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“MEETING OF THE IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CAUCUS” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E1896-E1897 on Sept. 20, 2005.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
MEETING OF THE IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CAUCUS
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HON. THOMAS G. TANCREDO
of colorado
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, September 20, 2005
Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, please submit the following transcript from the June 25, 2005 meeting of the Iranian Human Rights and Democracy Caucus for the Record.
Congressman Tom Tancredo: We are going to be talking about the election in Iran and the aftermath of the election. According to reports the mullahs employed a variety of methods to get Mahmood Ahmadinejad elected and including the use of 5 million national ID cards of the deceased, voting with unofficial ID cards, voting with both passports and birth certificates outside of Iran to allow the mullahs men to write in their votes twice, paying $15.5 million 300,000 members of the parliamentary Bassij force in support of a particular candidate, buying votes for $35.00 each in many provinces, furthermore in recent years we have learned critical information about the mullahs of nuclear program. Since then the international community has come to better appreciate the extent of Iran's involvement in terrorist activity abroad, nuclear ambitions and interference in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. It would be a monumental error if we assume that the mullahs are reformable, can tolerate intellectually progress and regional or international peace. I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and I hope they can illuminate for us Iran's recent elections and their implications for the U.S. and the world.
Dr. Kenneth Katzman (Excerpt): Congressional Research Service--The twists and turns of the Iranian presidential election in 2005 might indicate that Iranian politics are more vibrant and less scripted than some experts, and some Administration officials appear to believe. On the other hand, Bush Administration criticism of the Council of Guardians' heavy hand in candidate selection--and eliminating of all women candidates from the competition--is accurate. .
. . Although Iranian voters apparently did not vote for him because of his foreign policy positions, his victory has now ensured a hardliner lock on virtually all major institutions--the Supreme Leadership, the Council of Guardians, 6 clerics appointed by Khamenei plus 6 jurists appointed by the judiciary, the Majles, the Expediency Council, and now the presidency and government ministries. The 86-seat Assembly of Experts is elected. Reformists are now virtually shut out. . . . Potential alterations to Tehran's bargaining strategies at the nuclear talks with the so-called ``EU-3'', Britain, France, and Germany, are perhaps harder to judge. During his second round campaign, Ahmadinejad pointedly criticized the Foreign Ministry negotiators as too willing to make dramatic concessions in order to reach a deal with the EU-3. Those penalties will likely be the subject of discussion between the United States and its European allies.
Professor Raymond Tanter (Excerpt): Iran Policy Committee--With regard to the turnout in the June 2005 Iranian elections, a Council on Foreign Relations analyst referenced Iran's notorious Ministry of Intelligence and Security to validate the regime's announced turnout numbers. . . . I think if disinformation means anything it means that you don't go to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security to find out what the turnout is! I've heard reports from some of the smaller cities in Iran that the opposition-led boycott was very effective. The turnout was between 10 percent and 20 percent not the regime's inflated figure of over 50 percent. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that the lower the turnout rate, the less the legitimacy of that government. . . . In addition, the so-called election was actually a ``selection'' because the Supreme Leader Khamenie handpicked candidates in advance of the vote. He started nearly two years ago to have the revolutionary guards take control over all organs of the regime. This power play did not begin a month before the June elections. There was some internal dissent, and Khamenie thought it was important for him to control all organs of power. . . . President Bush deserves credit for condemning the ``sham selections'' and hence de-legitimizing them in advance.
Here is a three-point plan of the Iran Policy Committee to facilitate regime change in Iran. First, remove the Mujaheddin-e Khalq from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. Secondly, expand U.S. funding for Iranian opposition groups and nongovernmental organizations committed to democratic change in Iran, including the Mujaheddin-e Khalq and related groups. Thirdly, invite Iranian opposition leaders to the White House and to the Congress; these leaders would include leaders of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq and members of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
Congressman Tom Tancredo: It does seem, listening to you, there is a ray of sunshine and you both have just let shine on this because, would we be Pollyannaish to think and that it is good that he is going to disavow any foreign investment and therefore any internationalization of the economy, those oil revenues will be less effective perhaps and the mischief making, then they otherwise would be if the economy were to thrive under a more expansive or more open arrangement.
Congressman Tom Tancredo: I would like to recognize a member who has joined us, congressman Clay.
Congressman William Lacy Clay: I appreciate hearing from Dr. Tanter and the other witnesses here, defined out their take on the recent elections in Iran. Let me also say that it's OK to mention Florida, you can also mention Ohio. This is a bipartisan committee [laughter] I'm delighted to be here, it's a pleasure, thank you.
Ilan Berman (Excerpt): American Foreign Policy Council--. .
. A great deal of think has been spilt in recent weeks in an attempt to game the Iranian elections. The art of predicting have the next president is going to be has been elevated to high drama, certainly on the editorial pages that we've all read. Also I think it's important to note that most of this analysis has been spectacularly wrong, not just wrong but spectacularly wrong. . . . The power centers within the Islamic Republic are fully consolidated under the leadership of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In the past, the outgoing President Mohammad Khatami had succeeded on a very notable but very few and far between occasions on breaking with the clerical leadership and doing so publicly. With the rise of Mr. Ahmadinejad such descent is more than likely going to become a thing of the past. Given his political leanings and his revolutionary credentials he is likely to steer the Iranian presidency into the out right rubber stamp of the clerical leadership. That is the first implication. . . . Second is that Mr. Ahmadinejad's ascendance to power actually mirrors a deeper political shift that has taken place within that the Iranian politics over the last couple of years. The reformists we now all see are in retreat and internal political changes have shifted power and shifted power dramatically to a cadre of clerical hardliners who are committed to revitalizing and even expanding the Islamic revolution. . . . Iran in short, constitutes a mounting strategic challenge to the United States and also to U.S. objectives and the broader Middle East and the war on terror. Unfortunately, and I use the same caviar and the Dr. Katzman did, that these are my views alone, the White House seems to have failed to articulate a comprehensive strategy towards addressing, not only the nuclear program but also the broader strategic threat from the Iranian regime and I think I'd like to conclude by saying that this is a high time in a good benchmark for us to urge to change that policy and to actually adopt a proactive approach.
Question from VOA: I'm wondering what the future relations between Iran and the United States and I see it as stage that there is a divergence between the European in the U.S. concerns. The EU is welcoming the elections and the Americans are denouncing the elections. What do you see as the future of Iran, U.S. EU relations and negotiations on the nuclear issue?
Congressman Tom Tancredo: I think we will have quite a tussle over the possibility of sanctions we mentioned earlier that if they do have an effect and I would imagine that will be arguing with our friends in Europe about things like that. Is not surprising to me that we see this divergence of opinion between Europe and the United States with regard to Iran but I have to admit myself that I have a hard time understanding the opinions that are being expressed about the president. I think to some degree our State Department is a reflection of Europe. We're going to be very pragmatic about this, we may not like it but that's the way it is and we'll make the best of it. That's the pragmatic view and I think that Europe takes that and I would say the more realistic view is that we have to change the situation. The status quo is not acceptable, it's far too dangerous. But I don't know that my opinion will be the one taken by the administration.
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