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“PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATORIAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR TESTING TREATY” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Energy was published in the Senate section on pages S13248-S13249 on Oct. 27, 1999.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATORIAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR TESTING TREATY
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I address the Senate today with regard to a bill that I am introducing which provides for the establishment of a commission to be known as the Presidential and Senatorial Commission on a Nuclear Testing Treaty.
On October 15, shortly after the historic debate in the Senate and the vote taken on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I addressed the Senate, suggesting that the President and the Senate explore options by which a commission could be appointed for the purpose of assessing issues relating to testing of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of crafting a treaty that would meet the security interests of our Nation, while enabling America to once again resume the lead in arms control.
Following the historic debate and vote, I voted against that treaty, and I would vote again tomorrow against that treaty, and the day after, and the day after that. I say that not in any defiant way, but simply, after three hearings of the Armed Services Committee and one of the Foreign Relations Committee, after very careful analysis, after hours of discussion with my colleagues, after participating in the debate, it was clear to me that the record did not exist to gain my support nor, indeed, the support of two-thirds majority of the Senate.
It is my view that the Senate and the President will join together to provide bipartisan leadership to determine, in a collaborative way, how to dispel much of the confusion in the world about why this Senate failed to ratify the treaty, to explain what the options are now, and to show that we are analyzing all of the other possibilities relating to a nuclear testing treaty. This, hopefully, will dispel such confusion. Much of that confusion is based on misconceptions and wrong information. But we can overcome that.
We must explain that this Government has coequal branches--the executive, headed by the President; and the legislative, represented by the Congress--and how our Constitution entrusts to this body, the Senate, sole authority to give advice and consent. This body exercised that obligation, I think, in a fair and objective manner. But we are where we are.
My bill is somewhat unique, Mr. President. I call for a commission with a total of 12 members--6 to be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; 6 to be appointed by the distinguished Democratic leader of the Senate, with coequal responsibility between two members to be designated as cochairmen. I did that purposely to emphasize the need for bipartisanship. We, the Senate, will not ratify the treaty unless there are 67 votes in the affirmative. This last vote was 19 votes short--votes cast by individuals of this body of clear conscience. That significant margin of 19 votes, in my judgment, can only be overcome through a bipartisan effort to devise a nuclear testing treaty seen clearly as in our national interests.
The cochairmen will be appointed--first, one by the distinguished majority leader of the Senate, and the second by the President, in consultation, of course, with the distinguished minority leader. That brings the President well into the equation. He will undoubtedly be in consultation with the distinguished minority leader throughout the series of appointments by the minority leader.
This commission can have no more than two Members of the Senate appointed by the majority leader, and no more than two Members of the Senate, if he so desires, appointed by the minority leader. Therefore, up to four Senators could participate. But the balance of the 12--eight members--will be drawn from individuals who have spent perhaps as much as a lifetime examining the complexity of issues surrounding nuclear weapons, the complexity of the issues surrounding all types of treaties, agreements, and understandings relating to nonproliferation.
We saw them come forward in this debate--individuals such as former Secretaries of Defense, former Secretaries of State, men and women of honest, good intention, with honest differences of opinion, and those differences have to be bridged. By including eight individuals not in the Senate along with four Senators--if it is the will of the leaders--
we can lift this issue out of the cauldron of politics. We can show the world that we are making a conscientious effort to act in a bipartisan manner. The experts the majority leader and the ones the minority leader, in consultation with the President, would pick will be known to the world--former Secretaries of Defense of this Nation, former Secretaries of State, former National Laboratory Directors, individuals whose collective experience in this would add up to hundreds of years. In that way, I believe we will bring credibility to this process and will result in this commission being able to render valuable advice and recommendations to the Senate and the President at the end of their work.
Several years ago, I was privileged to be the Ranking Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. There was a great deal of concern in the Senate toward the Central Intelligence Agency and how it was operating at that time. As a matter of fact, some of our most distinguished Members--one indeed I remember clearly--called for the abolishment of the CIA. This individual was extremely disturbed with the manner in which they were conducting business.
