Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) requested the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) to review the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) refusal to exercise proper oversight over Boeing’s apparent misconduct regarding Boeing’s 737 MAX.
In 2018 and 2019, the crashes of two 737 MAX aircraft resulted in the deaths of 346 people.
The Chairs’ request came after FAA failed to provide an adequate response to their November 2021 letter with Congressman Greg Stanton (D-AZ) seeking answers from the agency on the apparent lack of Boeing accountability for longstanding issues with the 737 MAX.
“As described in our November 29, 2021, letter, when Boeing first discovered that the [angle of attack] AOA Disagree alert was inoperable on more than 80 percent of 737 MAX aircraft, Boeing continued to produce 737 MAX planes with the inoperable alert, in violation of its approved type design, and concealed the nonconformity from FAA, airline customers, and MAX pilots for more than a year,” the Chairs wrote to DOT Inspector General Eric J. Soskin.
The first issue that DeFazio and Larsen want the DOT OIG to look into is the angle of attack (AOA) disagree alert, and FAA’s failure to hold Boeing accountable for not disclosing the AOA issues until after a fatal crash.
“This response is problematic for two reasons. First, Administrator Dickson did not address the fact that Boeing did NOT communicate the issue to customers despite having knowledge of it for more than a year, and then only did so after the first deadly 737 MAX crash. Second, the blatant lack of enforcement actions against such non-compliance in this case could encourage manufacturers to ignore their approved type design in the future. Fortunately, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act provides FAA with additional enforcement mechanisms for nonconformities with type design,” DeFazio and Larsen wrote.
The second issue addressed in the letter is the Boeing effort to downplay MCAS.
“During our committee’s investigation, we uncovered an alarming internal Boeing record, documenting a 2013 meeting in which individuals appear to have hatched an explicit plan to avoid using the term ‘MCAS’ with anyone outside of Boeing because, ‘If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there may be greater certification and training impact,’” DeFazio and Larsen wrote. Their letter noted that the Boeing document suggested a plan to downplay the significance of MCAS to at least one regulator and that an Authorized Representative, a Boeing employee authorized to conduct work on behalf of the FAA, was involved in the plan. A copy of the document, which has been previously released, can be found here.
“In response to the November 29, 2021, letter which asked for more specific information about FAA’s investigation and/or civil enforcement efforts regarding the plan to downplay MCAS, Administrator Dickson responded, ‘FAA actions focused on the safety of the product and the acceptability of the system for return to service. Due to the U.S. Department of Justice investigation as well as the work of the Joint Authorities Technical Review and Special Committee, the FAA did not pursue investigations or actions [emphasis added] against the individuals within the Boeing Company,’” DeFazio and Larsen wrote.
The Chairs requested the DOT OIG examine three matters: review and reevaluate FAA’s actions as it relates oversight of AOA disagree sensors and MCAS; assess whether FAA’s actions followed applicable statues, policies, and procedures; and identify any legal or regulatory hurdles that precluded FAA from pursuing civil enforcement related to either matter.
The full letter can be found here.
