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“AFGHANISTAN” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S8730-S8732 on Dec. 10, 2010.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, this month, the Obama administration will submit its review of the war in Afghanistan. I expect--and I think a number of Members of Congress expect--that this review will provide answers to the key questions before us, questions the American people deserve answers to. I believe these questions fall into three broad categories: first of all, Afghan governance; second, development and humanitarian efforts; and, finally, establishing a sustainable security environment in Afghanistan.
Since the announcement of a new strategy in December of 2009 and the deployment of 30,000 additional troops, I have sought to carefully monitor U.S. progress toward its goals. As part of this effort, I have paid special attention to combating the top killer of U.S. troops, which, of course, is improvised explosive devices. I chaired a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on this topic on November 18 and will continue to press our government and our leaders and governments in the region to do more to restrict the availability of components that make up these terrible weapons, especially, of course, ammonium nitrate, which flows into Afghanistan every day of the week to make IEDs that kill our troops.
I am pleased significant progress has been made by the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to coordinate an all-of-government approach to this problem. I wish to applaud the recent efforts of the Afghan security forces that seized one metric ton of ammonium nitrate on Monday in Zabul Province. All the key players appear to be on the same page on this issue, but there still has not been a significant decrease of these deadly weapons in Afghanistan. I trust that the December review by the administration will address the flow of ammonium nitrate, and I look forward to continuing to work closely with the administration on this issue.
At a strategic level, too many questions remain as we head into the December review. I would like to list some of those right now.
First of all, on the issue of governance, I have two questions I hope the December review will address. First, do we have a political strategy--a political strategy--in place to ensure that the Afghan Government is prepared to enact reforms that concretely show the population it represents their key interests and concerns? I believe our efforts to pressure the Afghan Government have been at best uneven in this area, due, in large part, to a reluctance to pressure the Afghan leadership.
Any security gains in Afghanistan can be easily squandered without serious progress on governance. The United States, ISAF, and Afghan security forces are sacrificing too much as the Afghan Government fails to enact reforms in the best interests of the Afghan people. It will be difficult to succeed in Afghanistan without a strategy to help build the institutions of governance, including the judiciary, political parties, and, of course, electoral institutions.
As difficult as these interactions may be, the international community must be more willing to confront the Afghan Government on issues of political representation, corruption, and the rule of law. We should stand ready to help build and develop these democratic institutions.
The 2009 Presidential election and the 2010 parliamentary elections were rife with problems that seriously undermined the confidence of the international community in Afghanistan's ability to conduct elections free of fraud and manipulation. If the electoral process remains deeply flawed, the Afghan people's support for the democratic process itself may well erode.
While the government has said it wants to develop a ``strategy for long-term electoral reform that addresses in particular the sustainability of the electoral process,'' few steps have been taken in this direction. The election law is in need of serious reform. The executive branch has nearly exclusive power over the Independent Election Commission and Electoral Complaints Commission. The single nontransferable vote system impedes the development of political parties, an essential long-term way to organize and represent the interests of the Afghan people.
Corruption continues to be a serious issue that affects citizens across Afghanistan, especially in the southern part of the country. A recent public opinion survey conducted by the Washington Post, ABC News, the BBC, and ARD television in Germany showed that 55 percent of respondents in Kandahar say they have been asked for bribes from the police--55 percent--well above the national figure of 21 percent. Moreover, most Kandahar residents say their situation would only get worse if they exercised due process and filed a complaint about a public official.
U.S. efforts to improve governance at times compete with our security concerns. There is an inherent tension between the United States and ISAF forces in efforts to engage, to combat extremist elements at the local level and cooperation with warlords who rule over certain areas. While there is an imperative to collect intelligence and conduct operations that may require cooperation with local power brokers, I am concerned the long-term cost of such interaction is very high. Are we empowering another generation of local power brokers who have little regard for representing the interests of the local population? That is a question that needs to be asked over and over, and we need answers to that question.
