“IRAN” published by Congressional Record on Dec. 4, 2013

“IRAN” published by Congressional Record on Dec. 4, 2013

ORGANIZATIONS IN THIS STORY

Volume 159, No. 171 covering the 1st Session of the 113th Congress (2013 - 2014) was published by the Congressional Record.

The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.

“IRAN” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the House of Representatives section on pages H7493-H7498 on Dec. 4, 2013.

The publication is reproduced in full below:

IRAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Perry). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2013, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Roskam) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

General Leave

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on the subject of this Special Order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, there are hinge points in history. There are times at which you can sense that history is moving almost on a hinge from one trajectory to another trajectory, and my sense and my observation is that the United States is experiencing such a hinge right now.

Okay, what is the hinge? What is the change? What is going on? Here is what is happening. The administration has made a decision that is moving subtly in some ways, but I think the results are going to be very, very consequential and the subtleties will be lost, and we are going to be at a very different position. In other words, the hinge will move us from our current policy which says that Iran shall not be a nuclear power. That is the stated position of the United States. It is unambiguous. There is no ambiguity about that, at least not up until now.

But the hinge that is changing is a direction that begins to say, well, maybe not. Maybe instead we need a policy of containment, and that is very dangerous, Mr. Speaker. That is a direction that we ought not go. It is a direction, unfortunately, that the Obama administration is leading us in right now, and I'm convinced it is a mistake.

The House of Representatives has a responsibility as part of a coequal branch of government. We have worked, we have passed sanctions that are robust and dynamic that are not taken up by the false claim of the Iranians, a false promise of future conduct. We need our colleagues on the other side of the rotunda to take on a very rigorous sanctions bill and to push back very, very aggressively.

Because here is the thing: the Iranians are allowed to enrich under this proposed deal. There is no investigation as it relates to the warheads. There is no investigation as it relates to their missile capacity. And so what is happening? The Iranians gain an advantage of time and money, and we squander both. This is the time when the United States needed to be clear and not ambiguous.

So there are Members who are gathered here today, Mr. Speaker, to talk about the seriousness of this issue, to admonish the administration and encourage them to change course; and we hope to highlight the significant nature of this shift in American foreign policy that we are seeing lay out before us as we speak.

So toward that end, I would be honored at this point to yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), my colleague and friend.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The political pundits are all focused on was this a good deal, was this a bad deal. But we're not here in Congress to give a grade to the administration. We are here in Congress to decide what legislation should be passed. Congress is a policymaking body, although so often those in the administration think that we are, at most, advisers or critics; but let us take a look at this deal, and we'll see that what we get out of this is at least overstated by its proponents.

Because we are told that this halts their enrichment of uranium. It is true that it limits their 20 percent uranium; and Iran will not be making progress during the 6-month period of this deal toward its first bomb, but they will be making very substantial progress toward their eighth, ninth, and 10th bomb. And Iran is not a nuclear power until they have some to hide, one or two to test. It is not their objective to have but one, because throughout this agreement it is very clear the centrifuges keep spinning, the amount of low enriched uranium keeps growing; but we're told that Iran will not be increasing its stockpile. If you read the agreement, yes, they will, but they have to convert to uranium oxide metal, that which they produced during the term of this agreement.

There are some proponents of the agreement that say, Well, that means that they are neutralizing all that they produce under the agreement. That is hardly true.

I have been the chair or ranking member of the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee since it was created in the early part of this century, and I have worked with the nonproliferation experts. The fact is that this uranium oxide, this huge new additional stockpile to be created over the next 6 months can be converted back to gaseous form and then enriched further. And converting it back to gaseous form will take only a couple of weeks.

So this agreement provides that Iran makes substantial progress toward more low-enriched uranium, building its stockpile toward a real collection of nuclear bombs.

We are also told that we have given up very little in this agreement. We have given up far more than you can find in the text because the most important thing about our sanctions is momentum. And we passed additional sanctions in 2010, 2011, 2012; and, if hadn't been for this agreement, the Senate would have passed the bill that we worked on in the summer, and we would have passed additional sanctions in 2013.

The content of those sanctions is important, but even more important is the momentum. If you are a multinational corporation, you can find a law firm that will find loopholes in our existing sanctions, but you will decide not to invest a lot into that business plan because you know Congress is going to pass more sanctions.

Well, now you know we are not passing any sanctions in 2013; and the question before us, as legislators, is whether we will be passing sanctions in 2014.

Why is momentum so important not just to those international businesses trying to decide whether to invest in exploiting the loopholes? Most of economics is psychology. It is currency values. It is consumer confidence. It is business confidence. It is investment. And we saw the celebrations in Tehran as the business community celebrated this agreement because it ends the continuing momentum toward additional sanctions.

