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“THE CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2006” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Energy was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E1303-E1304 on June 28, 2006.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
THE CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2006
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HON. BENNIE G. THOMPSON
of mississippi
in the house of representatives
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, a terrorist attack takes three components: a weapon, a target, and a terrorist. Usually these three items are separate, as we saw in the 9/11 attack, the terrorist bombings in London, Madrid, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, and countless other places around the world faced with terrorist attacks. In special cases, however, the weapon and the target are combined. Such is the case with a facility that produces or maintains large amounts of toxic or otherwise dangerous chemicals. If such chemicals can be released and cause harm, the target itself becomes a weapon.
While the protection of all national critical infrastructure is important, chemical plants represent a special subset of those assets which should be given the highest priority in protecting. As a country, we recognized such a danger when it came to nuclear power plants. The Department of Energy made the connection and put in place rigorous security measures. The same has not been true for chemical plants, even though they are much more vulnerable, and can have much higher consequences if successfully attacked.
Recently, however, this problem has been given the attention it deserves. Successful improvements in securing chemical facilities will take the cooperation of the administration, the Congress, and the facility owner-operators. We find ourselves in a unique situation where all three of these parties are in agreement that there is a security gap that needs to be closed, and that it will require regulation to do it.
Since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, one of its missions has been the protection of critical infrastructure. Some 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the country is privately owned. Neither the private sector nor the government was eager to promulgate security regulations. The hope was that in a post-9/11 world, private industry would voluntarily make necessary security improvements, aided by guidance from the Department in the form of recommendations and publication of ``best practices.''
This worked to some degree. Many members of the chemical industry stepped up their security practices voluntarily. However, many did not, and the economic disadvantage suffered by those who made investments in security practices prompted them to ask Congress and the Administration for some regulatory mechanism that would level the economic playing field by requiring all members of the chemical sector to ensure that their facilities are secure.
The Department of Homeland Security also noticed that there was a big disparity in the level of participation and cooperation to increase security across the chemical sector. Both Secretary Michael Chertoff and former Secretary Tom Ridge recognized this problem. In October 2002, then-DHS Secretary Ridge and then-EPA administrator Christie Whitman declared in a joint statement: ``Voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to provide the level of assurance Americans deserve.''
Two and a half years later, during his appearance before the House Committee on Homeland Security in April 2005, Secretary Chertoff stated, ``In the area of chemical plants, the President has indicated that if we could not get what we need in terms of security using these various kinds of market-based incentives and best practices, that we would look to the possibility of some kind of regulation.'' He reiterated this stance in March during a forum on chemical plant security that ``free riders,'' meaning smaller plants that have not implemented voluntary security standards, need to be brought under a regulatory scheme to ensure security.
Finally, Congress, in both houses and in both parties, is ready to act. Recently, bipartisan legislation introduced by Senators Collins and Lieberman has been marked up in the Senate. Mr. Lungren, myself and
(whoever else) will soon mark up a bill which is quite similar and I am proud to be a part of this effort.
The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 will make our country more secure by giving the authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security to regulate security practices at chemical plants. However, the bill does not take a heavy-handed, overly proscriptive approach. The bill directs the Secretary to place the country's chemical plants into tiers based on risk, and to set security performance standards which increase in rigor for higher risk tiers. By setting performance standards rather than proscribing specific actions, the scheme would seek to form a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and the chemical plants to come up with their own creative ideas to reach the desired level of security.
The tiered structure will also provide incentives to chemical manufacturers to make their plants inherently safer and therefore lower their risk tier. By lowering the inherent risk of the plant, they would not be required to have as high a level of security if the plant moves from high risk to low risk. Obviously, a plant that makes extremely toxic chemicals needs tighter security than one that makes less dangerous ones. I believe that acquiring the use of inherently safer technology where feasible would be more effective, but I am hopeful that the incentive approach will be successful. We also ensure that chemical plant workers will be our partners in securing their facilities, by directing the Secretary to set up a method that will allow workers to report security gaps that they find to the Department, and ensuring that such workers are not retaliated against.
The time for action is now. We have an opportunity to ensure this vital industry, and the population that lives around these facilities, are safe and secure. We must seize the opportunity to work together to secure our infrastructure, our economy and the lives of our citizens.
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