Last week, a group of internet technologists and social movement activists gathered in Brussels to simulate an internet shutdown. This "blockathon" was a technical demonstration designed to show what the network looks like to engineers when there is no network. Participants were encouraged to attempt breaking out of the simulated shut-down network while discussing the privacy and ethics of creating such a censorship test-bed.
In regions like the U.S., EU, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, network outages typically occur due to natural disasters or accidental damage. In contrast, countries such as Iran and China may experience government-engineered outages. Regardless of the cause, losing internet connectivity disrupts modern life significantly, impacting communication with family, friends, and emergency services. For many global citizens, digital isolation may be enforced by government policies.
The blockathon was held on the final day of Splintercon Brussels. This event brings together network researchers, software developers, internet freedom advocates, and those affected by large-scale censorship. The aim is to understand and address how communities can stay connected during complete internet shutdowns.
The inaugural Splintercon took place last December in Montreal. It featured three days of talks, workshops, and hackathon projects focusing on the impact of Russia's war on Ukraine for activists and broader internet censorship issues. As part of my role at CDT and as a board member of hosting organization eQualitie, I delivered a keynote on why and how internet standards development must consider censorship circumvention.
The second Splintercon in Brussels focused specifically on Iranian internet censorship. Co-hosted with Canadian NGO ASL19, the sessions were curated by a programme committee that I am part of. These discussions emphasized digital networks rather than app-specific shutdowns like those affecting Facebook or Instagram. Losing access to all internet applications is more severe than losing access to individual apps.
These sessions underscore the need for backup systems and resilient networks capable of functioning even during power grid failures—at least long enough for essential communications with loved ones or emergency services. When governments shut down the internet, normal redundancies are insufficient as they too are likely disabled. Events like Splintercon help network engineers and anti-censorship advocates understand these challenges and explore potential solutions. I am proud to contribute to this critical conversation.
