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“CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 5), REMARKS BY DAVID SWARTZ, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO BELARUS” mentioning the U.S. Dept of Agriculture was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E1080-E1081 on May 25, 1999.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 5), REMARKS BY DAVID SWARTZ, FORMER
AMBASSADOR TO BELARUS
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HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH
of ohio
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, May 25, 1999
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on May 6, 1999, I joined with Representative John Conyers, Representative Pete Stark, and Representative Cynthia McKinney to host the third in a series of Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If a peaceful resolution to this conflict is to be found in the coming weeks, it is essential that we cultivate a consciousness of peace and actively search for creative solutions. We must construct a foundation for peace through negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy.
Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress and the public to explore alternatives to the bombing and options for a peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers of different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the Congressional Record transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed light on the many dimensions of the crisis.
This presentation is by David Swartz, former Ambassador to Belarus. He is a retired foreign service officer and Director of the International Institute of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Graduate School. His other foreign-service posts included Rotterdam, London, Moscow, Kiev, Zurich, Calgary and Warsaw. He is the author of
``Redirecting the CIA: Keep Agency Out of Policymaking, Make Ambassador Boss Overseas'' (Foreign Service Journal, February 1996).
Ambassador Swartz explains how United States policy in Bosnia contributed to NATO's current dilemma in Kosovo. He also states a clear position on a central question: Does the United States have an overriding national interest in the resolution of strife in the Balkans? Ambassador Swartz's comments may be controversial to some, but they represent a valuable contribution to our ongoing debate.***HD***Presentation by David Swartz to Congressional Teach-In On Kosovo
I think my role today is going to be controversial. And if ever there was a conflict that was controversial this one certainly is. So I'm pleased to be here. Some of what I'm going to say is going to offend some people and possibly some of it will offend everybody, I don't know. But at least is may serve as a catalyst to help get the discussion going as we move along. But I am being deliberately provocative in some places so I warn you in advance and ask your indulgence.
I do wish to express my thanks for the opportunity to present may statement this afternoon on U.S.-Kosovo policy. My statement, while critical, is non-partisan. It reflects the general reality , in my view at least, that U.S. polices in the Balkans over the past eight years have reflected bipartisanship, just as criticisms of Administration policy, particularly with regard to the Yugoslavia war, have also tended to be bipartisan.
The two key desiderata driving my views on U.S. actions in that region and in the Kosovo region are these: First, human suffering must be minimized. And that's way ahead of any other. But the second one is: clear U.S. national interests justifying involvement must be present. Our policies in my view reflect deficiencies on both counts. I will very briefly touch on three aspects of that problem. One, how we got to where we are. Two, why current policy is wrong. And three, what next. Three is perhaps being developed as well speak.
First, how we got where we are. American involvement in the post-
communist Balkan turmoil stems in large part in my view from a questionable policy of premature diplomatic recognition of groups asserting sovereignty, particularly Bosnia, in the early 1990's. Some groupings in the then-Yugoslavia could genuinely be considered ripe for independence, most especially Croatia, and Slovenia, possibly to a lesser extent Macedonia. Bosnia, however, could by no reasonable standard be considered a nation-state.
What is Bosnia? Who are Bosnians? What is their history, language, literature, religion? What can we point to that is uniquely Bosnian? It seems to me that creation of a multi-ethnic state is complicated under the best of circumstances, and Bosnia in the early 90's was not the best of circumstances. At a minimum, a la Switzerland, the disparate groups must have a common desire to join together in some higher level of governance than just the individual groupings they find themselves in. So in Bosnia a so-called country was cobbled together and we know the result: ethnic cleansing, massacres, artificiality imposed at Dayton, and peace maintained solely through the possibly permanent presence of armed forces of external powers. Far from fostering stability in the former Yugoslavia, I would argue that the Bosnia so-
called settlement has served to institutionalize instability. If U.S. involvement in Bosnia was the proximate cause of our current troubles, highly superficial understanding by our policy makers of the centuries of passions, hatreds, vendettas, indeed genocide throughout the Balkans was a more deep-seeded problem. If we knew nothing else, we should have known that there are no good guys in the region, and that therefore aligning ourselves in one or another direction was fraught with danger.
