The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Energy was published in the Senate section on pages S7001-S7002 on Sept. 29, 2015.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. President, I wish to discuss the international nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA. Reached on July 14, 2015, after years of difficult negotiations among the United States and the other P5+1 countries--
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany--and Iran, the agreement confronts the Iranian nuclear program, which has long been the subject of U.S., European Union, and United Nations sanctions.
Throughout these years of international negotiations, and more recently, during these months of congressional debate, I have been focused on one goal--ensuring that our dual-track policy of diplomacy and economic sanctions results in an outcome that verifiably prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran getting the bomb is simply unacceptable, and blocking that is in our national security interests and that of our allies, including Israel.
This international agreement impacts the safety and security of Americans and our allies and is an incredibly serious matter, deserving careful and considered scrutiny. That includes a thorough and responsible debate in Congress. That is why I voted for the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, P.L. 114-17, which provided Congress with a 60-day window to consider the JCPOA prior to its taking effect. And that window was filled with vigorous debate in the Senate. Regardless of one's position for or against the international agreement, one thing is clear: every Senator has had an opportunity to pass their judgement on whether we are right to choose a path of international diplomacy to achieve our goal of verifiably preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In my judgement we are.
For me personally, I felt that it was critical to closely review the details of the agreement and hear from individuals on all sides of this debate, including experts and constituents, and listen to their arguments. I have attended numerous classified briefings with administration officials, including those with firsthand technical, scientific, and diplomatic expertise, heard from the Ambassadors of our P5+1 partners, and benefited from many candid conversations with Wisconsin constituents. All of these interactions have been invaluable and have informed my conclusion that rejecting this international agreement is not in our national security interest. According to the agreement, before receiving relief from sanctions, Iran must comply with a number of far-reaching and long-term obligations to limit its nuclear program, all of which will be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, through an unprecedentedly robust inspections and monitoring framework. Iran's obligations include redesigning the Arak reactor to eliminate the plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons; eliminating its current stockpile of highly enriched uranium, reducing its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97 percent, and capping enrichment at that level for 15 years; reducing the number of operational centrifuges by two-thirds and severely limiting research on advanced enrichment technology; converting the underground Fordow facility to a medical research center; accepting intrusive IAEA monitoring of Iran's nuclear supply chain and fuel cycle; and satisfactorily answering IAEA questions into the possible military dimensions of its prior nuclear program. In exchange for verifiably meeting these obligations, Iran will receive relief from U.S. and international nuclear-related sanctions. And importantly, U.S. sanctions against Iran related to human rights violations, support for terrorism, and illicit arms shipments remain in effect. Should the international verification regime catch Iran noncompliant with its obligations, the agreement includes a provision allowing the United States to unilaterally reimpose nuclear-related U.N. sanctions.
My judgement on this issue has also been guided by the hard lessons that should be learned when America chooses to engage in military action and war in the Middle East. It is easy to conclude that a rejection of international diplomacy and the JCPOA would shatter the current international coalition, making key multilateral sanctions impossible, and would result in Iran restarting its illicit nuclear activities, leading to inevitable military action. Indeed, I have been struck by the inability of opponents of the agreement to put forth a credible alternative that does not involve military action in the Middle East. In this case, it is simply not feasible for the United States to go it alone. So I am proud that America led six countries toward a historic international agreement with Iran that verifiably prevents it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
While the agreement does represent the best option to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, moving forward, Congress and the administration must work together in a bipartisan manner and in concert with our allies to ensure that the agreement is implemented effectively. Implementation is critical because this agreement is not built on trust of Iran. In fact, the agreement is built on mistrust of Iranian motives and a clear-eyed view of Iran's past and present destabilizing activities in the region.
That is why the JCPOA establishes the most intrusive inspections and monitoring framework in the history of arms control agreements. Approximately 150 IAEA inspectors, outfitted with the latest training and technology, much of which originates from the cutting-edge work of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Labs, will be onsite in Iran and ready to report any suspicious behavior.
In addition to this stringent monitoring regime, the very real threat of snapback sanctions will work to incentivize Iranian compliance with its JCPOA obligations. According to the agreement, in the event of Iranian cheating, the United States has the ability to unilaterally reimpose nuclear-related U.N. sanctions as well as add on to U.S. sanctions against Iran beyond those related to human rights violations, support for terrorism, and illicit arms shipments that remain in place. And Iran should make no mistake: I, along with my colleagues in the Senate, will not hesitate to reapply sanctions should Iran break the terms of the JCPOA. In short, if Iran cheats, even along the margins, we will catch them and there will be a heavy price to pay.
I am under no illusions regarding Iran's continuing destabilizing behavior in the region and its record during the Iraq war, which includes supporting Shiite militias that killed American servicemembers. From human rights violations to support for terrorism and criminal client states such as Assad's Syria to its illicit nuclear program, Iran is a bad actor. That is why it is absolutely critical that the JCPOA move forward and block Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon, an unthinkable outcome that would make it an even greater security challenge.
At the same time, I support taking immediate, additional steps to counter Iran's non-nuclear activities in the region and bolster the security of our Gulf Cooperation Council partners--who support the JCPOA--and Israel. From the time of the establishment of the modern Jewish State in 1948, the United States and Israel have shared a special bond, grounded in our mutual commitment to democracy, freedom, respect for the rule of law and the quest for a secure and stable Middle East. I have spent more time in Israel than in any foreign country, and my travel and interactions there have greatly informed my understanding of the security challenges Israel faces.
That is why I have been a longtime supporter of annual U.S. aid to Israel, which is currently set at $3.1 billion per year, as well as additional funding for Israeli missile defense systems such as Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow, all of which are so valuable in protecting Israeli citizens. I support increasing that level of assistance and broadening and deepening our two countries' collaboration in the security and intelligence spheres. The United States and Israel are currently drafting a new 10-year memorandum of understanding to govern the nature of U.S. military assistance to Israel. This is an opportunity to further strengthen our security relationship with Israel and ensure its qualitative military edge.
In conclusion, the United States cannot afford to walk away from an international agreement that is based on a robust inspections and compliance regime and will verifiably prevent Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon. While there are legitimately held policy differences on this highly complex issue, going it alone is not an effective path forward and not in our national security interest. I support moving this international agreement forward so we can begin enforcing it and preventing Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon.
____________________