But we are not here, again, to grade the administration. That is for pollsters and pundits. We are here to decide whether to pass legislation.

It is very clear we are not going to pass legislation that becomes effective in 2013. The question before us is whether we will pass legislation which, by its terms, becomes effective June 1, 2014. And the reason the administration sent some of its top officials to brief us in a classified briefing today is because they want to convince us not to take any action in the first 5 or 6 months of 2014. Well, what does that mean? That means, in effect, we are not going to take action in 2014. Why is that?

Most people think that this deal expires in late May, 6 months after it was adopted on November 24, 2013. That is not the case. The start date is some day to be determined sometime probably in late January. So if we, as a Congress, are convinced not to take any action, not to pass any legislation, not to go through the committee process and the markup until after this agreement has terminated, we are talking about late July. Well, at the end of July, we go on break. We come back for, what, 2 or 3 weeks between then and the November elections.

So if the administration can convince us to not do anything until 6 months after the trigger date, which is a date to be determined sometime in January, they can assure the Iranians that no new sanctions will be adopted in 2014. And that will be apparent to those doing business in Iran and those doing business with Iran.

The administration complimented us more than once, saying these sanctions are what brought Iran to the table, but let us remember that the administration opposed the adoption of these sanctions every single time. The reason we did not adopt any sanctions against Iran in 2009 was because of opposition from the administration and the tremendous intellectual clout and credibility that the State Department and administration bring.

But it is not just this administration. We didn't pass any sanctions during the entire 8 years of the prior administration. Oh, we passed some through the House, but they stopped them in the Senate, and with considerable effort. Not one bill became law. So we have seen two administrations do their best to delay, dilute, prevent, and defeat sanctions legislation.

So now they say, Isn't it great we have this legislation, but don't pass any new legislation. Let us remember, we were against the legislation they now say is so great.

The best example of this is the Kirk-Menendez amendment in 2011. That was the bill that prevented Iran's central bank from clearing their petroleum dollar-denominated transactions through the American banking system. Well, what did the administration say in the form of a letter from Secretary Geithner? He wrote on December 1, 2011: ``I am writing to express the administration's strong opposition to this amendment because, in its current form, it threatens to undermine the effective'' sanctions. ``In addition, the amendment would potentially yield a net economic benefit to the Iranian regime.''

{time} 1730

There is only one reason Iran is at the table today. It is because of the sanctions we have adopted the last 3 years. And the most important of those was the Menendez-Kirk sanctions that the administration fought against.

What we ought to do is adopt legislation providing additional sanctions. And we have already written them. We passed the bill in June, with 400 votes on this floor. We should have those sanctions--and I would think others--go into effect on June 1, unless Congress, in an expedited proceeding, passes a resolution saying, Hold off. We've seen enough progress. These sanctions don't need to go into force.

Instead, and the other choice, we can do nothing on the theory that we will do the right thing in the last few days of July, as if Congress turns on a dime, as if the State Department has been unsuccessful in delaying, defeating, and diluting sanctions in the past. That, I think, would be a mistake.

With that, I would point out that this deal calls for a rollback of sanctions that violates American law in a number of respects. It will not be the first time that an administration has refused to enforce the sanctions bills passed by Congress.

I will say that from 2010 through 2013 this administration has done a much better job of enforcing such legislation than either of the prior two administrations. But as a technical matter, the administration has agreed to waive that which the law does not allow it to waive, particularly section 504. And I will go into the details in some other forum.

Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman for his insight and for his leadership on this important issue, and particularly his highlighting that the timing, Mr. Speaker, is an illusion, as the gentleman said, to think this all turns on a dime on the 1st of June.

With that, I would like to yield to the gentleman from North Carolina

(Mr. Hudson).

Mr. HUDSON. Mr. Speaker, the nuclear deal agreed upon with Iran is shameful. There is no better example of this than Iran's announcement just days after the agreement was reached to open a new nuclear weapon plant that is not even subject to IAEA inspection.

Any nuclear deal must include swift and decisive action that forces Iran to completely abandon its crusade to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. We must not give a dangerous regime with a penchant for terrorism and extremism the capability to build a weapon before the world can react.

A nuclear-equipped Iran is the most dangerous threat to Israel, the world, and to the stability of the Middle East. Indeed, with a nuclear weapons capability, Iran is a direct threat to the United States.

Mr. Speaker, negotiations like this require serious discussions about our foreign policy in the Middle East, not a reckless decision by President Obama that weakens our national security, threatens our allies, and lacks the support of this Congress and, frankly, the American people.

