The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“NORTH KOREA NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Commerce was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E1267-E1268 on July 19, 2000.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
NORTH KOREA NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000
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HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
of new york
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, July 18, 2000
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce H.R. 4860, the
``North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2000''.
I am offering this bipartisan legislation in response to North Korea's ongoing proliferation of missile and other dangerous weapons technologies to terrorist and other rogue states. The United States and our allies have worked hard to rein in North Korea's dangerous missile program. There have, from time to time, been signs of progress. But a recent headline in New York Times accurately summarizes North Korea's current policy: ``North Korea Vows to Continue Missile Program''.
This New York Times story described North Korea's reaction to the latest round of diplomacy between the United States and North Korea in which the North Koreans were asked once again to stop proliferating missile technolgy to rogue states. North Korea deigned to participate in this latest round of diplomacy with the United States following the Clinton Administration's termination of the 50-year old U.S. embargo of North Korea on June 19, 2000.
The process leading up to the Clinton Administration's termination of the embargo on June 19th is worth recounting, because it speaks volumes about North Korea's ability to wear down and outflank U.S. negotiators.
For years it was the Clinton Adminstration's policy that it would end the U.S. embargo of North Korea only in connection with a binding agreement in which North Korea promised to end missile prolieration. The prospect of ending the embargo was the principal inducement that the U.S. negotiators had to offer the North Koreans for such a deal.
But on August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a three-stage long range Taepo Dong missile across Japan, and the Japanese became very angry. So angry, in fact that they threatened to end their financial support of the Agreed Framework with North Korea--the 1994 agreement in which the Clinton Adminstration promised to give North Korea two advanced nuclear reactors worth approximately $5 billion in exchange for a ``freeze'' of North Korea's nuclear program.
The Clinton Administration became so alarmed about the risk of Japanese withdrawal from the Agreed Framework that it made the prevention of any more missile tests by North Korea its highest priority. Over the next year, the Administration negotiated diligently, and on September 12, 1999, it announced that North Korea had agreed to a temporary moratorium on further missile tests. In exchange for the moratorium, the Clinton Administration pledged that it would end the U.S. embargo of North Korea.
The Administration had, in other words, given away its leverage on the issue of missile proliferation for a temporary deal on missile testing. The U.S. negotiators charged with getting an agreement ending North Korean proliferation were left with no meaningful inducements to offer the North Koreans.
The Clinton Administration did not immediately end the embargo. For nine months, it held off doing so in the hope that a promised ``high level visitor'' from North Korea would come to the United States to formalize the moratorium on missile testing. No such visitor ever materialized, and the moratorium was never formalized, but on June 19, 2000, the Administration relented and ended the embargo anyway. In exchange, the North Koreans agreed to participate in another round of talks about missile proliferation.
The U.S. negotiators went to the talks with no meaningful inducements to offer, so the North Koreans boldly requested one: they offered to stop missile proliferation in exchange for $1 billion per year in cash from the United States.
The U.S. negotiators rejected this offer out of hand, but the North Korean request illustrates a broader truth: now that the Clinton Administration has effectively normalized economic relations with North Korea, it will have to come up with some other massive bribe in order to make progress on missile proliferation. Such a bribe can only help shore up the North Korean regime and strengthen its grip on power.
The North Korea Nonproliferation Act tries to overcome this dilemma by restoring the linkage between normalized economic relations with the United States and good behavior by North Korea with regard to proliferation. The bill does not reverse the Administration's decision to end the embargo, but it would require reimposition of the embargo in two circumstances: (1) if North Korea violates the missile testing moratorium, or (2) if it proliferates to a state sponsor of terrorism or a country that has tested long range missiles built with North Korean goods or technology.
The legislation provides the President a national interest waiver that he may exercise to promptly terminate the embargo of North Korea if it is reimposed pursuant to this legislation.
The effect of the legislation, therefore, is to underscore to the North Koreans that they cannot continue to proliferate dangerous weapons technologies to the world's most odious governments without paying a price in their relationship with the United States.
I am pleased to be joined in offering this legislation by some of the leaders within the Congress on the issue of proliferation: Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA), co-chair of the House Nonproliferation Task Force, Congressman Joe Knollenberg (R-MI), and Congressman Frank Pallone (D-
NJ).
Summary of H.R. 4860
North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2000
1. Reports to Congress.--The President shall submit a report to Congress every six months identifying all instances in which there is credible information that North Korea has--
(a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's obligations under--
(1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or
(2) any future international agreement in which North Korea agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation of missiles or missile technology; and
(b) transferred to a foreign country, on or after the date of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).
2. Discretionary Reimposition of Sanctions.--The President is authorized to reimpose any or all of the restrictions on commerce with North Korea that were in place under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, if a semiannual report to Congress under this Act indicates that there is credible information that, on or after the date of enactment, North Korea transferred to a foreign country goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list
(i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).
3. Mandatory Reimposition of Sanctions.--In addition, the president shall reimpose all of the restrictions on commerce with North Kroea that were in place under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, within 10 days of submitting a semiannual report to Congress under this Act indicating that there is credible information that North Korea has--
(a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's obligations under--
(1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or
(2) any future international agreement in which North Korea agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation of missiles or missile technology; or
(b) transferred, on or after the date of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists) to--
(1) any country listed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, or
(2) any country that has tested a long-range missile incorporating goods or technology knowingly transferred to such government by North Korea.
4. Determination that North Korea Did Not Knowingly Act.---In the case of any action by North Korea that otherwise would require the President to reimpose restrictions on commerce with North Korea, that requirement shall cease to apply if the President determines and reports to Congress that there is substantial doubt that North Korea knowingly took that action.
5. National Interest Waiver.--In any instance in which the President was required by this Act to reimpose restrictions on commerce with North Korea, he may, not less than 30 days after reimposing such restrictions, and following consultation with Congress, waive the continued imposition of such restrictions if he determines and reports to Congress that such waiver is important to U.S. national security interests of the United States.
6. Authorities of the President if North Korea Enters A Binding International Agreement Regarding Missile Proliferation.--If North Korea enters a binding international agreement that satisfies United States concerns regarding the transfer by North Korea to other countries of missiles and missile technology, the President is authorized to--
(a) support the commercial launch in the United States or other countries of satellites for North Korea; and
(b) waive sanctions that are in place against North Korea pursuant to U.S. missile technology and other nonproliferation legislation.
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