the front lines in discovering trade problems that might need to be negotiated or are related to lack of implementation of certain agreements. Our current institutional structure that divides these and other major trade functions among separate entities is not, I would argue, in our national trade interest.
It is in our national trade interest to restructure trade functions in a way that builds on and improves the best features that exist. We want to preserve the lean and mean negotiating structure of the USTR and to also ensure that there is an effective interagency and private sector advisory process that allows for legitimate input from other agencies and voices as needed. But our negotiators should have the necessary support structure in place to achieve ambitious negotiating objectives. We also should be implementing and administering trade agreements and trade programs in one house. There is not a whole lot of sense, for example, to the USTR administering the GSP program, while Commerce implements major bilateral trade agreements such as the semiconductor agreement.
The specific business concerns that have been raised about the trade provisions of the Commerce Dismantling Act must be examined very closely, and the Committee on Governmental Affairs will be holding hearings on these and other aspects of the bill after the July recess. I share some of the concerns that have been raised, including those relating to the international economic policy and trade development functions of the Commerce Department. I also believe greater consolidation should be accomplished. A cabinet level trade structure should include, for example, the Commerce Department's existing export control functions.
Mr. President, citizens are demanding a government that works better, as well as costs less. An integrated trade structure within our Government will not only work better for our citizens, but it will also achieve efficiencies, synergies and cost savings.
In closing, I would just to like to say that there is a window of opportunity here to reflect in a comprehensive way about how we should be organized to address the many trade challenges ahead of us. I hope we can prevent jurisdictional concerns from becoming the driving force in this debate, and that we move it instead in a positive and constructive direction. I look forward to working with my colleagues to achieve the best trade structure for our country, one which will promote an effective national trade agenda for the 21st century.
____________________
