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“UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INDONESIA” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S11232-S11234 on Sept. 25, 1996.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INDONESIA
Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I rise today to make a few brief remarks about United States policy in Indonesia.
I am deeply concerned about some of the views being expressed by some members of the Clinton administration, and am particularly concerned because the administration has been quite culpable in the past with regard to aspects of our Indonesia policy. Despite a violent crackdown in Jakarta on July 27--not quite 2 months ago--this administration says it still intends to go forward with the sale of nine F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia.
Mr. President, the administration had fully intended to send up notification of this sale earlier this month. Fortunately, objections from myself and many of my colleagues convinced the administration that now was not the right time to announce officially the intention to sell fighter jets to Indonesia.
I am pleased that--for the time being--this sale cannot move forward, at least until Congress reconvenes in January.
But what concerns me today, Mr. President, are recent statements that suggest that the administration necessarily will attempt to notify Congress again in January--apparently without conditioning this move on any actions by the Indonesian authorities either in the past or in the coming months.
Given the history of human right abuses in Indonesia, as well as the events of July 27, I find this attitude difficult to accept.
Last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on United States policy toward Indonesia. We heard from two very capable administration witnesses and four distinguished private panelists, including a political science professor from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
As one of the witnesses commented, this may have been the first hearing in many years to look at the full scope of American ties to Indonesia.
Mr. President, I recognize that Indonesia is an important country and a valuable ally. It is the largest country in Southeast Asia, and its population of more than 200 million people is the fourth largest in the world. It plays a significant role in Asian affairs, and has been instrumental in conflict resolution efforts in the region. It also has been an important ally of the United States in international forums, such as the United Nations.
I also salute Indonesia's economic success, and believe there are many valuable lessons in Indonesia's experience which can be applied to other developing countries across the world.
Mr. President, these achievements cannot--and do not--excuse Indonesia's consistently dismal record on human rights and its continuous assault on democratic freedoms.
Mr. President, I am particularly concerned about the massive human rights abuses that continue in East Timor.
As we all know, Indonesia has sustained a brutal military occupation of East Timor since 1975. Human rights organizations from around the world, as well as our own State Department, continue to report substantial human rights violations by the Indonesian military--
including arbitrary arrests and detentions, curbs on freedom of expression and association, and the use of torture and summary killings of civilians.
More recently, we have heard reports of the Indonesian military conducting systematic training of East Timorese youth to take part in local militia groups. We also have heard disturbing reports of increasing religious and ethnic tension in East Timor, which at times is exacerbated by government inaction.
On top of the ongoing pattern in East Timor, the July 27 events in Jakarta reinforce my perception of an Indonesian regime that squashes alternative political discourse.
On that day, hundreds of people rioted after President Soeharto attempted to oust Megawati Sukarnoputri, a popular opposition leader, from her position as chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI.
During the riot, arson-led fires caused considerable property damage. At least five people were killed, at least 149 injured, and hundreds arrested. But, as Human Rights Watch reports, many of those arrested did not appear to be responsible for initiating the riot. Instead, most were linked, or accused of being linked, to the reform movement or specifically to the Megawati camp.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a September 20, 1996, article from the Washington Post which describes how difficult it is for Megawati to operate as an opposition candidate after government officials ousted her as party leader, threatened to shut down party headquarters, and arrested many of her supporters.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Indonesian Says Slow Approach Avoids a Trap
(By Keith B. Richburg)
Jakarta, Indonesia, Sept. 19--Police are still hauling in her supporters for questioning. Already more than 100 languish in jail, and dozens others are missing. A member of parliament, she has been left off the list of candidates for next year's parliamentary elections, meaning she may lose her only official platform for challenging the government. Now the police say they will shut down her new headquarters because it violates local zoning laws.
These are trying times for Indonesia's premier opposition leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Just a few months after she emerged from virtual obscurity to become the first real rallying point for opposition to President Suharto's 30-year rule, Sukarnoputri finds herself besieged, harassed, called in for questioning like a common criminal, facing the likelihood of being sidelined from her country's tightly controlled political process--and grappling with the mounting impatience of her own supporters.
But even with these pressures weighing on her, Sukarnoputri remains surprisingly sanguine, unhurried, almost eerily serene. She is not out on the streets, not leading rallies, not exhorting her followers. This morning, she is seated at the dining room table of her spacious house in Jakarta's south suburbs, taking a Spanish lesson from her regular tutor.
What has learning Spanish got to do with leading a ``people power'' movement against Asia's longest-serving and most durable leader?
``I think it will be easier for me to communicate with Latin American people,''; Sukarnoputri explains later, after the tutor has left for the day. ``And also Spanish is more important in the United States,'' she adds, citing the increasing Hispanic population there.
Sukarnoputri clearly has her own agenda. And while her backers and sympathizers may be growing frustrated, she is determined to proceed at her own slow and steady pace, careful not to engage the government in direct confrontation and not be goaded by her more radical followers.
``They want me to do something more concrete, like have a rally,'' she said. ``But at the moment, I think that is not a good tactic, because so many people are still intimidated.''
She said the political situation remains tense after a July 27 riot--prompted by a government raid--in which five people were killed and several banks and government offices gutted by fire. The government used the riot as a pretext to launch a widespread crackdown on opposition organizers, labor leaders, human rights activists and anyone else suspected of links to the long-dormant and outlawed Indonesian Communist Party, which tried to foment revolution here three decades ago.
