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“COUNTERING THE THREAT TO MONTENEGRO” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S7441-S7443 on July 21, 2000.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
COUNTERING THE THREAT TO MONTENEGRO
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the threat to Montenegro, the sole remaining free part of the Yugoslav federation.
In the decade of the 1990s, there were four mornings on which my colleagues and I awoke to a recurring headline: new war in the former Yugoslavia, started by Slobodan Milosevic.
First, in Slovenia. Next, in Croatia. Then, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, in Kosovo.
I do not want to ever read that headline again. I never want to read the headline that says: Milosevic starts new war in Montenegro.
So let's say it loud and clear: hands off Montenegro, Mr. Milosevic!
What is going on today in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, specifically, in the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro?
Why is it important for us to pay attention?
And what should be our stance toward developments there?
These are the questions I aim to answer in my remarks today.
Most of my colleagues are aware that ``Yugoslavia'' is an invented term. It was not the name with which that nation was born after the First World War. Rather, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes officially changed its name in 1929 to the ``Kingdom of Yugoslavia,'' meaning the kingdom of the South Slavs.
That was the first Yugoslavia, the one which perished in the course of the Second World War. Out of the ashes of World War II, the second Yugoslavia arose. That was Tito's Yugoslavia. Tito had been dead for a less than a decade when his Yugoslavia began to unravel at the start of the 1990s. And now, today, all that remains of Yugoslavia is an increasingly quarrelsome couple: Serbia and Montenegro.
Once Yugoslavia was a state of 20 million inhabitants, with five constituent republics plus two semi-autonomous provinces. And today? Slovenia, gone. Croatia, gone. Bosnia and Herzegovina, gone. Macedonia, gone. Kosovo, for all intents and purposes, gone.
The two republics of Serbia and Montenegro are what is left of Yugoslavia, Mr. President. And the undeniable fact is that many people in Montenegro want no more to do with that Yugoslav federation with Serbia as it is today.
Will Montenegro someday split off to become an independent nation-
state, like Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina? Maybe.
Will Montenegro someday become a partner with Serbia in a revitalized and restructured Yugoslavia? Maybe.
Will Montenegro wind up as a Serbian puppet-state, ruled from Belgrade by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic or some other Serbian authoritarian jingoist? Not if I have anything to say about it, and I hope my colleagues and the U.S. Government agree with me.
We simply must not take our eye off the ball, Mr. President. There is still a very serious risk that Milosevic will undermine and then overthrow the elected government of the Republic of Montenegro.
What would be the result of such a development? At a minimum--
Montenegrins executed or thrown in jail, others forced to flee abroad as refugees, Milosevic in charge of new borders with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo. At a maximum--war with a capital
``W'', in the Balkans, once again.
What is the seriousness of the threat today to Montenegro?
Earlier this month Milosevic made his latest move from Belgrade. He got the obedient legislature to approve changes to Yugoslavia's constitution.
The first major change was that henceforth the President of Yugoslavia will be directly elected. Guess who gets to run? Yes, Milosevic himself--who otherwise would have been obliged by the constitution to step down next year at his term's end. This means that Mr. Milosevic has, in effect, extended his legal ``shelf-life'' by as many as eight years.
The second major constitutional change was that the upper house of Yugoslavia's parliament henceforth will be elected proportionally. Mr. President, that's easy for us to understand. It means that, by comparison, in this Chamber, there would be a heck of a lot more Senators from California than from Delaware. In the case of Yugoslavia, it isn't hard to figure out the significance: Montenegro has 650,000 inhabitants; Serbia has 10 million.
This constitutional re-jiggering has fooled absolutely no one.
That it was immediately condemned, on July 8, both by Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic and by the legislature of the Republic of Montenegro. The vote in the Montenegrin legislature was 36 to 18 in favor of a vigorous condemnation of the constitutional changes as
``illegal and illegitimate.''
The changes have also been condemned by the political opposition within Serbia.
The changes have even been condemned by the Russians, who joined in the recent G-8 communique statement condemning Milosevic's constitutional fiddling.
Milosevic and his cronies are clearly trying to topple the democratically elected government of President Djukanovic. These constitutional changes are but the latest gambit.