It is a simple fact, disaffection among Afghan citizens with the central government and local power brokers provides recruiting opportunities for the Taliban. This is a serious concern because it gets to the heart of our engagement in Afghanistan: Cooperation with local warlords can provide short-term security gains, but what is the long-term impact? I hope the administration's December review will address this issue.
Question No. 2: What is the state of the reconciliation process with the Taliban? I have expressed serious concerns about the impact of negotiations with the Taliban on women and other vulnerable groups in Afghanistan. My concern grew--and I know others' concern as well--our concern grew in reading the poll numbers from Afghanistan recently. There was a 13-percent jump from last year among respondents who say women's rights are suffering.
The December review should address the current state of play with respect to these negotiations. The recent Afghan poll showed that nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should pursue negotiations with the Taliban, with almost two-thirds willing to accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office.
Ultimately, there must be a political solution to end the war in Afghanistan. I am not suggesting we are close at this time to that result, but we need to know the degree to which the administration and the Karzai government are coordinated and headed down the same path. International engagement on any negotiation process will be essential to long-term success. Pakistan has a role to play and is a necessary element to any long-lasting peace agreement.
The next area, security. U.S. operations in southern Afghanistan appear to be having a positive impact on Afghan public opinion. Sixty-
seven percent of the people in the Province of Helmand describe their security as good, a 14-percent jump from December 2009. Nearly two-
thirds of Helmand residents state that Afghanistan is on the right track.
This is an indication that positive momentum has been built in Afghanistan's most sensitive region. But such gains can be short-lived, and in order to facilitate a sustainable security, we must take a long-
term approach to ensure that the Afghan Government can provide for its own security.
The training of the Afghan National Security Forces is a key threshold question. We cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become a haven for al-Qaida or other extremist groups to launch attacks against the United States. ISAF forces have denied al-Qaida this haven since 2001. However, we cannot provide this security in perpetuity. The Afghans have to assume more responsibility for their own security, and we must do all we can to prepare the Afghan National Security Forces for that day.
So where do we stand at this point? I would have to say the view is decidedly mixed. For years, the international community exercised what can be characterized as gross neglect in building Afghan security forces, and only recently have we begun to take on this task.
First, some positive news on this issue. We do not hear enough about this.
Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Caldwell, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, the so-called NTM-A, has been a source of real progress. The Afghan National Army and Police are exceeding--
exceeding--their recruitment goals. As of August of this year, the Afghan National Army's total strength had grown to 138,164, exceeding the goal for October 2010 by more than 8,000 troops. As of August, the Afghan National Police had an end strength of 119,639, exceeding the 2010 goal of 109,000. These recruitment numbers are an important sign of progress, but serious concerns remain related to the quality of the force, the retention rate, and the low rate of literacy.
The Afghan National Army has significant shortages in officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Effective junior leaders are essential to a professional force since they control immediate on-the-
ground situations.
The Ministry of Defense and the training mission in Afghanistan are working to overcome a shortfall of more than 4,500 Afghan National Army officers. There are more Officer Candidate School units, twice as many seats in the Integration Mujahedeen Course, and larger classes at the National Military Academy.
As for noncommissioned officers, the Afghan National Army faces a shortage of more than 10,500. Similar expansions in training capacity and direct entry programs are underway to address this deficiency. According to a recent Pentagon report, the gap will not be closed until the end of 2012.
The Pentagon also reports we face a shortfall of more than 900 international trainers in Afghanistan. I hope our allies in ISAF can help to address this very important training need. Many European countries have a proud history of developing elite paramilitary forces. This valued expertise is needed right now in Afghanistan.
While expanding capacity is critical to growing the force, I hope the December review by the administration will address not just the efforts to grow more leaders but also describe how these leaders are laying the foundation for professionalizing the Afghan national security forces.
Retention and attrition rates. For years, the Afghan national security force's attrition rate has been an issue. Facilitating rapid growth while increasing quality requires that retention rates remain high.