Reducing sanctions now merely rewards bad behavior and fundamentally halts the progress we have already made. Indeed, instead of reducing our influence and taking steps backward, we must pursue every avenue to ensure that Iran does not engage in nuclear weapons proliferation and, most importantly, does not develop a nuclear weapon.

The only suitable agreement is one that starts with Iran ending their uranium enrichment program; otherwise, we should not loosen sanctions on this bad actor.

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn).

Mr. LAMBORN. I thank Representative Peter Roskam, a leader on the U.S.-Israel relationship here in Congress. He and I are two of the cochairs of the Republican Israel Caucus.

I share with many colleagues on both sides of the aisle deep concern over the interim agreement that this administration has reached with Iran over its nuclear program. We have struck a deal that irreversibly weakens sanctions against a country that is infamous for deception and deceit--a deal that does nothing about the infrastructure of its nuclear program.

In the weeks since the accord was announced, we already see the first signs of how these sanctions--which are what brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place--are being eroded by other countries eager to resume trade with Iran, as many of us predicted.

Weakening the sanctions now without demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear program takes away our leverage. They have not stopped a single one of its 19,000 centrifuges from enriching uranium. They are not dismantling their plutonium plant either, a plant which has absolutely no peaceful civilian purpose.

We are witnessing a recurrence of the kind of effort that failed to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, but in an even more volatile and dangerous region of the world. All this is being done with a country that our own State Department has long defined as the chief state sponsor of international terrorism and which is determined to get nuclear weapons.

By giving up our leverage in return for a flawed interim agreement, we are only reducing the chances that a productive accord can ever be reached with Iran over its nuclear program where Iran actually renounces its right to enrich uranium.

Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Rodney Davis).

Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Thank you to my good friend and colleague from the great State of Illinois (Mr. Roskam) for leading this Special Order on a very important subject.

We have concerns. We should have concerns over a deal with Iran, especially as Americans. It wasn't too long ago that President Clinton told us that North Korea would abide by a similar deal. They agreed to stop their nuclear ambitions in order to get sanctions lifted and get billions in aid from the United States. But they went ahead and secretly continued their program. I caution this administration and the American people to make sure that this doesn't happen again with Iran.

This interim deal allows Iran to continue enriching uranium to the 5 percent purity level and to keep building new centrifuges to repair old ones. It calls for Iran to convert 20 percent of enriched uranium either to fuel or to a diluted 5 percent stock. But these processes can easily be reversed, especially since this interim deal does not force Iran to disassemble the infrastructure that allowed it to produce enriched uranium in the first place.

A nuclear Iran is a grave danger to our friend and greatest ally in the Middle East, the State of Israel; the rest of our allies throughout the world; and our own American foreign policy interests. As Henry Kissinger noted in The Wall Street Journal:

The heart of the problem is Iran's construction of massive nuclear infrastructure and stockpile of enriched uranium far out of proportion to any plausible civilian energy production.

I am very concerned that this interim deal does not address the issues at hand.

Furthermore, easing sanctions as part of the interim deal causes us to lose leverage at the negotiating table. As many of my colleagues have already mentioned, it is these sanctions that brought them to the negotiating table. We cannot lose sight of their effectiveness.

I actually happen to agree with my colleagues here in the House, like Mr. Roskam, and my Senator, Mark Kirk, that we should increase sanctions. That would give us a stronger negotiating stance and draw more concessions from Iran.

The world needs to be a much safer place for all of us. The only way to make it a safer place is to stop Iran's nuclear capabilities. Mr. Speaker, this deal does not do that.

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I will yield to the gentleman from Arizona

(Mr. Franks). As he is approaching the microphone, let me just make one point, and that is something that Mr. Davis just highlighted.

Sanctions are working. Sanctions have brought the Iranians to the table. So think of it this way. You have got a hold of a pit bull. You have got it. It is a very dangerous animal and it is ferocious, and if you let go of it, it may come and attack you. Why in the world, if you have got it under control or under some semblance of control, would you say, ``You know what? Let's loosen our grip and try this again''?

It doesn't make any sense.

I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I certainly thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I would suggest there are two components to every threat in terms of national security that this country and other nations face. That first component is that of intent, and the second is that of capacity.

If one listens to the rhetoric that the Iranian leaders have spoken in recent years, the intent issue should be settled clearly in our minds. The question that remains is their capacity.

I would suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that if, indeed, Iran gains a nuclear weapons capability, the world will step into the shadow of nuclear terrorism. Terrorists the world over will have indirect access to nuclear weapons. My children and those of the Members in this body will face a forever future that is uncertain every step they take.

