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“INTRODUCTION OF THE SANCTIONS REFORM ACT, H.R. 2708” mentioning the U.S. Dept of Agriculture was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E2080-E2081 on Oct. 24, 1997.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
INTRODUCTION OF THE SANCTIONS REFORM ACT, H.R. 2708
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HON. LEE H. HAMILTON
of indiana
in the house of representatives
Thursday, October 23, 1997
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, today Congressman Philip Crane and I introduced H.R. 2708, the Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act. This bill would reform the process by which both the Congress and the executive branch consider unilateral sanctions proposals. I would like to share with my colleagues the rationale for this bill and describe its key provisions.
The United States needs economic sanctions in its foreign policy toolkit. We need to respond to many international problems. Economic sanctions can be an attractive policy option when military action is not warranted, and diplomacy seems to have failed. In some circumstances, the conduct of a particular country may be sufficiently abhorrent or dangerous that we will feel compelled to respond, regardless of whether other countries join us.
Prior to 1980, several major laws authorized the imposition of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. Those laws tended to give the President considerable flexibility to decide when and how to impose sanctions. They also tended to target foreign conduct, rather than specific countries.
During the past two decades, however, and especially since 1990, U.S. sanctions policies have evolved substantially.
First, we impose unilateral sanctions more frequently. In a report prepared earlier this year, the President's Export Council noted that more than 75 countries are now subject to, or threatened by, one of more unilateral U.S. sanctions.
Second, we use a wider variety of unilateral measures to target a wider range of foreign conduct. The Export Council counted 21 specific sanctions covering 27 different target behaviors. We have also given the President less latitude in implementing sanctions.
Third, during the past 2 years we have adopted unilateral sanctions that are extraterritorial in scope. In 1996, we departed from our longstanding policy of opposing secondary boycotts by enacting two laws that penalize foreign firms for activities for activities in Cuba, Iran, and Libya. Meanwhile, roughly 20 States and localities have adopted laws prohibiting government commercial dealings with United States or foreign companies that do business with countries that have poor human rights records.
Fourth, over the past year, several of our colleagues have introduced measures that seek to narrow the presidential waiver or lower the decision threshold in existing sanction statutes. None of these measures has made it to the President's desk. If any do, however, they will raise difficult questions about the roles of Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign policy.
Concerns on Unilateral Sanctions
I have several concerns about the increasing frequency and scope of unilateral sanctions.
First, unilateral measures often cost U.S. exports. The private Institute for International Economics estimated earlier this year that restrictions imposed for foreign policy purposes are costing $15-19 billion in export sales annually.
An extraordinary example of the cost of unilateral sanctions recently came to my attention. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the five countries currently under total U.S. trade embargoes--Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea--will together account for roughly 11 percent of the world's wheat export market this year. This means that 11 percent of the world wheat market is off-limits to U.S. farmers. But it doesn't mean those countries can't get wheat. If they have the cash, there are plenty of other countires willing to do business with them.
My second concern is that our reputation for unilateral sanctions is costing potential export sales and foreign investment opportunities. Many executives I have spoken with over the past couple of years have told me that foreign firms and governments are increasingly steering clear of U.S. companies when making procurement decisions. They are concerned that deals with U.S. firms could be jeopardized by subsequent sanctions. I also understand that some European companies have begun to tell prospective customers that U.S. competitors can't be counted on because of U.S. sanctions policies.
Third, exports lost to unilateral sanctions mean lost jobs. Fifteen to twenty billion dollars in export sales would support tens of thousands of American jobs.
Fourth, third-party unilateral sanction measures like the Helms-
Burton and Iran-Libya statutes put us at odds with many of our closest friends. That can undermine both our trade leadership and the effectiveness of our foreign policy.
Fifth, in addition to antagonizing foreign governments, some of our State and local sanctions raise difficult questions concerning the constitutional authority to conduct U.S. trade and foreign policy.
Ineffectiveness of Unilateral Sanctions
Unilateral sanctions might be worth their price in exports, jobs, and foreign policy interests if they succeeded in achieving their aims. They rarely do. In fact, they are sometimes counterproductive and harmful to the very people we are trying to help.
A number of studies have concluded that sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, have worked less than half the time since the early 1970's. One of the most thorough and credible of these studies, from the Institute for International Economics, found that unilateral and multilateral sanctions together have succeeded less than 20 percent of the time since 1990. Unilateral sanctions rarely work because the world economy has become too interdependent. When we deny a country access to our products or our markets, it has plenty of alternatives.
