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“SWORD TO PLOUGHSHARES” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Energy was published in the Senate section on pages S2573-S2574 on March 20, 2001.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
SWORD TO PLOUGHSHARES
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss some efforts in defense conversion that are reaping great gains. In the book, ``The Idea of National Interest'', Charles Beard wrote:
Government might legitimately take the initiative and pursue some interests aggressively. Furthermore, it might make use of its own citizens and their interests to advance the national interest.
Early on U.S. foreign policy for the Former Soviet Union, FSU, was designed to do just that: make use of U.S. citizens' interest to advance our national security objectives.
Today, I would like to briefly underscore some successes, specifically in the realm of defense conversion. Before doing so, however, I wanted to offer some insights regarding the scope of the problem.
First, the legacies of a command economy were prevalent in all nations behind the Iron Curtain. Such legacies included: a structure of production dominated by heavy industry, distorted factor and product prices, antiquated or obsolescent capital stock, inadequate skills to compete in a modern economy; a neglected infrastructure, severe environmental degradation, trade oriented towards other uncompetitive markets, and large volumes of non-performing loans and heavy foreign debt.
The FSU was no exception with respect to inheritance of these burdens and impediments. And despite all these similarities with other eastern European states, the FSU, especially Russia, was unique in one very important way.
For Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan ``heavy industry'' was that of defense. Fifty-two percent of Russia's industry was involved in military-related research, design and manufacturing. In Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the defense industry comprised about fifteen percent of their heavy industry.
This distinction made the Soviet industry not merely an economic concern, but rather a central threat to international security. As Soviet central authority deteriorated, control over its massive military complex also crumbled. As such international security concerns are not limited to issues of control over nuclear weapons and material, but include attaining a degree of economic stability to offer stable employment to a vast number of persons in military and military-related occupations, especially scientists and engineers in that sector.
The threat was apparent; the risk of inadequate action has been readily apparent. The national interest, indeed, the global interest, is in securing stability in the region. Stability in the region equates with global stability, especially in light of the potential leakage of knowhow from weapons complex.
Our approach has come in fits and starts. We have not offered a integrated, comprehensive plan for U.S. economic assistance or nonproliferation programs. Increasingly, however, we are coming to recognize the interrelationship between these two elements of our Russia policy, even if we still haven't achieved a semblance of a strategy.
I did, however, want to discuss some efforts that have succeeded. They are not sufficient in breadth, depth or financial means. Nonetheless, the are an exception to the rule in our efforts to provide meaningful, stable employment to former Soviet scientists and engineers.
I begin with the efforts of the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation, CRDF. CRDF was created pursuant to Section 511 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 in 1995. Its mission is to conduct innovative activities of mutual benefit with the countries of the FSU. Further, CRDF was to offer opportunities to former weapons scientists to achieve transition to productive civilian research. They have been remarkably successful.
Since its inception, CRDF has expended $16 million of U.S. Government funds and $1 million from private foundations. The FSU, in turn, has committed $4.8 million to these activities. These funds have backed 597 projects that supported a total of 4300 scientists and engineers.
In addition, with major contracts from the DOE, DoD, NIH, and EPA as well as industry, CRDF is helping U.S. participants address issues of financial integrity in their dealings with the FSU. Over $30 million for over 500 projects has been managed by CRDF through these contracts.
The Foundation has committed an additional $11.8 million to projects in five program areas.
CRDF's industry programs reduce the risk for U.S. companies to engage FSU scientists. These grants have leveraged 300 percent of U.S. Government funds through in cash and in-kind contributions from U.S. industry.
I would also note that more than 95 percent of the collaborations formed in CRDF awards will continue, whether with CRDF support or not. Over 100 U.S.-FSU teams are seeking commercial applications for the products of their collaborative research. Twenty-two teams have filed for patents, fourteen of which are joint.
For over a year now CRDF has ensured financial integrity for Department of Energy projects under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, IPP, program. The United States Industry Coalition, USIC, the industry-arm of the IPP program, now boasts 96 members throughout the U.S. and several substantial commercial successes with FSU partners. Through its cooperation with CRDF, USIC and the IPP program now can ensure that funding for FSU scientists involved in these research efforts avoids taxation by Russian or other officials. This aspect is critical for maximizing the impact of U.S. Government or industry investments to provide stable employment and a steady income to FSU scientists.
Since 1994, the IPP program has engaged over 6,200 former weapons of mass destruction scientists. Importantly, USIC members usually surpass cost-sharing arrangements with DOE expenditures totaling $39.3 million versus the $63.4 million invested by U.S. industry. Currently, 75 of USIC's members are engaged in 120 cost-shared projects.
I would like to briefly highlight a recent success story in my home state of New Mexico. On January 15, I participated in a technology demonstration and press conference to announce a $20 million international investment in technologies jointly developed by a small U.S. engineering company, a Russian nuclear weapons plant, and two of the Department of Energy's facilities.
An entrepreneurial American company, Stolar Horizon of Raton, NM, a long-standing member of USIC, identified a Russian technology with market potential, then staked over $5 Million of its own money to develop it. Stolar Horizon worked in tandem with Sandia National Laboratories and the Kansas City Plant through the IPP program to test and refine the technology for commercial, peaceful applications.
The result: Credit Suisse First Boston has committed $20 million in financing to take the product to the global market. An estimated 350 new jobs will be created in New Mexico, and over 600 jobs await Russian nuclear scientists and technicians in Nizhny Novgorod at the Institute for Measuring Systems Research, NIIIS, are planned.
I would remind everyone that U.S. appropriations in FY2001 for the IPP program is only $24.5 million. In this one example, Credit Suisse will provide an investment equal to 80 percent of our own in this fiscal year.
The Stolar Horizon/NIIIS success is a concrete example of the original IPP vision: making the world a safer place through cooperative commercial efforts leading to long-term, well-paying jobs in both nations.
The cooperative efforts of USIC members, DOE-IPP, other U.S. government agencies, and the scientific institutes of the NIS are revolutionizing the post-Cold War world, creating new opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers, and making our world more safe and secure.
I return to the thoughts of Charles Beard. In pursuit of its interests, Government might make use of citizens' interests to advance the national interest. This is the foremost objective of nonproliferation programs that seek to create commercial opportunities in the FSU.
The statistics and examples I've offered above underscore the successes we've achieved. Obviously, our attempts have frequently stumbled sometimes as a result of our own false starts and other times due to circumstances beyond our control. However, at the same time, we have never faced a situation similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. We had never before legislated or formulated programs with the express intent of preventing proliferation through promotion of commercial opportunities. We had never confronted providing economic development aid to countries burdened by legacies of a command economy. From this perspective, we've made remarkable progress.
Mr. President, I would conclude on the following note: each concrete successful commercial venture will have exponential benefits. I am convinced that these ventures will pay off--by mitigating immediate potential proliferation threats, contributing to a stable economy in the region, and advancing U.S. citizens' own monetary interests.
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