Mr. Speaker, about 8 years ago, I stood here in this same spot and called for Iran to be referred to the Security Council. At that time, they had only 160 centrifuges. Of course, the call for them to be referred to the Security Council was diminished in that people said they needed 3,000 centrifuges for a full-blown nuclear weapons program. Today, Mr. Speaker, Iran has 19,000 centrifuges. Those centrifuges will continue to spin--most of them--under this agreement that the President has announced.

This agreement the President has announced ignores not only U.S. law, but ignores the UN sanctions that are in place. It also ignores the fact that Iran has not made any concessions in this area in the last 30 years. It also ignores the position that this deal puts Israel in--one that is untenable and more impossible than any I have seen in my lifetime.

The naivete of this administration in dealing with Iran is something that is simply breathtaking.

Mr. Speaker, I would just suggest to you that if Iran gains nuclear weapons, we will need a new calendar. It will change our reality in the world that much. And I would say to you that, while there is still time, we need to act.

Mr. Speaker, there is that moment in the life of every problem when it is big enough to be seen and still small enough to be addressed, but in terms of Iran's nuclear weapons pursuit, that window is closing quickly. And whatever this body can do, whatever this President can do to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapons capability, must be done, because soon they will have the ability to ignore our entreaties and only a military intervention will prevent it.

Mr. Speaker, whatever our cost is for preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, it will pale in its significance compared to the cost of allowing Iran to become a nuclear-armed nation.

Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, it is an amazing thing to think about how aggressive Iran has been without a nuclear weapon. It is a worldwide sponsor of terror, incredibly aggressive, and going after and making threats about the Strait of Hormuz and so forth. Can you even imagine what it would be like as a nation if it had a nuclear threat behind it? It would change the dynamic entirely.

I think one of the weaknesses of the administration's proposed deal is this: it puts the imprimatur of approval on enrichment. Up until now, it has been American policy that says, You can't enrich. You have no right to a nuclear capability.

And let's be frank. There is nobody with a straight face that is saying that the Iranians have any interest in pursuing nuclear technology because of an interest in global warming. This is not an energy pursuit at all. It is clearly a pursuit to manipulate the world stage toward their ends that are oftentimes driven by terror.

One of the great advocates of a strong U.S.-Israeli relationship and one of the great advocates of a strong U.S. foreign policy is the gentlelady from Florida, former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to whom I now yield.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Mr. Roskam for his leadership in spearheading this discussion on the dangers of last month's interim nuclear agreement deal with Iran.

As we have had more time to dissect this deal, it is becoming clearer and clearer that, despite Secretary Kerry's claim that no deal is better than a bad deal, we have been had.

In exchange for the one thing that Iran so desperately needs--

sanctions relief to jump-start its flailing economy--the administration received nothing more than window dressing to stop Iran's nuclear program.

This interim deal is the unraveling of the sanctions policy that was so painstakingly crafted over the past 10 years. It was aimed at bringing Iran's nuclear program to an end. We have already seen other nations eager to get back into the Iranian market, and it will now be nearly impossible to stop the cash infusion into the Iranian regime.

{time} 1745

How can we stop this?

This deal is contrary to U.S. sanctions law. It is contrary to U.N. Security Council resolutions that explicitly prohibit Iran from being able to enrich its own uranium.

By accepting this deal, the administration has acquiesced to Iran's illegitimate claim to a right to enrich uranium, and it has done nothing to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure of Iran's. Any temporary pause in Iran's progress can now be easily started right up again with no real detriment to Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons capability.

The administration has struck a deal with an Iranian regime that is one of the world's biggest supporters of terrorism and is a U.S.-

designated state sponsor of terrorism. It has offered sanctions relief to the very same man who only 10 years ago, while serving as the chief nuclear negotiator of Iran to the West, boasted of using deception to buy time for Iran's nuclear program to progress. Yet the administration has fallen for what I call the ``Rouhani ruse.''

We have already seen Iran announce that it will continue construction on its plutonium plant at Arak, with some experts believing that Iran will exploit a possible loophole in the agreement to allow it to build important components of this heavy water reactor off site; and we continue to see Iran make advances on other nuclear weapons programs not addressed in the interim agreement, such as the development of ballistic missile technology needed to launch a nuclear payload over long distances.

Mr. Speaker, not only is this interim deal dangerous for the precedent that it sets--that rogue regimes will get rewarded at the expense of our friends and allies who do play by the rules--but the deal is also dangerous because it weakens our credibility and harms our relations with other countries.

This sends a terrible message to other countries in the region that have long feared Iran becoming nuclear but have refrained from seeking their own nuclear programs because the United States had promised that we would not allow Iran to enrich uranium or to complete its heavy water reactor. This deal will create a loss of trust from other regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and others, who now see a double standard from the United States. Our closest friend and ally--the democratic Jewish State of Israel--continues to feel an existential threat from Iran.

