“NATIONAL SECURITY INTERAGENCY REFORM” published by Congressional Record on Sept. 15, 2008

“NATIONAL SECURITY INTERAGENCY REFORM” published by Congressional Record on Sept. 15, 2008

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Volume 154, No. 146 covering the 2nd Session of the 110th Congress (2007 - 2008) was published by the Congressional Record.

The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.

“NATIONAL SECURITY INTERAGENCY REFORM” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the House of Representatives section on pages H8103-H8104 on Sept. 15, 2008.

The publication is reproduced in full below:

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERAGENCY REFORM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Davis) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to share my perspective on an essential reform to ensure the security of our Nation. We must reform our national security system to ensure effective interagency operations. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee and co-

chair of the House National Security Interagency Reform Working Group, implementing reform of the national security system is one of my highest priorities. Our current interagency process is broken. There are regulatory, legislative, budgetary, resource and culture impediments to effective interagency operations. These problems are independent of personalities, policies and particular presidential administrations. In order to protect the United States interests and its citizens, it is critical that reform to executive and legislative processes be allowed to better the integration among currently stove-

piped departments.

A successfully integrated interagency process will empower the United States to more effectively employ our nonmilitary instruments of power abroad. This ability will allow us to more effectively fulfill our interest while reserving the use of lethal force as a last resort. In fact leaders and policy makers need two things; first, an overarching national strategy that frames the intent of all policy on national security; second, a toolbox of resources that can be configured, hopefully in a preventive way, to fulfill our strategic objectives.

The current interagency system was devised over 60 years ago for a different era and is based on a very specific national security strategy when security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by one department in overseas missions. At the time, major combat operations and nuclear deterrence were the principal focus of U.S. national security strategy. This strategy required limited coordination of activities between vertically structured military and civilian departments and agencies.

Today, national security involves a much wider array of issues that can be addressed only with a broader set of capabilities that are highly synchronized and carefully calibrated.

Many agencies are not conscious of or prepared to act in their national security roles. Many civilian departments and agencies do not believe they have a role in the national security system, and the cultures of these organizations produce few, if any, incentives for staff to participate in national security missions. These agencies often lack ``expeditionary'' capabilities. Even if they have the desire to help, they may be prevented from doing so by a combination of factors including personnel shortages, lack of resources, lack of statutory authorizations and regulatory constraints.

Additionally, interagency operations are not governed by standard concepts and procedures. Without common processes, interagency operations tend to be very ad hoc. For example, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition For Provisional Authority in postwar Iraq believed that he reported to the President through the Secretary of Defense and did not want to be bogged down by ``the interagency process.'' National Security Adviser Rice's senior deputies, simply to get information, were relegated to checking the CPA website every day to see what new orders Bremer had issued. Such arrangements are enormously inefficient and liable to produce erratic outcomes.

We must ensure that civilian agencies have the resources required for effective integration with the Department of Defense. Think what could have been done to deter the growth of criminal militias in Iraq if the Department of Treasury had been able to assist in the rapid implementation of simple electronic banking systems to get money and payroll to the people of Iraq during the post conflict stabilization period.

A new National Security Act is needed to update the organization and procedures created by the National Security Act of 1947. We need to codify an adaptive approach that flattens, simplifies and integrates the agencies of the executive branch and the committees of Congress. We must ensure all departments and agencies that have national security roles have specific objectives, responsibilities and operational planning capabilities so they can protect America's interests.

Second, we should require that personnel who are selected for the Senior Executive Service in departments and agencies with national security roles have professional development via institutional training and operational assignments in agencies other than their own to better understand the national security interagency system. Third, we should strive to build regional expertise across the departments and agencies to ensure a bench of personnel with the knowledge and skills required to accomplish departmental and agency missions in all regions of the world. For example, we should consider better regional alignment between DOD and the State Department.

As my colleagues and I undertake the challenge of crafting reform legislation, I welcome the opportunity to work with all agencies to gain their insights on the way ahead for reform.

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SOURCE: Congressional Record Vol. 154, No. 146

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