Weak Information Base
One of the most alarming aspects of U.S. sanctions policy, in my view, is the weak information base upon which most unilateral sanction decisions are typically made.
Congress does not usually have before it a detailed assessment of new sanctions bills when it takes them up. We hold hearings and we debate proposals in mark-ups. But our review of sanctions is rarely systematic or comprehensive.
We need to improve our decisionmaking on sanctions. Before they act, Congress and the President should both have in hand better information on the potential costs and benefits of unilateral sanctions proposals. And they should both proceed in a more deliberative and disciplined manner.
Sanctions Reform Act
The bill Congressman Crane and I will introduce is a bill that seeks to accomplish these objectives. H.R. 2708 would reform the process by which both Congress and the executive branch consider unilateral sanctions proposals.
The bill defines a unilateral sanction as any restriction or condition on foreign economic activity that is imposed solely by the United States for reasons of foreign policy or national security.
For both Congress and the executive branch, the bill sets out guidelines for future sanctions proposals and procedures for their consideration and implementation.
The guidelines would be largely similar for both branches. We propose that sanctions bills approved by Congress and sanctions measures imposed by the President:
Contain a 2-year sunset;
Provide waiver authority for the President;
Protect the sanctity of existing contracts;
Be targeted as narrowly as possible on those responsible for sanctionable conduct;
Minimize any interference with humanitarian work performed by nongovernmental organizations; and
Include measures to address any costs incurred by U.S. agricultural interests, which are especially vulnerable to foreign retaliation.
With the exception of this agriculture provision, all of the guidelines would be mandatory for the executive branch. But the President could waive several of them in the event of a national emergency.
The bill's procedural reforms for Congress would require a committee of primary jurisdiction to include in its report on a sanctions bill an analysis by the President of the bill's likely impact on a range of U.S. foreign policy, economic, and humanitarian interests. The committee would also need to explain in its report why it did not adhere to any of the sanctions guidelines.
By invoking the Unfunded Federal Mandates Act of 1995, the bill would also require a report by the Congressional Budget Office on a sanctions bill's likely economic impact on the U.S. private sector. Under the terms of the Unfunded Mandates Act, the bill could not be considered on the House or Senate floor until the CBO analysis was completed and made public.
With respect to the Executive Branch, the bill would require the President to report to Congress prior to implementation on the likely impact of a proposed measure on U.S. foreign policy, economic, and humanitarian interests. The President would also be required to consult with Congress and to provide opportunities for public comment. To provide time for this consultation, public comment, and reporting, a sanction could not be imposed--except in the event of a national emergency--until 60 days after the President has announced his intention to do so.
It is also important to understand what our bill would not do:
The bill would not prevent Congress or the President from imposing unilateral sanctions.
The bill would not impact any sanctions currently in effect. The bill's executive branch guidelines and procedural requirements would apply, however, to future sanctions imposed by the President pursuant to existing laws.
The bill would impose no limitations on the foreign countries or conduct that could be targeted by sanctions.
The bill would have no impact on any of the following kinds of measures--now or in the future:
Sanctions imposed under any multilateral agreement to address a foreign policy or national security matter--including proliferation, human rights, and terrorism.
Restrictions or controls on the export of munitions.
Resolutions disapproving a Presidential decision to maintain MFN trade privileges for China or any other country.
Measures imposed under U.S. laws and regulations implementing trade agreements, combating unfair foreign trade practices, and safeguarding the domestic market.
Import restrictions designed to protect food safety or to prevent disruption of domestic agricultural markets.
Measures to implement international environmental agreements.
Import restrictions designed to protect public health and safety.
This bill is not a red light for sanctions. It is a flashing yellow light. Its message is to take a careful look around and proceed with caution.
I hope that Members who have supported sanctions in the past--as I have--would be able to support this bill. To oppose a measure like this is to say that Congress and the President can't use and shouldn't have better information about sanctions. That is a position neither we nor the President should take. We need not fear information.
This bill would require those who propose sanctions to work harder to justify their proposals. It would ensure that elected officials and the public are better informed about the potential consequences of a proposed measure. Sanctions that receive the kind of careful scrutiny this bill will require are bound to be more effective in achieving their aims and to cause less collateral damage to humanitarian and economic interests. Better-designed sanctions will also be more likely to retain public support.
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