President Obama has weakened the trust and the credibility of the United States and, in exchange, has strengthened the legitimacy of the illegitimate Iranian regime. It is a double whammy--we lose stature while elevating a dangerous regime. And all for what--our ability to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and an all-out arms race in the Middle East? It is not going to happen. We are going to see a nuclear-armed Iran, and we are going to see an all-out arms race in the Middle East. We have tarnished our relationships with our trusted allies.

I remain committed, Mr. Speaker and Mr. Roskam, to ensuring that Iran never becomes a nuclear-capable country. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to take up the sanctions legislation that we in the House overwhelmingly passed earlier this year.

Mr. Speaker, Iran has no right whatsoever to enrichment. There can be no ambiguity here. The United States must not accept any new deal with Iran that does not end Iran's enrichment program completely and that does not completely dismantle the nuclear infrastructure of this dangerous regime.

I thank Mr. Roskam for his leadership, and we will continue to fight.

Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentlelady.

At this time, I would like to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Weber).

Mr. WEBER of Texas. I thank the gentleman from Illinois, our distinguished deputy whip.

Mr. Speaker, this House disagrees on almost every issue brought before it. However, this is one issue on which this House agrees: we all agree that we must never allow a nuclear-armed Iran.

Repeatedly, this Congress has passed resolutions condemning a nuclear Iran as well as having passed multiple pieces of legislation strengthening an Iranian sanctions policy in the hopes of halting their progress. A number of resolutions calling for sanctions, increased scrutiny and the cessation of enrichment have also passed the U.N. Security Council. Yet instead of tightening the sanctions policy--a policy which has forced Iran to the negotiations table in the first place--this administration seems hell-bent on easing those sanctions and on allowing the release of billions of dollars in assets and finances to Iran. Even more incredulous, we still don't have a finalized deal, much less even know the details of what they are planning.

As a result of this administration's easement, Iran is already threatening an oil price war within OPEC, and companies around the world are jockeying to play in a country that still has no restrictions upon enrichment or upon nuclear weaponization. The terms of the so-

called ``deal,'' still under negotiation, allow Iran to continue enrichment, directly violating multiple U.N. resolutions, directly violating U.S. stated policy, and directly violating international stated policy.

The Institute for Science and International Security recently published a report indicating that Iran was a mere few months away from reaching that nuclear threshold. However, this administration's negotiations do nothing regarding dismantling systems obviously aimed at weaponization. They do nothing regarding the removal of uranium enriched beyond civilian needs. They do nothing regarding work on delivery systems or ballistic missiles, and they do nothing to stop the enrichment currently taking place. In essence, Iran has received everything it has wanted, and we have gotten nothing. Christmas has come early in Iran.

The Iranian Government, Mr. Speaker, is not to be trusted. It has been demonstrated time and time again. If we intend to keep our country safe and strong, we cannot grant concessions without first verifying behavioral changes from politically unstable countries like Iran. We tried that tact, Mr. Speaker, in North Korea. How has that been working for us?

Members of Congress should refuse to stay silent on this issue. It is time for the Senate to step up to the plate and pass the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act. It is way past time for our administration and our negotiators to take a hard-line stand against this evil.

Here is a plan to do that. Let's demand some action. I will give you seven things:

(1) Demand that Iran stops human rights violations and releases all political hostages, including Americans like Pastor Saeed Abedini, former U.S. marine Amir Hekmati, and ex-FBI agent Robert Levinson;

(2) Stop the exportation of terrorism and renounce terrorism;

(3) Stop all the centrifuges; destroy them; and allow unlimited access from the IAEA;

(4) Publicly apologize to America and Israel for calling them the large and small Satan;

(5) Recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state;

(6) Withdraw from Syria if they want to prove that Iran is serious.

(7) Wait a year to show the world they are serious, and perform those six functions. We want action, Mr. Speaker, not promises.

As former Senator Phil Gramm once stated:

If the lion is going to lie down with the lamb, then we want America to be the lion.

We want to use our strength, to show our strength, to negotiate from a position of strength. To do anything else may make Israel the sacrificial lamb. This current administration needs to understand that this deal is a bad deal.

I am Randy Weber, and there you have it.

Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman for his insight and for his perspective and for his admonition for action.

Mr. Speaker, at this point, I would like to yield to the gentlelady from Indiana (Mrs. Walorski), a member of the Armed Services Committee.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Roskam, for your leadership on the issue and for the opportunity to speak about this issue tonight.