This truism applies equally to our current dilemma in Kosovo. With specific regard to Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo, the United States' misreading of his intentions is nothing short of shocking. If intelligence and diplomatic analysis are good for anything at all, they must serve the critical function of providing policy makers with accurate prognoses of the intentions of adversaries. We can forgive White House ignorance about Milosevic's likely response to a forced dictate over Kosovo, and perhaps even that of our Secretary of State. However, certainly at a minimum, emissary Richard Holbrooke and his well-meaning but judgment-impaired staff, with the hundreds of hours they spent in direct contact with Milosevic, should have been able to discern his intentions, once it became clear to him that the United States' intentions were to carve away his authority in Kosovo. At that point, the nonsensical idea that Milosevic would cave under the threat of bombing should have been discarded once and for all. Tragically, it wasn't.
My second point: Why our policy is wrong. And this brings me back to my two basic desiderata: Minimizing human suffering, and advancing clearly identified U.S. interests. A powerful argument has been made in some circles, an argument that I find somewhat persuasive, perhaps not completely, that the least human suffering in the former Yugoslavia would have resulted from the outside world not involving itself at all in the internal civil strife. Yes, there would have been oppression, yes there would have been killing, but in the end, the argument goes, a level of coexistence would eventually have been reached, no doubt for the moment at least with Serbia in full charge, in which life would have gone on for the masses. Not freedom, perhaps, not automony, certainly, but at least basic life. With outside support first for Bosnian independence, a wholly unsustainable proposition over the long run, and then for an imposed Kosovo settlement, even more implausible, great violence resulted, and continues.
What are U.S. interests? I am not persuaded that we have any overriding interests in the Balkan strife and certainly none that would justify the course of action on which we are embarked. The NATO credibility argument is not persuasive. Had the alliance led by the U.S. not constantly threatened Milosevic with military action if he did not submit himself to NATO's demands, we would not have found ourselves in the put-up-or-
shut-up corner. Expansion of the conflict to say, Turkey or Greece, or Turkey and Greece, is equally implausible. Clearly the conflicts are limits to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and Milosevic' desire to reassert his and Serbia's domination. Support for human rights is indeed a laudable national interest, but as suggested above, our intervention in the region has had the opposite of the desired effect.
Where we do have strong national interests are vis a vis Russia, and there the Kosovo is quite possibly going to result in, if not permanent, at least long-lasting damage to reformist elements in Russian politics on whom we count for achieving societal transformations there. Or alternatively, as now seems quite likely, if Russian involvement in the settlement takes place, that might well lead to a diluted result bearing little resemblance to our stated conditions when we began this war. Or both of those might happen.
My third point: What next? Having embarked on what in my judgment is a foolish and ill-considered air war, it seems to me that the U.S. now has only two options: Stop the bombing, cutting whatever deal the Russians can broker for us, that now seems to be underway, perhaps, or immediately and massively escalate, with the specific twin goals of removing Milosevic and eliminating all Serbian fighting units in Kosovo. The first option is the one I prefer, because as I said at the outset I believe minimizing human suffering must be the goal. Each day of bombing is accompanied by more ethnic cleansing, raping and summary executions of Kosovars. It of course also leads to casualties among Serbia's civilian population. Forty-plus days of bombing have seemingly not stopped Milosevic's evil in Kosovo one whit, indeed, have accelerated it. The cessation of bombing is of course fraught with danger, since it will mean an outcome, no doubt far short of our stated objectives when we began this war, it will mean a resurgent Russia on the world scene, which might not be a bad thing, but that Russia could well be far different from the one we had hoped for, and now a truly credibility-deficient NATO. But we should have thought of those matters earlier, and in the meantime, each day brings more casualties.
I for one have reached my tolerance level of the daily dosage of atrocity stories juxtaposed with confident NATO spokespersons detailing the quote-unquote in the air war the previous night's 600 sorties have resulted in, where clearly the latter has not diminished the former.
The other option is massive force now. I do not advocate this course, but it seems to me the only other viable option. Paratroopers dropped in throughout Kosovo, going after Milosevic himself on the grounds of his long-overdue designation as a wanted war criminal. The other NATO partners will balk, and the U.S. should be ready to act alone, wasting no more time. Yes, this approach will result in still more deaths, and other atrocities among the suffering Kosovars, but at least the end of the agony will be sooner than with our present incomprehensible approach.
In sum, the U.S. should not be engaged in this war in the first place, but since it is, we must either win it quickly, or get our quickly. Otherwise the lives of many, many more innocent people will be on our American conscience.
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