The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOES NOT LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO ACT WITHOUT CONGRESS” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Justice was published in the House of Representatives section on pages H68-H69 on Jan. 9, 2020.
The Department is one of the oldest in the US, focused primarily on law enforcement and the federal prison system. Downsizing the Federal Government, a project aimed at lowering taxes and boosting federal efficiency, detailed wasteful expenses such as $16 muffins at conferences and board meetings.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
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WAR POWERS RESOLUTION DOES NOT LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO ACT
WITHOUT CONGRESS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Barr) for 5 minutes.
Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to a dangerous and partisan resolution offered by my Democrat colleagues designed to handcuff our President and limit his constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief to defend our Nation against Iranian aggression.
The resolution before us today needlessly politicizes our national security and shows that Democrats have once again put their partisan agenda ahead of the American people simply because they do not like President Trump.
Let's be clear. President Trump's decisive and defensive action to eliminate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, is not the reason for the recent escalation between the United States and Iran. The President ordered the strike because of Iran's own escalation and aggression, for which General Soleimani was largely and personally responsible.
For over 40 years, Iran and it proxies have been attacking U.S. interests and our allies, but since the flawed Iran nuclear deal, under which the regime received billions of dollars in sanctions relief, the Islamic republic has used that economic windfall to accelerate its support for terrorist proxies, restart its ballistic missile program--
in violation of U.N. resolutions--and cheat on its denuclearization aims.
My colleagues have heard the quote of the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that: ``We must stop partisan politics at the water's edge.''
Senator Vandenberg, a Republican, who worked across the aisle with Democrat President Truman in the early days of the Cold War was right.
This resolution is not safeguarding our Constitution, but attacking our Constitution by attempting to divest a duly elected President of his Commander in Chief powers, and in the process, emboldening our enemies.
In fact, President Trump has demonstrated enormous restraint in his targeted action against Soleimani making this vote entirely unnecessary. There was no invasion of Iran, but a strike against a terrorist in a country we had the legal authority to operate in under the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force.
Mr. Speaker, you have heard many of my colleagues doubt the applicability of that AUMF, so for those colleagues who are unconvinced that that is a sufficient authority, consider the fact that even in the absence of explicit congressional authorization for the Soleimani strike, here is a helpful reminder: Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that: The President shall be Commander in Chief. And it is true that the Constitution gives Congress the sole power to declare war and the sole power of the purse to either fund or defund military action, but dating back to the Prize cases in 1863, the Supreme Court has long held that the President may act without Congress to defend the Nation.
In recent years, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has opined that the Constitution authorizes the President as Commander in Chief to order military action without congressional permission if the President determines that the action would be anticipatory self-defense or otherwise serves the interest of the United States, at least where the nature, scope, and duration of the anticipated hostilities are limited.
And that was what was the case here.
Specifically, the OLC has said the President's inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, his broad foreign policy powers, and his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, empower him to deplore the armed forces abroad, without a declaration of war by Congress or other congressional authorization.
The courts have generally declined to review the exercise of such unilateral executive power.
The War Powers Resolution does not limit the President's power to act without Congress. At most, it imposes a reporting and consultation requirement that this President has complied with.
Furthermore, the War Powers Resolution applies only to the deployment of significant bodies of military personnel and would not apply to a drone strike.
Finally, according to OLC, `` . . . if our Armed Forces otherwise lawfully stationed in a foreign country were fired upon and defended themselves, we doubt that such engagement in hostilities would be covered by the consultation and reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution.''
Of course, that is precisely the scenario here involving the President's decisive strike against Soleimani in response to an attack on our embassy.
Thank goodness we have a Commander in Chief who will not allow another Benghazi on his watch. Don't forget, the Framers of the Constitution specifically rejected a proposal that Congress be empowered to ``make war,'' and implied power for the President to
``repel sudden attacks.''
This was in recognition of the slow pace and inefficiency of legislative proceedings under the Articles of Confederation. As Members of Congress, we have a special duty to jealously guard legislative prerogatives, including the power to declare war, and to provide a check on the executive branch for overreach. But we also must have the humility to acknowledge that Congress lacks the power to divest the President of his Commander in Chief powers under Article II.
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