The most serious anti-government outburst in recent memory, the July riot erupted after police backed by army troops raided the old headquarters of the officially sanctioned Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI, to oust a group of Sukarnoputri supporters who had occupied the building in protest of a government-orchestrated party coup that replaced her as party leader. The government apparently feared that Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia's charismatic first president, Sukarno, could become a potent challenger to the incumbent Suharto.
Sukarnoputri said today that she did not believe her supporters were involved in the rioting, but that the violence was sparked by government agents who wanted to discredit her movement and use the unrest as the pretext for the wider crackdown that followed.
``It could not have been common people,'' she said. ``It must have been professionals. . . . I think there was some engineering. How could common people burn so many high buildings in such a short time? I think they wanted to make a trigger, a trap, for people who are pro-democracy.''
Sukarnoputri said her go slowly, softly approach--for example, not calling any new street protests and, thus, not defying a government ban on rallies--is to avoid falling into another ``trap.'' She said: ``So many people try to make moves, to push, to push PDI to use violence or hard action. But if we do, they will trap us, just like that riot.''
Some observers here--Western diplomats, journalists, academics--say Sukarnoputri may be correct, that moving too quickly with mass actions will expose more of her supporters to arrest, prison, or worse.
But many also say that with her quiet approach, Sukarnoputri may have let her moment pass, that the momentum and publicity generated by the government's heavy-handed takeover of party headquarters may already be lost.
``I don't think she's in an enviable position,'' a Western diplomat said. ``She can maintain her status as a symbol of opposition, but without doing anything, that fades.''
The other legal challenges and obstacles Sukarnoputri faces may prove even more damaging to her long-term ability to mount a credible challenge to the regime.
On Monday, the day for filing candidate lists for next June's parliamentary elections, the anti-Sukarnoputri faction of the Democratic Party showed up early in the morning at the National Election Commission offices with a list of names that did not include Sukarnoputri or any of her supporters. When a Sukarnoputri deputy came that afternoon with a separate ``Megawati slate,'' election officials refused to accept it.
Sukarnoputri is challenging her ouster as party leader in Indonesian courts, and she said she also will file suit to have her candidates' list accepted. If she is not a candidate next year, she will lose her seat and whatever slim chance she may have had of running against Suharto for the presidency in the next election in two years. (The Indonesian president is not directly elected but voted on by a people's assembly.) Under Indonesia's restricted political system, if Sukarnoputri loses her current parliamentary seat, she will be unable to gather supporters, make speeches or call political rallies.
But Sukarnoputri is undeterred. She said she insists on exhausting all legal remedies first, mainly as a way to test the independence of the country's judiciary. If she is prevented from running for office next year, she said, her exclusion will serve to point out flaws in the electoral process.
``It will be a big problem for the government,'' she said.
``There are already so many people protesting to the government [about] why I, a popular and sympathetic person in the country, am not on the national list. People will see the election is not free and fair.''
But even if she loses, Sukarnoputri disagrees with the analysis that her stature will fade.
In our culture, there is not only a formal leader. There is also an informal leader,'' she said. ``Sometimes the informal leader can be more powerful than the formal leader. You can see how my father, even though he has already passed away, in spirit still lives inside the Indonesian people.''
She added, ``I'm sure about that.''
Mr. FEINGOLD. The climate described in the article clearly is not one that supports freedom of expression, freedom of the press or freedom of association.
The events of July 27 underscore the Government's intention to foster a repressive climate in the months leading up to the 1997 parliamentary elections.
As the New York Times declared in a recent editorial, ``This is no time to be selling high-performance warplanes to Indonesia.''
The administration says its policy is ``to make available to Indonesia military equipment that will support legitimate external defense needs.'' At the same time, the United States will not export or transfer to Indonesia small arms, crowd control equipment or armored personnel carriers until we have seen significant improvement in human rights in the country, particularly in East Timor.
Mr. President, I am pleased that the Congress and the administration have worked together to develop a policy linking the sale of small arms to Indonesia to its human rights record. This policy evolved from an amendment that I offered to the foreign aid appropriations bill several years ago.
But I believe that we are missing an important opportunity to apply pressure to the Indonesian regime by failing to impose comparable conditions on the F-16 sale. In fact, in public statements since congressional notification was delayed, the administration has not even mentioned human rights or democratic values in connection with the sale.
Instead, it continues to state publicly that it intends to go through with the sale as early as January.
I believe official advocacy of the F-16 sale sends the wrong message to the Indonesian military. It sends the message that--despite our concerns about the lack of respect for human rights in East Timor and despite the continued failure of the Indonesian military to respond substantively to these concerns--the United States will continue to supply substantial amounts of lethal military equipment to Indonesia.
If the events of July 27 tell us nothing else, they should signal to us that Indonesia still has a long way to go in terms of respect for human rights and democratic values.
I believe that we should support progress in these areas--only when real progress actually is achieved. Instead, within weeks of a major crackdown by the Indonesian authorities, the administration persists in its plans to provide Indonesia with nine advanced military planes.
I do not think now is the time to be rewarding Indonesia with nine planes. Only when we see some improvement in Indonesia's conduct should we be elevating the level of our military ties to the country.
In sum, I continue to believe that--in Indonesia, as elsewhere--we must consider a military's human rights record as one of the determining factors in deciding whether or not the U.S. Government should license or facilitate a foreign arms sale.
As a result, I oppose the administration's plans to allow the transfer of the F-16's to Indonesia at this time, or in the near future, and I intend to work with a number of other Members of the Senate who share that view to persuade the administration that a change in policy is warranted here.
Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
(The remarks of Mr. Graham pertaining to the introduction of S. 2121 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
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