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“ACDA ANNUAL REPORT IS INFORMATIVE, CLEAR-HEADED EFFORT” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S10076-S10077 on July 14, 1995.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
ACDA ANNUAL REPORT IS INFORMATIVE, CLEAR-HEADED EFFORT
Mr. PELL. Mr. President. Yesterday, the President transmitted to the Senate the annual report for 1994 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition to detailing the Agency's many activities during 1994, the report includes a major section on the adherence by the United States to its arms control obligations and the compliance of other nations with their arms control obligations.
This compliance report, which was provided in both classified and unclassified versions, is the most detailed annual compilation of arms control issues available to us. It has been required of the agency for a number of years, and it is particularly thorough and detailed in this year's iteration. I believe that my fellow Senators should avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain the report from ACDA and to review both the Agency's activities and the numerous arms control compliance questions addressed in the report.
This year's unclassified report is remarkably open with regard to the kind of problems that we must address, and it represents a serious effort by ACDA Director, John Holum, and his staff to be informative and clear-headed in their analysis and judgments.
Let me give you several examples of the kind of information included in the report:
With regard to Russia's compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the report says:
Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued involvement of ``old hands'' in trilateral BW discussions and in what Russia describes as a defensive BW program.
With regard to former Soviet biological weapons related facilities, some research and production facilities are being deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce biological warfare agents. The Russian Federation's 1993 and 1994 BWC data declaration contained no new information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral process that began in 1992, while there has been progress towards achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement, the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.
next steps
The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to work with the Russian leadership to ensure complete termination of the illegal program and to pursue a number of measures to build confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.
With regard to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and China, the report says:
The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC.
finding
The United States Government believes that based on available evidence, China maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents. China's CBM mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program and there are strong indications that China
probably maintains its offensive program. The United States Government, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations.
The report is quite forthcoming and realistic with regard to some of the serious problems regarding compliance with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. For example, the report says this about the Iraqi situation:
Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article 11's requirement that Parties not * * * manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not * * * seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Iraq's construction of secret facilities, including its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article 11. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article 111, which requires that safeguards be applied with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The war and inspections have significantly set back Iraq's program to develop a nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, Iraq almost certainly intends to continue nuclear weapons related activities and to build a nuclear weapon as soon as domestic and international circumstances permit.
finding
The United States Government has determined that Iraq violated its Safeguards Agreement when it pursued an active nuclear weapons development program and that this program violated its obligations under Article 11 and 111 of the NPT. The United States Government has further determined that Baghdad is continuing its effort to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process by withholding relevant information, and to preserve as much nuclear-related technology as possible for a renewed weapons effort.
next steps
The United States plans to continue to support UNSCOM/IAEA inspections in Iraq and the long-term monitoring of Iraq's nuclear program in accordance with UNSCR 687 and 715.
Mr. President, I have something of an ulterior motive in bringing this report to the Senate's attention at this time. As most of you know, there is a movement afoot to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and make it a part of the Department of State. I have opposed that effort in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I intend to oppose it on the floor when the relevant legislation is before the Senate. I am not going to make a case here for ACDA because I deeply believe that any Senator reading this report and getting a sense of the tenacity and seriousness that ACDA brings to these crucially important national security issues is quite likely to reach the judgment that the modest number of dollars necessary to keep ACDA as an independent agency are among the best spent dollars in the Federal budget.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from President Clinton transmitting the ACDA annual report be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, July 13, 1995.Hon. Jesse Helms,Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk, Secretary of State at that time, believed the President needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.
After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy requires an independent, specialized, and technically competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.
In the absence of such an agency, neither I nor any future President could count on receiving independent arms control advice, unfiltered by other policy considerations. A President would thus at times have to make the most consequential national security decisions without the benefit of vigorous advocacy of the arms control point of view.
Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly developed capability for multilateral negotiation and implementation of the most intricate arms control and nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with equal effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.
The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later, its most recent major success is its long-term effort culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's leadership and professional staff.
I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy.
Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of the other growing arms control and nonproliferation challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national security asset.
In that spirit, I commend this report to you.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.
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