“U.S. EFFORTS IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ” published by Congressional Record on Oct. 17, 2002

“U.S. EFFORTS IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ” published by Congressional Record on Oct. 17, 2002

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Volume 148, No. 137 covering the 2nd Session of the 107th Congress (2001 - 2002) was published by the Congressional Record.

The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.

“U.S. EFFORTS IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S10640-S10642 on Oct. 17, 2002.

The publication is reproduced in full below:

U.S. EFFORTS IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, early last Friday morning, the Senate acted on the President's request to grant him authority to use force in Iraq. I joined with a majority of my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to support the resolution granting that authority, but made clear then and continue to believe now that our vote was the first step in our effort to address the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In my statement before that vote, I indicated the President faces several challenges as he attempts to fashion a policy that will be successful in our efforts against Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.

One of those challenges is preparing for what might happen in Iraq after Saddam Hussein and preparing the American people for what might be required of us on this score. To that end, I was interested to see an article in Friday morning's newspaper with the title, ``U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report.''

Citing unnamed administration officials, the article contends the administration is modeling plans for the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq on the successful efforts in post-WWII Japan. The article goes on to report that the Administration has yet to endorse a final position and this issue had not been discussed with key American allies. When questioned at a press conference Friday afternoon, the White House spokesperson distanced himself from this specific plan.

If this news account is true, I have no choice but to conclude this administration has much to do before it will be in position to present a plan to the American people and the world about what it feels is necessary to promote economic and political stability in post-conflict Iraq. We do know, however, that a plan based on the Japan precedent would require a significant and lengthy commitment of American political will, economic resources, and military might.

While I do not doubt either our resolve or capability to be successful in Iraq, it is critical that the Administration be clear with the Congress, the American people, and the world about what it believes will be needed in post-Saddam Iraq, what portion of that it believes America should undertake, and what it believes others should be prepared to do. To this end, I urge the President and his administration to keep in mind the following facts and questions as planning for post-conflict Iraq continues.

General MacArthur and President Truman made a strategic choice in post-WWII Japan to leave intact as much as 95 percent of the imperial Japanese government, including the Emperor himself, because of the fear of what impact a massive upheaval of the government structure would have on stability in Japan. Do the President and his team intend to follow that precedent, or we will start from scratch in constructing post-conflict institutions in Iraq?

We maintained nearly 80,000 troops in Japan for 6 years after V-J Day and still maintain 47,000 troops to this day, more than a half century after the conflict officially ended. How long does the administration anticipate having U.S. forces in post-conflict Iraq, and how much of this burden can we anticipate our friends allies will assume?

Post-WWII Japan represented an ethnically and religiously homogenous population. How does the fact that Iraq is riven by ethnic and religious difference impact U.S. planning for post-conflict Iraq?

From 1946 to 1950, the Congressional Research Service estimates that the United States spent a yearly average of $3 billion, in today's dollars, for the occupation of Japan. Are those the kinds of numbers the President and his team anticipate for political and economic reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq?

If the administration plans on obtaining assistance from others, what nations is it assuming will be willing to help us? What is the administration assuming these other nations are prepared to do and for how long? If no plan is yet in place and no allies briefed, when does the administration believe such discussions should begin?

I ask unanimous consent to print the article in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. Has a Plan To Occupy Iraq, Officials Report

(By David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt)

Washington.--The White House is developing a detailed plan, modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, to install an American-led military government in Iraq if the United States topples Saddam Hussein, senior administration officials said today.

The plan also calls for war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders and a transition to an elected civilian government that could take months or years.

In the initial phase, Iraq would be governed by an American military commander--perhaps Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander of United States forces in the Persian Gulf, or one of his subordinates--who would assume the role that Gen. Douglas MacArthur served in Japan after its surrender in 1945.

One senior official said the administration was

``coalescing around'' the concept after discussions of options with President Bush and his top aides. But this official and others cautioned that there had not yet been any formal approval of the plan and that it was not clear whether allies had been consulted on it.

The detailed thinking about an American occupation emerges as the administration negotiates a compromise at the United Nations that officials say may fall short of an explicit authorization to use force but still allow the United States to claim it has all the authority it needs to force Iraq to disarm.

In contemplating an occupation, the administration is scaling back the initial role for Iraqi opposition forces in a post-Hussein government. Until now it had been assumed that Iraqi dissidents both inside and outside the country would form a government, but it was never clear when they would take full control.

Today marked the first time the administration has discussed what could be a lengthy occupation by coalition forces, led by the United States.

Officials say they want to avoid the chaos and in-fighting that have plagued Afghanistan since the defeat of the Taliban. Mr. Bush's aides say they also want full control over Iraq while American-led forces carry out their principal mission: finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction.