Mr. Speaker, in his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, President Barack Obama said:

Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.

On March 4, 2012, President Obama again stated his desire to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. He said:

Iran's leaders should understand that I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

On October 22, 2012, President Obama said of Iran:

The clock is ticking . . . and we are going to make sure that, if they do not meet the demands of the international community, then we are going to take all options necessary to make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon.

Fourteen months later, the clock is still ticking, and Iran is now closer to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

Now that world leaders have reached an interim agreement on Iran's illegal nuclear program, we must be able to verify compliance and demand that any final deal completely dismantle Tehran's existing nuclear program.

There are three reasons this is imperative and for the international community to demand the suspension of nuclear enrichment:

First, Tehran must stop all enrichment activities because Iran is in noncompliance with the highest form of international law:

Iran is in direct violation of mandatory U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding them to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing. By not requiring Iran to abide by multiple U.N. resolutions, we are rewarding bad behavior. We are signaling to the entire world that we are not serious about preventing the spread of nuclear weaponry;

Second, a nuclear-armed Iran threatens our national security. The threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is not something that is just talked about in the Halls of this Congress. Every time I am home, I hear the fears of Hoosiers who worry about how acts of terrorism might impact gas prices, food prices, and the well-being of loved ones. Since 1984, our government has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. The State Department has characterized Iran as the ``most active state sponsor of terrorism'' in the world. Iran has provided weapons, training and funding to terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq, who are responsible for the murders of hundreds of U.S. servicemembers and innocent civilians;

Third, a nuclear-armed Iran threatens to further destabilize an already volatile region: If Iran is allowed to further pursue its nuclear ambitions, the region--highlighted by perpetual conflict in places like Iraq, Syria and Yemen--will become more destabilized. Furthermore, a nuclear-armed Iran will jeopardize the safety of our allies and partners in the region, like Israel.

I believe--now more than ever--the United States must renew our unbreakable commitment to Israel and her inherent right to self-

defense.

Iran's continued violation of U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency restrictions have only given the world good reason to question Iran's willingness to abide by any future international agreement.

Mr. Roskam and Mr. Speaker, I call on the President to remember his words to the American people about preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and I urge the President to use all tools at his disposal, including additional sanctions, to persuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Mr. ROSKAM. Thank you, Mrs. Walorski.

Mr. Speaker, at this point, I would like to yield to the gentlelady from Minnesota (Mrs. Bachmann), a member of the House Intelligence Committee.

Mrs. BACHMANN. Mr. Speaker, I want to say thank you to my colleague, Peter Roskam. We came in together when we won our election in 2006. It has been a privilege to serve with Mr. Roskam, who is not only the head and cochair of the Israel Caucus but who is also a strong defender of a strong United States national security posture--one that has helped to lead the world into safety for decades and one that we continue to maintain for the benefit of the American people.

{time} 1800

You see, this is a very interesting time that we are in. We have virtually watched the hinge of history turn just in the events of these last several weeks.

Why do I say that? I say that because the Obama administration and the negotiators of the Obama administration have entered into a deal that could effectively guarantee that Iran will obtain the certainty of a nuclear weapon. Now, I know that it is the stated intention of the Obama administration that just the opposite of that will happen, but there is a big difference between theory and intention and the outcome of the result.

Today, we listened to members from the Obama administration and members of the negotiating team from the Obama administration, and they seem quite convinced in the theory of stopping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The theory goes something like this. It says we believe that Iran has the capacity to continue to enrich uranium and do it for a peaceful purpose. They believe that it is possible to verify that Iran would do that.

But what about the reality? What is the reality of what the supreme leader of Iran has said their intentions are with this program? Just prior to the signing of the agreement, the supreme leader was not vague; he was quite clear. He gave a speech on press TV. He wanted the world to know what his intentions were. He gave a speech in front of tens of thousands of paramilitary troops in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He said that ``it will be Iran's position that we will not change our nuclear program one iota.'' So apparently, according to the supreme leader, the program that Iran has originally envisioned it will go on. ``It will go on at the same pace that it was going on before without any change.''

Once the agreement was struck, there was a real question, and the question was this: Will Iran maintain the indigenous inherent ``right'' to enrich uranium? You see, that is the whole ball game, Mr. Speaker: Will Iran have the right to enrich uranium?

What do you need to build a nuclear weapon? You need fuel for that weapon, whether it is plutonium or whether it is uranium. Iran wants to make sure that they achieve the goal, so they are engaging both in developing plutonium and uranium. They have a heavy water reactor, the Iraq facility, and the Iraq facility is under construction. We have a 6-month interim agreement where we are supposed to get to a final negotiation. The plutonium facility is not built yet, but it is under construction.

