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“THE U.S. AND PANAMA BEYOND 1999” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E1308-E1309 on July 15, 1998.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
THE U.S. AND PANAMA BEYOND 1999
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HON. ELTON GALLEGLY
of california
in the house of representatives
Wednesday, July 15, 1998
Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, over the July Fourth district work period some very disturbing and disheartening news reached us regarding negotiations between the United States and Panama as to the presence of the United States in Panama beyond 1999. And now, our State Department is about to inform the Government of Panama that talks may just be over. This could be a mistake and both sides should agree to take a time out and enter into a cooling off period.
As my colleagues know, next year, on December 31, 1999, the Panama Canal Zone will be turned over to Panamanian control and all United States forces are to withdraw from that nation. However, for over a year, the United States and the Government of Panama, largely at the suggestion of the Panamanian President, Perez Balladares, have been negotiating a compromise which would permit a limited number of U.S. military personnel to remain in Panama.
The negotiations were over the creation of a new multinational anti-
narcotics center which would be located at the Howard Air Force Base. Under the agreement, which was largely completed last January, some 2,000 U.S. military personnel would be permitted to remain in Panama to staff the center which would provide regional air surveillance, intelligence information and direct counter-narcotics assistance to nations participating in the center. At the time, there was a good deal of optimism expressed by both sides that the agreement would satisfy each nation's specific needs. Panama would see the end of U.S. control of the Canal and would gain what it considered its final and total national sovereignty. The U.S. would retain a presence in Panama while not appearing to be retaining a strictly defined military base. For the United States, the retention of a small military profile in Panama would allow us to maintain our commitment to the preservation of democracy and stability in Central America and to continue the fight against the drug trade essentially in region. For Panama, the continued presence of U.S. personnel would serve as a confidence builder for foreign investors and those concerned over the future security of the canal.
Interestingly, Panamanian public opinion seemed to favor such an agreement for largely the same reasons.
Unfortunately, and despite the initial optimism, the agreement now appears to be in serious jeopardy as both sides seem to be having difficulty deciding what it is they really want. The Government of Panama, for its part, can't seem to make up its mind as to whether it really wants a continued U.S. presence beyond 1999 or for that matter, a counter-drug center on its territory. All of this is wrapped around internal political and Presidential politics with President Perez Balladares unable to determine whether such a center helps or hurts his standing within his own political party and whether it hurts or helps his reelection chances.
The United States, for its part, cannot seem to decide whether it wants a military base or an anti-narcotics center in Panama. The whole premise for supporting an anti-drug center was to reassure those in this country that wanted the U.S. to remain in Panama that it was possible to do so and to avoid the controversy within Panama of retaining a bona fide military base in that country beyond 1999 and in violation of the Panama Canal Treaties. A multinational, anti-drug center seemed to fit the bill with at least a wink and a nod. Even the other nations of the region, while supporting the concept of an anti-narcotics center, were not about to sign on if the center was simply a cover for a U.S. military base.
Yet, the negotiations have broken down at least in part due to the Clinton Administration's insistence that it be allowed to conduct additional operations out of the center which are more closely associated with military operations than counter-narcotics operations. One can argue the finer points of search and rescue or humanitarian resupply, but to insist on them being part of a non-military base, anti-drug center, does give the Panamanian government a legitimate issue to argue over. It seems that both sides could compromise on this issue. The U.S. side could temporarily drop its insistence on the inclusion of other missions and just work on the anti-drug center, provided of course that the anti-drug center is the priority. The Government of Panama could commit, preferably in a side note, to take up the question of the other missions once the anti-drug center agreement is finalized, if it really wants such a center in Panama.
Mr. Speaker, the bottom line is that both sides must determine what it really wants. President Balladares must face the voters. The Clinton Administration must face the American people. If the drug center is that important, and in many respects it is. And if the ability to retain some element of the U.S. military in Panama beyond 1999 is a political necessity, and it could be, then the Administration must decide the price in throwing away this opportunity solely because we may not be able to write into the agreement whether or not search and rescue training can be conducted once in a while in Panama over the next twelve years.
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