The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S12129-S12132 on Nov. 1, 2005.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. SUNUNU (for himself, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Vitter, Mr. Kerry, and Mr. Pryor):
S. 1947. A bill to amend chapter 21 of title 38, United States Code, to enhance adaptive housing assistance for disabled veterans; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, today I introduced the ``Specially Adapted Housing Grants Act of 2005'' to help all disabled veterans move home from medical facilities. The bill upgrades eligibility criteria for housing assistance grants to better reflect the needs of today's veteran community.
Before discussing the legislation's merits, I want to acknowledge my House colleague, Representative John Boozman of Arkansas, who serves as Chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity. Congressman Boozman has demonstrated real leadership on this issue through his bill, the ``Veterans Housing/Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 3665. Section 101 of Congressman Boozman's bill is almost identical to the measure that I have sponsored. The House Veterans Affairs' Committee recently approved his legislation, and the full House is expected to consider the bill in the near future. I am grateful to Congressman Boozman for his considerable efforts to advance a measure that will help improve the lives of many disabled veterans, and I am happy to advance his efforts here in the Senate with this bill.
I appreciate the support of my Senate colleagues, Senators Durbin, Vitter, Kerry and Pryor, who have added their names as original cosponsors of the ``Specially Adapted Housing Grants Act of 2005.'' Their endorsement of this bill represents bipartisan agreement on Capitol Hill that Congress must constantly evaluate veterans programs to make certain that our Nation provides responsive support to veterans.
While representing New Hampshire in the House and Senate, I have worked to ensure that those who served in our armed services receive their hard-earned benefits quickly and in full. Too often, out-of-date and burdensome regulations deny qualified veterans from receiving the benefits to which they are entitled. Whenever possible, it is imperative that we remove red tape that does not take into account the realities faced by today's veterans.
Guided by these facts, I have introduced legislation to reform rules that determine requirements for a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) grant program that helps many disabled veterans make their homes suitable for occupancy. Currently, a disabled veteran must at least partly own his or her residence to receive VA housing assistance grants to perform necessary residence modifications, such as installing wheelchair ramps or railings. However, many younger veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have not yet had the opportunity to become homeowners. Being ineligible for VA help to modify their homes, these veterans and their families often are compelled to either shoulder the costs of retrofitting their residences or face extended stays in VA medical facilities.
My bill would establish a 5-year pilot program to allow severely disabled veterans who live temporarily with family to receive up to
$10,000 in adaptive housing assistance; less severely disabled veterans could receive a maximum of $2,000. This grant money will help ensure that all disabled veterans--regardless of whether they own property--
are able to leave hospitals and return home as quickly as possible.
Also, mindful that these individuals will likely purchase their own residence, the bill would allow disabled veterans to receive two additional Specially Adaptive Housing Grants to be used for homes that they own in the future. Severely disabled veterans could receive a total of $50,000 to modify residences; less severely disabled veterans would be eligible for a total of $10,000. Only one of the three total grants could be used for a temporary residence, such as a family-owned home.
America's veterans have made enormous sacrifices to protect our Nation and the ideals for which it stands. Our country owes a special obligation to those men and women who have become disabled as a result of their service. Under no circumstances should these American heroes be divided into groups of ``haves'' and ``have nots.''
This Nation can do no less than to ensure that all disabled veterans are returned to the normalcy of home life as quickly and comfortably as possible. The common sense changes put forth in the legislation I have introduced aim to do just that, and I look forward to working with my colleagues in the House and Senate to ensure that its provisions become law as soon as possible.
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By Mrs. CLINTON (for herself and Mr. Sununu):
S. 1948. A bill to direct the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations to reduce the incidence of child injury and death occurring inside or outside of passenger motor vehicles, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, today I am introducing The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2005 with my colleague Senator Sununu, a bill to improve the child safety features in new vehicles. This bill is named after a 2 year old Long Island boy who was killed when his father accidentally backed over him. Although this effort is too late to save little Cameron, it is named in his honor and aimed at preventing other families from suffering the same fate.
I also want to thank my friend and colleague, Congressman Peter King for championing this issue in the House of Representatives.
While we hear a great deal about automobile accidents, we don't hear nearly as much about non-traffic automobile accidents, which can be just as tragic.
