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“THE WAR AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S1789-S1790 on Feb. 28, 1997.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
THE WAR AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, before this day is ended, the administration must decide whether or not to certify Mexico as an ally in the war against illegal drugs.
Having served in the House of Representatives as chairman of the Western Hemisphere Committee for some years, and representing the State of New Jersey, which, among other centers of urban and suburban life in our country, has been plagued by narcotics, I feel a need and a responsibility to address the administration on this issue before it makes its final judgment because I believe, based on the actions of the Government of Mexico in the last year, the choice, though difficult, is very clear. The simple fact is that no country anywhere on the globe now poses a more immediate threat to our actions in curtailing the spread of narcotics than Mexico. Indeed, the administrator of the DEA has said, and I quote, ``Mexicans are now the single most powerful drug trafficking operation in the world.''
The State Department's 1996 World Narcotics Control Strategy Report outlines the threat that Mexico now represents. It cites Mexico as the principal transit route for cocaine entering the United States and a major source for heroin and marijuana. Indeed, Mr. President, it has been suggested that with the success of American operations in the Caribbean and the Bahamas, fully two-thirds of cocaine now entering the United States is being routed through Mexico. As we have succeeded in the Caribbean and the Bahamas pound for pound, dollar for dollar, Mexico has been available to compensate the drug cartels. The State Department's 1996 report further concludes, ``Mexico is the most important money laundering center in the Western Hemisphere.''
There is no escaping the fact that Mexican cartels now are bribing whomever can be bribed and killing those who resist. In recent months, eight Mexican prosecutors and law enforcement personnel have been murdered in Tijuana, all this since certifying last year that Mexico was assisting United States Government operations. In the last year, Mexico has failed to capture or extradite a single high-ranking member of any drug cartel. There are now 52 outstanding United States extradition requests for drug dealers, and Mexico has not complied with a single one of those extradition requests. Indeed, Mr. President, there is no record of any Mexican national ever being extradited to the United States on a narcotics charge.
There has been considerable hope since certification last year that the use of the Mexican Armed Forces would represent a change. If, indeed, the narcotics strategy of Mexico included not simply law enforcement personnel who might have been compromised but Mexico represented and recognized that this was a matter of their own national security and involved their armed forces, that there might be a change. But the record is now clear. There has not been a change. The announcement of only last week that General Gutierrez, a 42-year veteran of the armed forces, had accepted bribes from the Carrillo Fuentes cartel makes clear that the entry of the Mexican Armed Forces is not only insufficient but inadequate and, indeed, potentially counterproductive.
Changes in Mexican law lead us to the same conclusion. Last year the Mexican Parliament passed criminal money laundering laws, but they are both incomplete and completely not implemented. These laws at a minimum do not require banks to report large and suspicious currency transactions. Unfortunately, the Mexican Government, having not implemented its antinarcotics strategy, having now recognized that the entry of the armed forces is inadequate or counterproductive and taking no actions against laundering with the banks, it therefore, in my judgment, can be concluded that Mexico has not taken the certification process seriously. Previous certifications have brought no new cooperation, and now we must reach a different judgment.
Indeed, Mr. President, in light of the evidence of the corruption of law enforcement personnel, new evidence of corruption of the armed forces, the failure to comply with American requests for extradition, the failure to enforce their own laws on money laundering, the United States Government should be answering the following question: What else would Mexico have to do to be denied certification? Having failed on almost any level of analysis, what else could they do? Here is what we see.
The United States today will also readdress the question of whether or not Colombia should be recertified. It is an arguable question. In the last year, since we denied certification, the Colombian military genuinely seems to have at least undergone some change. They have mobilized 5,000 troops and through the use of joint military and law enforcement operations destroyed laboratories producing 1\1/2\ tons of cocaine per day. They have issued 3,000 arrest warrants on drug charges and removed 450 million dollars' worth of cocaine from the production pipeline.
The administration may or may not, on their own evidence, recertify Colombia. But the Colombian experience gives evidence that, while it is difficult to take action against a friendly government, people in Colombia or Mexico that we respect, it is successful. Our decertification of Colombia produced results. It is a question the administration must address before deciding on their actions about Mexico today.
The President is faced with three possibilities in deciding whether to certify Mexico in the drug war. He can certify that Mexico is fully cooperating with the United States Government actions. That would be false on its face. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that Mexico is being cooperative. Indeed, it would make the entire certification process lose all credibility. No nation involved in narcotrafficking within its borders would ever feel any responsibility or pressure to cooperate with the U.S. Government activities if we were to so stretch our credibility by fully certifying Mexico.
Second, the administration can decertify Mexico and bring a halt to all American foreign assistance except antidrug programs.
Or, third, the administration can decertify Mexico but grant a national security waiver. The last of these options I would understand. People could legitimately argue the relative merits of decertification with a national security waiver, based on specific promises of the Mexican Government; to deny certification but, for 1 more year, to give one last chance for them to meet the responsibility to their own people, the international community, and their previous promises. But to certify, given that this other option is available, would be inexplicable to our own people, an insult to those engaged in this country in law enforcement, and contrary to the evidence.
On occasion, in this country, we describe our efforts against narcotics as a war on drugs. But in dealing with foreign governments with whom we would like to have good relations, we seek to win a war without casualties. The sensitivities of the Mexican Government might be a casualty in this certification, but it is necessary if we are to be serious and produce real results.
Finally, I hope the administration will reach the right judgment. The stakes are high. I urge the administration to take these comments and these facts into consideration in reaching its judgment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, may I inquire, is the Senate in morning business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in morning business.
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