In contrast with Milosevic's hopelessly inept long-term strategies, most of his tactics are clever. If these constitutional changes were ultimately to be accepted by, or forced upon, the Montenegrins, they would facilitate his control of Montenegro through peaceful means. Given, however, that the Montenegrins have rejected the changes, Mr. Milosevic now can claim, spuriously, that the Montenegrins are acting
``unconstitutionally'' or ``illegally'' and that, therefore, Belgrade has some right to ``intervene.''
Mr. Milosevic also is trying to provoke the Montenegrin authorities into reacting out of anger and national pride, and going ahead with a referendum on independence.
Thankfully, the Montenegrin Government, including both President Djukanovic and the legislature, have not fallen for Milosevic's trap. On July 8, the same day that it so roundly condemned Milosevic's constitutional shenanigans, the Montenegrin legislature specifically rejected a proposal calling for an immediate referendum on independence.
The support for independence in Montenegro is not--at least not yet--
sufficiently strong to justify holding a referendum. Look again at that vote--36 to 18. There clearly are pro-Milosevic politicians in Montenegro. Many Montenegrins, especially from the northern part of the country, either consider themselves Serbs or at least profess greater allegiance to Serbia and/or a Yugoslavia which Serbia dominates than to Montenegro.
Aside from ethnic self-identification, there are many Montenegrins who are not convinced that independence is a better outcome for such a small country than a democratically reformed federation with Serbia would be. For example, in recent municipal elections in Montenegro, the capital, Podgorica, went for Djukanovic, while another city, Herceg Novi, went for the pro-Serbian party.
The risk of holding a referendum on Montenegro's independence, in such a context, would be that the balloting might easily be followed by civil unrest and skirmishes--provoked by Milosevic's henchmen or spontaneous--which would be all the provocation that Milosevic would need in order to seize power in the name of preserving law and order through some combination of paramilitaries and Yugoslav Army units already stationed in Montenegro.
In fact, Reuters reported that the Yugoslav Army was poised to implement just such a plan if the Montenegrin legislature had reacted more radically to the changes in the Yugoslav constitution. Our State Department does not discount these reports as idle speculation.
What is our policy in response to Milosevic's constant provocations and threats against Montenegro? What have we been doing, what are we doing, what more can we do?
First of all, we are providing economic assistance to the Government of Montenegro.
In Fiscal Year 2000, we have already allocated $60.56 million. Secretary of State Albright announced on July 13 that the Administration plans to notify the Congress of its intention to reprogram an additional $16.5 million for democratization and economic reform in Montenegro.
Why does Montenegro need this money?
Much of it is for budget-support. As a key part of Milosevic's effort at destabilization, he has squeezed Montenegro's economy very hard through a series of measures.
He has had Yugoslavia's central bank print extra money, against the wishes of the Montenegrin representatives to the bank, and then spent it in Montenegro to cause inflation there.
Yugoslavia has refused to grant import and export licenses to Montenegrin companies.
Serbia has taken virtually all of the revenue from Yugoslavia's customs collections, leaving none of it for Montenegro.
Yugoslavia has stopped payment to Montenegrin pensioners from the federal pension fund.
Yugoslavia has denied overflight clearances for aircraft that would transport foreign tourists to Montenegro.
And, most significant, Belgrade has cut off Montenegrin purchasers from food and medicine produced in Serbia, the market which previously had provided 75 percent of Montenegro's purchases of such commodities. Think about this--the Milosevic regime, which complains about sanctions targeted at specific individuals and enterprises in Serbia, has placed sanctions on its ``brother'' republic of Montenegro. These are sanctions that hurt all Montenegrins.
It is in large part to combat this kind of economic sabotage that we are providing so much assistance to Montenegro.
That is merely the economic kind of sabotage.
As I just mentioned, the Milosevic regime has been preparing the Yugoslav Army to be able to move against the Djukanovic government. For several years, Milosevic has been sending special troops to join Yugoslav Army units in Montenegro, as well as commanders who would not hesitate to obey orders to attack their Montenegrin ``brethren.''
Ready to defend the legally elected government are the relatively well-armed police force and Interior Ministry troops of the Republic of Montenegro.
There have been stand-offs and provocations at border crossings, at Podgorica airport, and elsewhere.