Since 1999, close to 975 children have died in non-traffic, non-crash incidents. This translates into a death almost every other day. The average age of victims in these cases is just 1 year old. And in 70 percent of backover cases, a parent, relative or close friend is behind the wheel.
As of October 15th of this year, there have been 317 non-traffic incidents resulting in ER treatment--tragically, 188 resulted in fatalities. New York State alone has suffered over 60 non-traffic incidents, 15 of them fatalities. These tragedies are heart-wrenching, not only due to the unimaginable suffering these families endure, but also because they are preventable.
The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act makes all passenger motor vehicles safer in three important ways. First, it requires a detection system to alert drivers to the presence of a child behind the vehicle. This system will prevent backing up incidents involving death and injury, especially to small children and the disabled. Second, it will ensure that power windows automatically reverse direction when they detect an obstruction--preventing children from being trapped, injured or killed when playing with power car windows. And finally, the bill will require the vehicle service break to be engaged in order to prevent vehicles from unintentionally rolling away.
Just as important, this bill will help parents by making them more aware of the dangers their vehicles pose to kids. Our legislation establishes a child safety information program to collect non-traffic, non-crash incident data and to disseminate vital information to parents about ways to mitigate the dangers cars pose.
This bill proves that with modest, cost-effective steps, we can prevent many tragic car-related accidents from occurring. The technology exists that can save children's lives at relatively low cost and new innovations are being developed all the time. Power window sensors, for example, cost only $8-12 a window. Brakeshift interlocks are already standard in most passenger vehicles, but where they aren't, they cost only $5 a car. Backover warning systems cost approximately
$300 a car, but they are still far cheaper than the DVD systems that can run up to $2000 and stereo systems that go for up to $800--costs that are commonly absorbed into the cost of new cars. There is no reason that we are not using these new technologies to save lives.
This kind of modest regulatory response to a safety problem has many precedents. Back in 1956, in response to a slew of tragic child suffocations, Congress passed the Refrigerator Safety Act to ensure that refrigerators could be opened from the inside and no child could again be trapped inside. When 156 kids died from airbags, the Federal Government regulated a design change. The government even changed the design of garage doors after 56 children were killed by them.
This is a comparable situation--this inexpensive technology could save thousands of children's lives.
So, I am proud to be introducing the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2005 today and I urge all my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill. Together, we can make cars and kids safer in this great country.
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By Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. Obama):
S. 1949. A bill to provide for coordination of proliferation interdiction activities and conventional arms disarmament, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today I rise on behalf of myself and Senator Obama to introduce the Cooperative Proliferation Detection, Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act of 2005.
This legislation aims to support the priority the Administration has placed on the detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, as well as dual-use items of proliferation concern. The legislation also contains important conventional weapons threat reduction measures that have previously been approved by the Foreign Relations Committee.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the remarks Senator Obama and I made this morning at the Council on Foreign Relations regarding this legislation be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Statement of Senator Obama on the Introduction of the Cooperative
Proliferation Detection, Interdiction, Assistance, and Conventional
Threat Reduction Act
Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Lugar in introducing the Cooperative Proliferation Detection, Interdiction Assistance, and Conventional Threat Reduction Act.
Earlier today, Senator Lugar and I appeared at the Council on Foreign Relations to discuss our recent trip to Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan and talk about this new piece of legislation.
Now, few people understand these challenges better than the co-founder of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Senator Lugar, and this is something that became particularly clear to me during one incident on the trip.
We were in Ukraine, visiting a pathogen laboratory in Kiev. This is a city of two and a half million, and in a non-descript building right in the middle of town stood this facility that once operated on the fringes of the Soviet biological weapons program.
We entered through no fences or discernible security, and once we did, we found ourselves in a building with open first-floor windows and padlocks that many of us would not use to secure our own luggage.
Our guide then brought us right up to what looked like a mini-refrigerator. Inside, staring right at us, were rows upon rows of test tubes. She picked them up, clanked them around, and we listened to the translator explain what she was saying. Some of the tubes, he said, were filled with anthrax. Others, the plague.
