WASHINGTON, DC - The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, chaired by Rep. Tim Murphy (R-PA), today held a hearing focusing on the need for stronger oversight of high-containment laboratories.
“Sweeping improvements and policy changes only work if the policies are effective. And, in this area, past policy reviews have not brought about the changes necessary to improve safety," said Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Murphy. “For that reason, Ms. DeGette and myself, along with Chairman Upton and Ranking Member Pallone, asked the GAO to evaluate the biosafety, biosecurity, and oversight policies for the 8 departments and 15 component agencies that own and operate the Federal government’s high-containment laboratories. GAO has been issuing recommendations for years on the need for better policies and standards at high-containment labs-recommendations that have not been implemented-so the agency was well-positioned to receive our request."
Chairman Murphy went on to highlight details of a new GAO report which made 33 recommendations they deemed as necessary in ensuring U.S. bioresearch laboratory polices are comprehensive and up-to-date.
In summarizing the report, John Neumann, Director, Natural Resources and Environment at GAO, testified, “Our review found that most of the 8 departments and 15 agencies had policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories, but those policies were not comprehensive. …We also found that some departments and agencies did not have up-to-date policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories. Some departments and agencies also lacked general requirements and time frames for reviewing and updating their policies or lacked expiration or recertification dates on their policies."
Also discussed during today’s hearing were the findings from majority committee staff regarding the subcommittee’s investigation of the 2014 smallpox discovery at NIH. Among the findings that require further investigation by HHS are:
* The failure to account for regulated select agents;
* The failure to conduct comprehensive inventory of all select agent material; and
* The failure to restrict unauthorized access to select agents.
These select agents included antibiotic-resistant anthrax and antibiotic-resistant plague.
Chairman Murphy echoed the concerns identified in the memo and pointed to a “culture of complacency." One example shared by Murphy was NIH’s continued lack of appreciation that newly-discovered select agents held in long-term storage should be assumed to be alive and dangerous.
“With regard to the lapse involving the discovery of the smallpox vials in an FDA lab on the NIH campus, both the NIH and the FDA have yet to conduct the necessary self-examination and introspection to fully understand the weaknesses and failures that led to smallpox being unknowingly stored in an unregistered, and improperly secured conditions. I hope this hearing provides the necessary encouragement for the NIH and the FDA to undertake such reviews," stated full committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI). “We want NIH, FDA, and all our federal laboratories to be successful in implementing lab safety improvements. These labs conduct vital research that can lead to the development of treatments, diagnostic, and vaccines to address public health needs. This research is also important to our defense efforts against bioterrorism, a serious threat to our troops, our nation, and our allies."
Rep. Susan Brooks (R-IN) also raised questions about protecting our homeland, citing the 2001 anthrax scare where an individual who had access to sensitive material used it to cause harm. Rep. Brooks inquired about policies for background checks for these labs. She also referenced reports of ISIS members trying to get biological weapons to carry out attacks, and how critical it is that our efforts at home to ensure that doesn’t happen are strong.
During several lines of questioning, witnesses admitted that they had not prepared for some of the scenarios that took place in recent security lapses. Chairman Murphy stressed that preparedness was the very goal of today’s hearing.
An archived webcast, background memo, and witness testimony can be found online here.
Related Items
* How Secure are U.S. Bioresearch Labs? Preventing the Next Safety Lapse.