So far cooler heads have prevailed, but no one should doubt that Milosevic has a plan to depose Djukanovic, the most prominent remaining democrat in Yugoslavia. Milosevic will undoubtedly wait for another target of opportunity. I have no inside line to Belgrade, but my guess is that he may act when we are preoccupied with the U.S. election campaign this fall and when he hopes that partisan political interest may make reaction to foreign aggression more difficult. More about that later.
In any event, it is abundantly clear that Montenegro urgently needs our assistance because it is threatened by the Serbia of Milosevic, through economic pressure and military intimidation.
Why, however, does Montenegro deserve our assistance?
The answer is simple. Because Montenegro, and President Djukanovic's government, want to do the right thing.
President Djukanovic, though still a young man, has traveled a long road. He has gone from being a Yugoslav Communist committed to the preservation of the status quo to being a Western-oriented democrat.
I have met with President Djukanovic on several occasions.
He is a realist. He knows that the only option for Montenegro is the Western model. That means market economy. That means fair elections and multi-ethnic inclusive politics. That means engagement with the outside world rather than sullen, sulking self-pity.
From the beginning, his government has been a coalition of Montenegrins, Slavic Muslims, and ethnic Albanians,
During the air campaign in Kosovo, President Djukanovic permitted refugees to enter Montenegro from Kosovo, and from Serbia as well. In fact, some members of the Serbian opposition were safer during that war in Montenegro than in Serbia.
Even while Yugoslav Army targets were being bombed in Montenegro, President Djukanovic kept his cool. He understood that what NATO was doing had to be done.
Recently, President Djukanovic did something that I think is extraordinary, and ought to be better known.
Earlier this summer, he offered an apology. Specifically, on behalf of Montenegro, he said to the Croatian people: I'm sorry for the role that some Montenegrins played in the infamous shelling of Dubrovnik back in 1991.
What is going on here? A Balkan leader actually apologizing for ethnic-cleansing and war-crimes?
The fact that President Djukanovic made that statement, and that it was accepted as an apology by President Mesic and the Government of Croatia, is highly significant.
That kind of statement and reaction represent the only way out of the morass of ethnic hatred that caused, and could still cause, death and destruction in the former Yugoslavia.
In terms of economic reform, the government of President Djukanovic has said that it would like to begin a major privatization of state assets sometime later this year. The United States, our allies, and the international financial institutions not only should support this, but should be involved in it. We have learned from hard experience throughout the former communist world, that if outside powers do not get involved, it is just too tempting for well-placed individuals to cream off the best for themselves, to the disadvantage of the populace as a whole.
Montenegro deserves our support, because its government wants to follow good models of governance, economics, and politics, despite the risk that its democratic and free-market policies could bring civil war, military coup, sudden exile, or even worse, assassination. Let us not forget that it was in Montenegro that Milosevic's hit-men shot and wounded Vuk Draskovic, the Serbian opposition leader. Standing up to Milosevic, when you live inside Yugoslavia, takes courage. Standing up to Milosevic in the name of a majority of your 650,000 countrymen, as President Djukanovic is doing, takes quite a bit of courage.
It seems clear to me that what we have on our hands in Montenegro is a case where we have American strategic interest combined with a moral imperative.
Let us not be caught flat-footed in Montenegro. Let us be vigilant and on guard.
First, I call upon our government to make clear to President Milosevic that the United States will not tolerate the overthrow of the legally elected government of Montenegro.
Second, I urge in the strongest terms that the United States immediately take the lead within NATO in drawing up detailed contingency plans for responding affirmatively to any request by the Djukanovic government for assistance in repelling aggression by the Yugoslav Army against Montenegro.
Third, in order that this not become a partisan issue in the fall election campaign, I urge the Administration to include representatives of both Vice President Gore and Governor Bush in all deliberations on the situation in Montenegro.
I hope that all members of Congress, and indeed all Americans, will agree that we owe it to ourselves, to our allies, and to our friends in Montenegro and in the Balkans, to be prepared. As somebody once observed, ``summoning the will to win is one thing; the more important thing is summoning the will to prepare.'' Deterrence is much cheaper than war-fighting. Milosevic must be made to understand that he will not be allowed to get away with his fifth war of aggression in 10 years.
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