At this point I turned around and said ``Hey, where's Lugar? Doesn't he want to see this?'' I found him standing about fifteen feet away, all the way in the back of the room. He looked at me and said, ``Been there, done that.''
Of course, Senator Lugar has been there and he has done that, and thanks to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs he co-founded with Senator Sam Nunn, we've made amazing progress in finding, securing, and guarding some of the deadliest weapons that were left scattered throughout the former Soviet Union after the Cold War.
As we discussed with the Council on Foreign Relations, this is one story that shows our job is far from finished at a time when demand for these weapons has never been greater.
Right now, rogue states and despotic regimes are looking to begin or accelerate their own nuclear programs. And as we speak, members of Al Qaeda and other terrorists organizations are aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, which they would use without hesitation.
We've heard the horror stories--attempts by rogue states to recruit former Soviet weapons scientists; terrorists shopping for weapons grade materials on the black market. Some weapons experts believe that terrorists are likely to find enough fissile material to build a bomb in the next ten years--and we can imagine with horror what the world will be like if they succeed.
Today, experts tell us that we're in a race against time to prevent this scenario from unfolding. And that is why the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons within the borders of the former Soviet Union represent the greatest threat to the security of the United States--a threat we need to think seriously and intelligently about in the months to come.
Fortunately, the success of Cooperative Threat Reduction--especially in securing nuclear weapons--serves as a model of how we can do this. And so the question we need to be asking ourselves today is, what is the future of this program? With the situation in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union so drastically different than it was in 1991, or even in 1996 or 2001, what must we do to effectively confront this threat in the days and years to come?
The answers to these questions will require sustained involvement by the Executive Branch, Congress, non-governmental organizations, and the international community. Everyone has a role to play, and everyone must accelerate this involvement.
For my part, I would suggest three important elements that should be included in such a discussion.
First, the Nunn-Lugar program should be more engaged in containing proliferation threats from Soviet-supplied, civilian research reactors throughout Russia and the Independent States.
The Department of Energy and others have certainly made progress in converting civilian reactors to low-enriched uranium, taking back spent fuel, and closing unnecessary facilities.
Yet, a serious threat still remains. Many of these aging research facilities have the largest, least secure quantities of highly enriched uranium in the world--the quickest way to a nuclear weapon. For a scientist or other employee to simply walk out of the lab with enough material to construct a weapon of mass destruction is far too easy, and the consequences would be far too devastating. Not to mention the environmental and public health and safety catastrophe that could come from a failure to store and transport these materials safely and securely.
In a way that balances the needs of science and security, more needs to be done to bring these materials--as well as other sources that can be used to construct improvised nuclear weapons and radiological devices--under control and dramatically reduce the proliferation threat they pose.
In the years ahead, this should become an increasing priority for the Nunn-Lugar program, the Congress, and the Russians, who are already taking important steps to help implement these programs.
I want to turn to a second critical area: biological weapons threat reduction programs.
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was engaged in a massive undertaking in the field of germ warfare.
At its height in the late 1980' s, this program stockpiled of some of the most dangerous agents known to man--plague, smallpox, and anthrax--to name just a few. As one book says,
``disease by the ton was its industry.''
Besides the devastation they can cause to a civilian population, biological agents can also be effective in asymmetrical warfare against U.S. troops. While they are often difficult to use, they are easy to transport, hard to detect, and, as we saw in Kiev, not always well secured.
Here in Washington, we saw what happened when just two letters filled with just a few grams of Anthrax were sent to the U.S. Senate. Five postal employees were killed and the Senate office buildings were closed for months.
This was two letters.
Fortunately, however, we've made some good progress on this front. For years, Nunn-Lugar programs have been effectively upgrading security at sites in six countries across the former Soviet Union. And the Kiev story is heading in the right direction--while we were in Ukraine, Senator Lugar, through his tireless and personal intervention, was able to achieve a breakthrough with that government, bringing that facility and others under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
But because of the size, secrecy, and scope of the Soviet biological weapons program, we are still dangerously behind in dealing with this proliferation threat. We need to be sure that Nunn-Lugar is increasingly focused on these very real nonproliferation and bioterrorism threats.
One of the most important steps is for Russia to permit the access and transparency necessary to deal with the threat.