The description of the emerging American plan and the possibility of war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders could be part of an administration effort to warn Iraq's generals of an unpleasant future if they continue to support Mr. Hussein.

Asked what would happen if American pressure prompted a coup against Mr. Hussein, a senior official said, ``That would be nice.'' But the official suggested that the American military might enter and secure the country anyway, not only to eliminate weapons of mass destruction but also to ensure against anarchy.

Under the compromise now under discussion with France, Russia and China, according to officials familiar with the talks, the United Nations Security Council would approve a resolution requiring the disarmament of Iraq and specifying

``consequences'' that Iraq would suffer for defiance.

It would stop well short of the explicit authorization to enforce the resolution that Mr. Bush has sought. But the diplomatic strategy, now being discussed in Washington, Paris and Moscow, would allow Mr. Bush to claim that the resolution gives the United States all the authority he believes he needs to force Baghdad to disarm.

Other Security Council members could offer their own, less muscular interpretations, and they would be free to draft a second resolution, authorizing the use of force, if Iraq frustrated the inspection process. The United States would regard that second resolution as unnecessary, senior officials say.

``Everyone would read this resolution their own way,'' one senior official said.

The revelation of the occupation plan marks the first time the administration has described in detail how it would administer Iraq in the days and weeks after an invasion, and how it would keep the country unified while searching for weapons.

It would put an American officer in charge of Iraq for a year or more while the United States and its allies searched for weapons and maintained Iraq's oil fields.

For as long as the coalition partners administered Iraq, they would essentially control the second largest proven reserves of oil in the world, nearly 11 percent of the total. A senior administration official said the United Nations oil-for-food program would be expanded to help finance stabilization and reconstruction.

Administration officials said they were moving away from the model used in Afghanistan: establishing a provisional government right away that would be run by Iraqis. Some top Pentagon officials support this approach, but the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and, ultimately, the White House, were cool to it.

``We're just not sure what influence groups on the outside would have on the inside,'' an administration official said.

``There would also be differences among Iraqis, and we don't want chaos and anarchy in the early process.''

Instead, officials said, the administration is studying the military occupations of Japan and Germany. But they stressed a commitment to keeping Drag unified, as Japan was, and avoiding the kind of partition that Germany underwent when Soviet troops stayed in the eastern sector, which set the stage for the cold war. The military government in Germany stayed in power for four years; in Japan it lasted six and a half years.

In a speech on Saturday, Zalmay Khalilzad, the special assistant to the president for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African affairs, said, ``The coalition will assume--and the preferred option--responsibility for the territorial defense and security of Iraq after liberation.''

``Our intent is not conquest and occupation of Iraq,'' Mr. Khalilzad said. ``But we do what needs to be done to achieve the disarmament mission and to get Iraq ready for a democratic transition and then through democracy over time.''

Iraqis, perhaps through a consultative council, would assist an American-led military and, later, a civilian administration, a senior official said today. Only after this transition would the American-led government hand power to Iraqis.

He said that the Iraqi armed forces would be ``downsized,'' and that senior Baath Party officials who control government ministries would be removed. ``Much of the bureaucracy would carry on under new management,'' he added.

Some experts warned during Senate hearings last month that a prolonged American military occupation of Iraq could inflame tensions in the Mideast and the Muslim world.

``I am viscerally opposed to a prolonged occupation of a Muslim country at the heart of the Muslim world by Western nations who proclaim the right to re-educate that country,'' said the former secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, who as a young man served as district administrator in the military government of occupied Germany.

While the White House considers its long-term plans for Iraq, Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, arrived in Moscow this evening for a day and a half of talks with President Vladimir V. Putin. Aides said talks were focused on resolving the dispute at the United Nations. Mr. Blair and Mr. Putin are to hold formal discussions on Friday, followed by a news conference.

Mr. Blair has been a steadfast supporter of the administration's tough line on a new resolution. But he has also indicated that Britain would consider France's proposal to have a two-tiered approach, with the Security Council first adopting a resolution to compel Iraq to cooperate with international weapons inspectors, and then, if Iraq failed to comply, adopting a second resolution on military force. Earlier this week, Russia indicated that it, too, was prepared to consider the French position.

But the administration is now saying that if there is a two-resolution approach, it will insist that the first resolution provide Mr. Bush all the authority he needs.

``The timing of all this is impossible to anticipate,'' one administration official involved in the talks said. ``The president doesn't want to have to wait around for a second resolution if it is clear that the Iraqis are not cooperating.''

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SOURCE: Congressional Record Vol. 148, No. 137

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