One of those items is building a road to the reactor. That road continues to be built. There is no effort to stop that from being done. There is virtually no way for us to be able to stop mobile components from being built elsewhere and eventually brought into the heavy water reactor for the plutonium site. That is an issue. That is a big issue, and the other one being enrichment.

We know today that Iran has something like 19,000 centrifuges. A minimum 10,000 of those centrifuges are spinning, so much so that the estimate is they have somewhere between 9 and 10 tons of enriched uranium.

If we were serious about stopping Iran from creating a nuclear weapon, there are several simple things we would do. We would make sure that Iran would shut down the heavy water plutonium reactor and we would make sure that Iran would dismantle, take a sledgehammer to the centrifuges. Gone. That hasn't happened. Not to one. The centrifuges remain. So if you have centrifuges enriching, if you have enriched uranium, if you are continuing to enrich, I would say you have got a program.

This is very interesting because we just concluded a negotiation. From my experience as a former Federal tax litigation attorney--I did a lot of negotiating--usually when two sides are negotiating, they do it for a reason, and the reason is because they want to be better off, both parties, they want to be better off based upon the agreement that they negotiated. It seems to me something happened along the way during this negotiation. It makes me wonder if the Obama administration negotiators forgot which side they were negotiating for.

Why do I say that? I say that because take a look at what Iran got out of the deal. And I want to give full attribution to Illinois Senator Mark Kirk, who created this terrific graphic. This is what Senator Kirk let's us know about the agreement.

What we are getting out of the deal are zero centrifuges dismantled. These are the machines that create the fuel for a nuclear weapon. Not one will be dismantled out of 19,000. Zero uranium of the 9 to 10 tons will be shipped out of Iran. So the material remains in Iran. The ability to continue to create more material remains in Iran. It looks like a pretty good get for Iran.

Zero nuclear facilities are closed. We know that there is even more than we thought originally. There is Natanz, there is Fordo, Parchin, and the plutonium reactor at Iraq, let alone other covert programs we are not aware of. There is also no delay on the plutonium reactor. In fact, the supreme leader in Iran made it abundantly clear. They said, we read the agreement to say that we are not going to stop any construction on the plutonium Iraq reactor. I would say that is a violation of the agreement right there.

What has been the reaction of the Obama administration? What has been the reaction of the negotiators? Do they have egg on their faces? Do they look a little foolish from this agreement that they struck? We haven't heard anything from the current negotiators.

There is also no stop in the missile testing. So if Iran has a nuclear weapon, if they have the fuel for a nuclear weapon, and if they have the capability to deliver that weapon through missile testing, I would say they have got something. There is also no stopping terrorism from Iran and there is no stopping human rights abuses.

Many Americans aren't aware that there are Americans who are being held hostage today in Iran. When Ronald Reagan dealt with the Soviet Union to try to end the Cold War, Ronald Reagan handed the Soviets a list of dissidents that he wanted freed in order for him to begin these talks with the Soviet Union. He sent a signal to the Soviet Union. It said, in America we believe every American life counts. That sent a very strong message.

In the case of the Obama administration negotiators, they didn't even bring it up. They didn't demand that one American be released before we talk. Now, this is interesting because the Obama administration put a lot of pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel. He said, You, Mr. Prime Minister, have to agree to release over 100 murderous thugs, including murderers who murdered an American, before the Palestinians will come to the table to negotiate with you on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. That was our President who put pressure under the prime minister--you have got to release thugs in order to negotiate. We would put that kind of pressure on Israel and we wouldn't put that kind of pressure on Iran?

You see, that is why, Mr. Speaker, I ask the question: Did the negotiators forget which Nation they were negotiating for? Because it looks to me like the score is pretty clear: United States zero, Iran made out on the deal.

The sad thing about that final score--and let's hope it is not the final score--is that, again, the hinge of history turns. If you have an Iran with a nuclear weapon, it won't be just Iran. You will explode proliferation. Saudi Arabia will have a nuclear weapon. Egypt will have a nuclear weapon. We will have a nuclear weapon most likely in Lebanon. And then at that point, what will happen with terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, al Qaeda, the al-Nusra Front, and on and on from there? The world changes. The hinge of history turns.

That is why this isn't political. That is why it is bipartisan here tonight. It is why Mr. Roskam has taken this very important courageous step of holding this time when Members of Congress can weigh in, because we aren't about bashing the Obama administration. That is not why we are here. We are here because we believe in national security--

America's national security, Israel's national security--and peace across the world. That is Pax Americana. America doing everything that we can to be forward of keeping the peace in the world.