Additional steps should also be taken to consolidate and secure dangerous pathogen collections, strengthen bio-reconnaissance networks to provide early warning of bio-attack and natural disease outbreaks, and have our experts work together to develop improved medical countermeasures. As the Avian Influenza outbreak demonstrates, even the zealous Russian border guard is helpless against the global sweep of biological threats.
My third recommendation--which I'll just touch briefly on and let Senator Lugar talk about in more detail--is that we need to start thinking creatively about some of the next-generation efforts on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
On our trip, we saw two areas where this is possible: elimination of heavy conventional weapons, and interdiction efforts to help stop the flow of dangerous materials across borders.
In Donetsk, I stood among piles of conventional weapons that were slowly being dismantled. While the government of Ukraine is making progress here, the limited funding they have means that at the current pace, it will take sixty years to dismantle these weapons. But we've all seen how it could take far less time for these weapons to leak out and travel around the world, fueling insurgencies and violent conflicts from Africa to Afghanistan. By destroying these inventories, this is one place we could be making more of a difference.
One final point. For any of these efforts that I've mentioned to work as we move forward, we must also think critically and strategically about Washington's relationship with Moscow.
Right now, there are forces within the former Soviet Union and elsewhere that want these non-proliferation programs to stop. Our detention for three hours in Perm is a testament to these forces. Additionally, in the last few years, we've seen some disturbing trends from Russia itself--the deterioration of democracy and the rule of law, the abuses that have taken place in Chechnya, Russian meddling in the former Soviet Union--that raise serious questions about our relationship.
But when we think about the threat that these weapons pose to our global security, we cannot allow the U.S.-Russian relationship to deteriorate to the point where Russia does not think it's in their best interest to help us finish the job we started. We must safeguard these dangerous weapons, material, and expertise.
One way we could strengthen this relationship is by thinking about the Russians as more of a partner and less of a subordinate in the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort.
This does not mean that we should ease up one bit on issues affecting our national security. Outstanding career officials who run the Nunn-Lugar program--people like Col. Jim Reid and Andy Weber who were with us at the Council this morning--will be there every step of the way to ensure that U.S. interests are protected.
Time and time again on the trip, I saw their skill and experience when negotiating with the Russians. I also saw their ability to ensure that shortcomings were addressed and programs were implemented correctly.
But thinking of the Russians more as partners does mean being more thoughtful, respectful, and consistent about what we say and what we do. It means that the Russians can and should do more to support these programs. And it means more sustained engagement, including more senior-level visits to Nunn-Lugar program sites.
It's important for senior officials to go and visit these sites, to check their progress and shortcomings; to see what's working and what's not. But lately we haven't seen many of these visits. We need to see more.
We also need to ensure that the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement, due to expire in 2006, is renewed in a timely manner.
And we need to work together to obtain a bilateral agreement on biological threat reduction.
The Russians, however, must also realize that with greater partnership comes greater responsibility.
There is no doubt that there is a tough road ahead. It will be difficult. And it will be dangerous.
But, when I think about what is at stake I am reminded by a quote from the late President Kennedy given in a speech at American University in 1963 about threats posed by the Soviet Union.
``Let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.''
Much of what President Kennedy described in 1963 remains true to this day--and we owe it to ourselves and our children to get it right.
I look forward to working with Senator Lugar on this legislation and, more broadly, on this issue for years to come.
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Council on Foreign Relations, ``New Directions for Cooperative Threat
Reduction,'' Senator Richard G. Lugar, November 1, 2005
It is a pleasure to appear before the Council on Foreign Relations with my good friend Senator Barack Obama. As you have heard, we had an extremely successful trip in August. I appreciate his strong support for the Nunn-Lugar Program. In his first year in the Senate, he has committed himself to improving the U.S. response to the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. We discussed existing programs and new opportunities extensively during our trip, and we are eager to share with you the first public mention of the joint legislative initiative that developed from our findings.
I was particularly pleased that Barack chose Nunn-Lugar as the subject of his first foreign travel as a Senator. This choice was not an accident or the result of a last-minute whim. During his Senate campaign, well over a year ago, he identified the threat posed by unsecured weapons of mass destruction as the greatest national security threat facing the United States. On the Foreign Relations Committee, he has followed these issues intensely, and he has been a steadfast voice of support for non-proliferation efforts.