I took it upon myself at that time to introduce in the Senate legislation calling for the establishment of a commission to make an overall study of our intelligence and to make recommendations to the President and the Congress. Congress adopted the legislation I introduced and it was enacted into law.
The first chairman of that commission was Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense, who, unfortunately, had an untimely death. He was succeeded by Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of the Air Force, who I knew well. I served with him. Our former colleague, Senator Rudman, was also closely involved. I was privileged to be on that commission. It did its work. It came up with recommendations. The intelligence community accepted those recommendations. The CIA survived and today flourishes.
I have given the outline of the commission I am proposing today. Let me briefly refer to the basic charge given the commission and the work they should perform.
Duties of the commission: It shall be the duty of the commission, (1) to determine under what circumstances the nuclear testing treaty would be in the national security interests of our Nation; (2) to determine how a nuclear testing treaty would relate to the security interests of other nations. I was motivated to do this because of the misunderstanding about the important and decisive action taken by this body.
(3) To determine provisions essential to a nuclear testing treaty such that that treaty would be in the national security interests of the United States;
(4) to determine whether a nuclear testing treaty would achieve the nonproliferation and arms control objectives of our Nation.
The bill includes a number of other recitations and other important provisions.
We deal with the question of verification. We deal with the question of the science-based stockpile stewardship program, now being monitored and more fully developed by the Department of Energy.
All of this is carefully covered in this legislation I make to this body tonight.
This is one Senator who believed he had an obligation to confer with his colleagues about this important matter. I believe it is important that this legislation be laid down as a starting point. It may well be that other colleagues have better ideas. I take absolutely no pride of authorship in this effort. Perhaps others can contribute ideas as to how this legislative proposal might be amended.
Eventually, collectively, I hope we can work with our leadership in establishing some type of commission so the consideration of a nuclear testing treaty can go foward and people around the globe will have a better understanding of our efforts to achieve a more secure world.
I went back to do a little research which proved quite interesting. We have heard so many times in this Chamber that politics should stop at the water's edge. I was reminded of this as I was privileged, along with many others in this Chamber, to attend the presentation to the former President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford, and his lovely wife, Mrs. Betty Ford, the Congressional Gold Medal.
I took down some notes from President Ford's wonderful speech. I had the privilege of serving under President Ford as Secretary of the Navy and, indeed, Chairman of the Bicentennial. I have great respect for him.
He talked about Senator Vandenberg and how Senator Vandenberg was an absolute, well-known conservative. Yet it was Senator Vandenberg's leadership that got the Marshall Program through the Senate of the United States. The Marshall Program was a landmark piece of legislation initiated by President Truman. Indeed, in some of the accounts of history, some people said it should be called the Truman Plan. But Truman said ``Oh, no, don't name it after me because the Congress won't accept it; name it after George Marshall''--showing the marvelous character of the wonderful President.
President Ford also talked about Everett Dirksen. He said:
The executive branch and the legislative branch worked with him arm in arm on relationships that were important between this country and the rest of the world.
Those are Ford's words.
Bipartisanship helped get the Marshall Plan through and enabled this country to show strength in the face of the cold war period.
That is history, ladies and gentleman.
I don't suggest in any way that I am making history here tonight. But I think it is very important that other Senators take time to look at this and contribute their own ideas. It will require a significant measure of bipartisanship to achieve the objectives of the commission I am proposing. Let's see what we can do to work with our leadership and go forward.
The events of history are interesting. Senator Vandenberg, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in 1948, thought Tom Dewey was going to win the Presidency. He wrote into the Republican platform the following phrase. I quote him:
We shall invite the minority party to join us under the next Republican administration in stopping partisan politics at the water's edge.
As it turned out, Truman won that historic election. And what did Vandenberg do but go on and work with President Truman in the spirit of that statement that he put into the Republican platform, and the first landmark that the two achieved was the Marshall Plan.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
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