This action nearly guarantees war and a threat of a nuclear strike. We can prevent that. But the final deal that comes out in these final P5+1 negotiations must be very simple: close down the plutonium reactor, zero right to enrich for Iran, and zero processing. If you do that, then we will have a deal.

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, we have had a discussion tonight that has been incredibly robust. It has been bipartisan. We have had insight from members of the Intelligence Committee, the Armed Services Committee, Members who have had a long-term interest in Middle Eastern affairs and American military affairs, all of whom, Mr. Speaker, have a clear view of history. A clear view of history says let's look back at past activities as the best indicator of what the future is going to be like.

In summary, Mr. Speaker, what we know is this. That the administration has struck a bad deal, maybe for all the right reasons, but they have struck a bad deal. It is the responsibility of Congress not to put its imprimatur of support on a bad deal, but to act as a coequal branch of government and say, We ought not do this. We have got to recognize the weakness of it. We have got to recognize the long-term consequences of it, and we have got to hold this administration accountable.

I yield back the balance of my time.

General Leave

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of the Special Order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago, we learned that the Obama Administration, along with representatives of the so-called P5+1 countries, had reached an agreement with Iran on freezing nuclear enrichment and relieving a portion of the sanctions that have been rightfully levied against Iran.

I think it is a positive step to have engaged Iran and to have reached a multilateral agreement. Certainly, freezing their nuclear enrichment, diluting the enrichment levels of Iran's uranium stocks, and reestablishing intrusive IAEA inspections are improvements over the current situation.

However, while I appreciate the need for a course of action that addresses the threat of a nuclear armed Iran, I maintain strong concerns about this agreement.

Foremost, I have serious doubts about the amount of trust we can extend to Iran. Engaging in negotiations that merely freeze their nuclear enrichment is a far cry from Iran foreswearing nuclear weapons, not to mention their abhorrent support for terrorism in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and beyond. We must recall that this is the same fundamentalist regime that has supported the murder of Israelis in Argentina, has cast doubt on the existence of the Holocaust, and that enabled attacks on American military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Amazingly, despite the supposed goodwill of the agreement, three Americans continue to be detained in Iran. I find it extremely regrettable that the release of these Americans--Pastor Saeed Abedini, former U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati and ex-FBI Agent Robert Levinson--was considered marginal to the nuclear issue, and could not be addressed simultaneously while negotiations occurred in Geneva. These Americans' families are understandably left in pain as they wonder about their loved ones' welfare, and what it will ultimately take to get them home. This speaks volumes about the intents and reputability of the Iranian regime--how can we trust a government to follow through on an agreement about nuclear issues when they continue to hold our citizens captive?

I am also very concerned about the implicit acceptance, if not endorsement, of Iran's right to enrich uranium. Numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions have stipulated that Iran must stop enrichment and set-aside its nuclear program. Yet, somehow, this agreement falls short of that previously established UN mandate. While it may be acknowledging the nuclear capacity that Iran has achieved, I cannot accept that.

It is unclear to me what peaceful need Iran has for uranium enrichment. There are international offers on the table to develop and fuel nuclear power plants and to provide medically necessary isotopes for Iran, in order to eliminate their purported need for indigenous nuclear capability. But Iran would prefer to deny those offers, and use the ruse of power and medicine to enable its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

This agreement even allows Iran to maintain the facilities, centrifuges and basic stockpiles that have enabled their nuclear pursuits. Remarkably, the Iranian military facility at Parchin, where research on a nuclear weapon has been widely suspected, is not included in the inspection program and imposes no restrictions on activities at this site.

Though the opportunity to use these implements may be forestalled for now, should a subsequent agreement not materialize, Iran could return to its current nuclear capacity in short order, and have billions of dollars' worth of sanctions relief in hand, with little long-term benefit to show from this short-term accord.

Yet, an agreement has been reached and we have to accept that as the reality at the moment. Nonetheless, I think it is important for the U.S. Congress to continue to pursue new sanctions that are contingent on Iran's absolute adherence to this agreement, and earnest engagement towards a deeper, longer-term agreement that further removes Iran's nuclear capacity. We must make clear that there will be swift and severe consequences should Iran deviate from the agreement. And, we must continue to aggressively counter their terrorism threat, meddling in the security affairs of the region, and abuse of human and religious rights.

We must maintain a strong posture towards the Iranian regime, as they have done nothing to earn the trust of the United States, or the western world in general. Iran remains a threat to regional and global security, and we must not neglect or forget that.

Implementing this agreement and pursuing any longer-term accord must be done with open eyes to the real threat that Iran has been and continues to be.

____________________

SOURCE: Congressional Record Vol. 159, No. 171

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