Our trip in August was spent hiking through nuclear weapons storage sites, picking through piles of mortar rounds and landmines, touring missile elimination facilities, examining laboratories containing deadly pathogens, and--for three hours--being detained in the visitors lounge at a remote Russian airfield, near Perm.
Barack, I want to make sure you understand that your future congressional travels are unlikely to include so many glamorous tourist hotspots.
It's safe to assume that none of the reporters who have joined us today are from Frommer's or Lonely Planet.
I have had the opportunity to visit the former Soviet Union to tour Nunn- Lugar sites and facilities once or twice a year for the last 14 years. As Barack witnessed, these trips serve a greater purpose than our personal edification. They are designed to invigorate and endorse the work of a program that both of us see as vital to our national security. On many previous trips, weapons facilities were opened to Americans for the first time, including such notable facilities as the SevMash submarine base, birthplace of the Typhoon nuclear missile submarine. Political support for Nunn-Lugar activities can never be taken for granted. Not everyone in the former Soviet Union, and indeed, not everyone in our own country believes that these programs should be a priority. The Nunn-Lugar program and associated non-proliferation efforts have required constant stewardship and support from the Congress. In this context, I am enthused and encouraged by Senator Obama's commitment to adding his strong voice and creativity to the proliferation challenge.
Since its founding, Sam Nunn and I always have regarded Nunn-Lugar as more than a government program. We have seen it as a disarmament concept and non-proliferation tool worthy of adaptation and expansion. The Nunn-Lugar program and people like Jim Reid and Andy Weber, who manage its day to day operations, represent a tremendous national security asset that can be applied to situations well beyond the scope of the original Nunn-Lugar legislation. Indeed, the program's aims have been expanded from the focus on safeguarding and destroying strategic nuclear weapons to a much broader array of goals involving safely disposing of all types of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials, as well as employing former weapons scientists. In 2003, I offered the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which was signed into law by President Bush. It allowed, for the first time, Nunn-Lugar funds to be used anywhere in the world, not just within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. As I have advocated frequently, U.S. officials should be prepared to extend the Nunn-Lugar concept whenever opportunities present themselves. Some potential applications for the program North Korea, for example--seem remote today. But the same could have been said for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
In this spirit, Senator Obama and I are introducing legislation, today, that will again extend the Nunn-Lugar concept to new areas of endeavor. Our bill is entitled the
``Cooperative Proliferation Detection, and Interdiction Assistance and Conventional Threat Reduction Act.''
As Barack described, our trip included an examination of conventional weapons stockpiles near Donetsk, Ukraine. We also visited Baku, Azerbaijan, where we observed the mock interdiction of a naval vessel playing the role of nuclear smuggler.
These visits and our subsequent joint research have convinced us that the United States can and should do more to eliminate conventional weapons stockpiles and assist other nations in detecting and interdicting weapons of mass destruction. We believe that these functions are underfunded, fragmented, and in need of high-level support.
The U.S. government's current response to threats from vulnerable conventional weapons stockpiles is dispersed between several programs at the Department of State. We believe that the planning, coordination, and implementation of this function should be consolidated into one office at the State Department with a budget that is commensurate with the threat posed by these weapons.
We are particularly concerned that our government has the capacity to deal quickly with vulnerable stockpiles of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, known as MANPADS. In recent years, concerns have grown that such weapons could be used by terrorists to attack commercial airliners, military installations, and government facilities here at home and abroad. Al Qaeda reportedly has attempted to acquire MANPADS on a number of occasions.
The Lugar-Obama bill recognizes that the proliferation of conventional weapons is a major obstacle to peace, reconstruction, and economic development in regions suffering from conflict and instability. It calls upon the State Department to implement a global effort to seek out and destroy surplus and unguarded stocks of conventional armaments and to cooperate with allies and international organizations when possible.
In Ukraine, we saw stacks of thousands of mortars, anti-personnel landmines, and other weapons, left over from the Soviet era. The scene there is similar to situations in other states of the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. I have also witnessed these threats firsthand in Albania and Georgia, where those governments have requested assistance in eliminating MANPADS, tactical missile systems, and millions of tons of ammunition and weapons.