In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approved the goal of developing a force of 305,600 personnel by October 2011. Recruiting efforts compared with increased retention have allowed the force to grow ahead of schedule so far. Moving forward, projections remain uncertain. The Defense Department reports the police have met attrition and retention goals. However, the Afghan National Army still has issues with attrition that may impact its ability to maintain its impressive growth in numbers. This month's review by the administration should clarify projections and detail efforts to boost retention.
Literacy is a big problem. The literacy rates are very low in the Afghan Security Force and this must be addressed. Consider this story from Lieutenant General Caldwell. He visited a base in northern Afghanistan where 90 percent of the troops claimed they had been unpaid for months. To limit corruption, the government has been paying the troops by electronic funds transfer instead of cash. The troops had no idea, however, since they could not read their bank statements.
Think about weapons security. How can a soldier be sure he has been assigned a weapon if he cannot read the serial number? Illiteracy is widespread in the force: Only 11 percent of enlisted personnel can read, write, or do simple math. This creates significant challenges in professionalizing the security force. In response, a huge literacy program has grown around the fielding of the Afghan security forces. So we have much to do on that.
I will move to the last part of our concerns, and that is on development. A qualified Afghan soldier is much cheaper to train and equip on the field than an American, so the overall cost to U.S. taxpayers would certainly diminish as the U.S. forces draw down. But by investing in this large force, there are long-term implications. Do we expect to pay for the Afghan security forces 10 years from now, 20 years from now? At what point will the Afghan Government be able to collect its own revenue to fund its security as well as other priorities?
That is, again, why responsible Afghan governance is essential. While the international community will shoulder much of the humanitarian and security burden in the short term, the Afghan Government needs to take steps to increase its domestic revenue collection, as well as put into place a sound legislative framework to encourage investment. They need to develop a minerals framework law, and they also need to put in place changes to bring about a stronger infrastructure.
Let me close with a reflection upon our troops. We have the obligation here in the Senate to ask and have answers to very critical questions, whether they relate to development or governance or security, and especially on the question of security. We also have an obligation to remember and keep in mind the human toll.
SSG SEAN FLANNERY
In the State of Pennsylvania, as in a lot of States, we have lost a lot of soldiers. To date, we have lost 60 servicemembers since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, we got to the number of about 196--just below 200. Let me share one story as I conclude. Two weeks ago, Pennsylvania lost Army SSG Sean Flannery who died a hero in Afghanistan. He is from the town of Wyomissing, PA, in Bucks County. He was an infantry squad leader who was killed after delivering first aid to a wounded Afghan soldier. Sean and his team carried the man to an evacuation helicopter. They stepped on an improvised explosive device which killed Sean and another soldier. Staff Sergeant Flannery was 29 years old. After he graduated from Wyomissing High School in 1999 and Shippensburg University, he was determined to serve his country. He was on his fourth tour of duty after having served two tours in Iraq and a prior tour in Afghanistan. He earned a Bronze Star because of his heroism and then another commendation last week. One of his high school classmates paid tribute to his friend at a service earlier this week. He said:
His fellow soldiers talked about how much they respected him and what a great leader he was and how they had true love for him, and not a word of it surprised us. He was the type of guy everybody wants their son to be--loyal, humble, and generous. I was honored to have him as a friend.
That is what Matt Rader, a classmate of Sean Flannery's, said about Sean.
All of us are honored to represent these young men and women who fight for us and some who die for this cause. Today we pray for those families. We pray for Sean and his family. But in the larger sense I guess we pray for ourselves as well. We pray that we are worthy and can prove ourselves worthy of their valor.
One of the ways Members of the Congress can prove ourselves worthy of that valor is to ask and demand answers to these very difficult questions, no matter who the administration is and no matter what party, because we have to get this policy right. We have an obligation to get it right, for Sean Flannery and for those who have loved and lost, and for our country.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Senator Reed, be given time on the floor for his remarks.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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