In many cases, the security around these weapons is minimal--particularly when the weapons are no longer being used by a nation's military. But as we have seen in Iraq, even obsolete weaponry and explosives can be reconfigured with deadly results. If foreign governments know that the United States is poised to help them eliminate such weapons, they will be more likely to come forward with requests for help, as Albania and Georgia did.
Inevitably, some countries will decline our assistance, and their stockpiles will remain unsecured. But this is not a reason to fail to secure the stockpiles that are opened to us. Every stockpile represents a theft opportunity for terrorists and a temptation for security personnel who might seek to profit by selling weapons on the black market. The more stockpiles that can be safeguarded or eliminated, the safer we will be. We do not want the question posed the day after an attack on an American military base, embassy compound, or commercial plane why we didn't take these threats seriously.
Two years ago the Department of Energy combined several nonproliferation programs into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) charged with identifying, securing, and disposing of vulnerable nuclear materials and equipment around the world. We used GTRI as a blueprint for the organizational and programmatic structure needed in the conventional arms elimination arena. By merging activities in a single office at the State Department and making it the lead Federal agency in efforts to eliminate non-strategic missile systems, MANPADS, and all small arms, we will raise the profile and value of this important work.
The second part of the Lugar-Obama legislation is focused on U.S. efforts to assist allies in detecting and interdicting weapons of mass destruction. The Nunn-Lugar Program is our country's first line of defense against the threat posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction. It attempts to secure weapons of mass destruction at their source. The Department of Homeland Security is our last line of defense, focused on detecting these threats inside U.S. borders and responding to attacks, if they occur. Our bill would bolster the second line of defense, namely, our ability to stop weapons of mass destruction that have been taken from the source, but have not yet reached the United States.
To strengthen the second line of defense, we believe that we must improve the capabilities of other nations. The United States military and intelligence services cannot be everywhere. We need the cooperation and vigilance of like-minded nations to detect and interdict WMD threats. The United States has constructed the Proliferation Security Initiative, which enlisted the participation of other nations in the interdiction of WMD. PSI is an excellent step forward in our communications with foreign governments on WMD interdiction. But what is lacking is a coordinated effort to improve the capabilities of our foreign partners so that they can playa larger detection and interdiction role.
The Lugar-Obama bill creates a single office dedicated to supporting the detection and interdiction of WMD. The State Department engages in several related anti-terrorism and export control assistance programs to foreign countries. But these programs are focused on other stages of the threat, not on the detection and interdiction of WMD cargo. Thus, we believe there is a gap in our defenses that needs to be filled.
The Lugar-Obama bill earmarks 25 percent of the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account to address the shortcomings in the State Department's response. This would have amounted to $110 million this year. Our bill goes one step further by calling on the State Department to also commit 25 percent of annual foreign military financing amounts to nations for the purchase of equipment to improve their ability to detect and interdict WMD. This would represent a potent but flexible tool that could help build a network of WMD detection and interdiction capabilities world wide.
Senator Obama and I give the State Department the flexibility to determine how these funds should be used. This is because a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach does not work with FMF funds. Some recipients of U.S. security assistance, such as Israel, already are capable of detecting and interdicting WMD. Other potential recipients are unable to utilize effectively such detection and interdiction assistance because they lack the basic military structures to employ it. We require the Administration to outline for Congress the rationale behind the decision not to invoke the 25 percent requirement clause. Through this reporting requirement, we are seeking to ensure that Congress remains an active participant in important decisions on foreign military financing.
I am confident that the ongoing reorganization of the arms control and non-proliferation bureaus, under the direction of Under Secretary Bob Joseph, provides us with an excellent opportunity to reshape, refocus and reinvigorate the State Department's non-proliferation mission. The Lugar-Obama legislation is intended to assist in the transformation of the Department's efforts.
The U.S. response to conventional weapons threats and the lack of focus on WMD detection and interdiction assistance must be rectified if we are to provide a full and complete defense for the American people. We look forward to working closely with the Administration on these proposals and will benefit from their recommendations on ways to perfect our legislation. The Lugar-Obama bill is a critical step forward in improving our ability to protect the United States and its citizens.
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