The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
“STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS” mentioning the Federal Reserve System was published in the Senate section on pages S13321-S13325 on Dec. 16, 2009.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Ms. CANTWELL (for herself, Mr. McCain, and Mr. Feingold):
S. 2886. A bill to prohibit certain affiliations (between commercial banking and investment banking companies), and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be joining my friend and colleague from Washington, Senator Cantwell, to introduce the Banking Integrity Act of 2009. My reasons for joining this effort are simple--I want to ensure that we never stick the American taxpayer with another
$700 billion tab to bail out the financial industry. If big Wall Street institutions want to take part in risky transactions--fine. But we should not allow them to do so with federally insured deposits.
Paul Volcker, a top economist in the Obama administration and former Federal Reserve Chairman, wants the nation's banks to be prohibited from owning and trading risky securities, the very practice that got the biggest ones into deep trouble in 2008. The administration is saying no, it will not separate commercial banking from investment operations. Mr. Volcker argues that regulation by itself will not work. Sooner or later, the giants, in pursuit of profits, will get into trouble. The administration should accept this and shield commercial banking from Wall Street's wild ways. ``The banks are there to serve the public,'' Mr. Volcker said, ``and that is what they should concentrate on. These other activities create conflicts of interest. They create risks, and if you try to control the risks with supervision, that just creates friction and difficulties'' and ultimately fails.
The bill we are introducing today precludes any member bank of the Federal Reserve System from being affiliated with any entity or organization that is engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution of stocks, bonds, debentures or other securities. Essentially, commercial banks may no longer intermingle their business activities with investment banks. It is that simple.
Since the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act in 1999, this country has seen a new culture emerge in the financial industry: one of dangerous greed and excessive risk-taking. Commercial banks traditionally used people's deposits for the constructive purpose of main street loans. They did not engage in high risk ventures. Investment banks, however, managed rich people's money--those who can afford to take bigger risks in order to get a bigger return, and who bore their own losses. When these two worlds collided, the investment bank culture prevailed, cutting off the credit lifeblood of main street firms, demanding greater returns that were achievable only through high leverage and huge risk taking, and leaving taxpayers with the fallout.
When the glass wall dividing banks and securities firms was shattered, common sense and caution went out the door. The new mantra of ``bigger is better'' took over--and the path forward focused on short-term gains rather than long-term planning. Banks became overleveraged in their haste to keep up in the race. The more they lent, the more they made. Aggressive mortgages were underwritten for unqualified individuals who became homeowners saddled with loans they couldn't afford. Banks turned right around and bought portfolios of these shaky loans.
Sub-prime loans made up only five percent of all mortgage lending in 1998, but by the time the financial crisis peaked in late 2008, they were approaching 30 percent. Since January 2008, we have seen 159 state and national banks fail. In my home State of Arizona, five banks have shut their doors, leaving small businesses scrambling to find credit from other banks that may have already been overleveraged.
Banks sold sub-prime mortgages to their affiliates and other securities firms for securitization, while other financial institutions made risky bets on these and other assets for which they had no financial interest. As the market grew bigger, its foundation became shakier. It was like a house of cards waiting to fall, and fall it did.
In October 2008, the financial system was on the brink of collapse when Congress was forced to risk $700 billion of taxpayer dollars to bail out the industry. These financial institutions had become ``too big to fail.'' In fact, the special inspector general of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP, testified before Congress earlier this year that ``total potential Federal Government support could reach $23.7 trillion'' to stabilize and support the financial system. Ironically, some of these ``too big to fail'' institutions have now become even bigger. An editorial from yesterday's New York Times stated:
The truth is that the taxpayers are still very much on the hook for a banking system that is shaping up to be much riskier than the one that led to disaster.
Big bank profits, for instance, still come mostly courtesy of taxpayers. Their trading earnings are financed by more than a trillion dollars' worth of cheap loans from the Federal Reserve, for which some of their most noxious assets are collateral. They benefit from immense federal loan guarantees, but they are not lending much. Lending to business, notably, is very tight.
What profits the banks make come mostly from trading. Many big banks are happy to depend on the lifeline from the Fed and hang onto their toxic assets hoping for a rebound in prices. And the whole system has grown more concentrated. Bank of America was considered too big to fail before the meltdown. Since then, it has acquired Merrill Lynch. Wells Fargo took over Wachovia. JPMorgan Chase gobbled up Bear Stearns.
If the goal is to reduce the number of huge banks that taxpayers must rescue at any cost, the nation is moving in the wrong direction. The growth of the biggest banks ensures that the next bailout will have to be even bigger. These banks will be more likely to take on excessive risk because they have the implicit assurance of rescue.
Excess was a common theme for banks/financial institutions in the mid-2000s--excessive risk, excessive bonuses. Times were good at Merrill Lynch in 2006 when the firm's risky mortgage business was booming. The firm made record earnings of $7.5 billion that year and paid out bonuses of $5 billion to $6 billion. Fast forward to late 2008 when Merrill's gambling left it in deep financial despair with losses exceeding $27 billion. Yet we witnessed the firm pay out another $3.6 billion in bonuses just before it was acquired by Bank of America.
Merrill Lynch wasn't alone in excess and greed. Citigroup posted a net loss of nearly $28 billion in 2008, yet paid out $5.3 billion in bonuses. Although Goldman Sachs earned only $2.3 billion, it paid out
$4.8 billion in bonuses. Morgan Stanley earned $1.7 billion, and paid out nearly $4.5 billion in bonuses. JPMorgan Chase earned $5.6 billion and paid $8.7 billion in bonuses. If a company doesn't make money, how can it pay these bonuses? In this case, each of these firms was a recipient of billions in taxpayer-funded TARP money.
The Federal Government has set a dangerous precedent here. We sent the wrong message to the financial industry: you engage in bad, risky business practices, and when you get into trouble, the government will be there to save your hide. Many would call it a moral hazard. I call it a taxpayer-funded subsidy for risky behavior.
The consolidation of the banking world was also riddled with conflicts of interest, despite the purported firewalls that were put into place. If an investment bank had underwritten shares for a company that was now in financial trouble, the investment bank's commercial arm would feel pressure to lend the company money, despite the lack of merits to do so. The Banking Integrity Act of 2009 would eliminate some of these conflicts.
Today, it is time to put a stop to the taxpayer-financed excesses of Wall Street. No single financial institution should be so big that its failure would bring ruin to our economy and destroy millions of American jobs. This country would be better served if we limit the activities of these financial institutions. Banks should accept consumer deposits and invest conservatively, while investment banks engage in underwriting and sales of securities.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
______
By Mr. FEINGOLD:
S. 2890. A bill to amend the Buy American Act to increase the requirement for American-made content, to tighten the waiver provisions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to help American workers and companies.
The bill that I am introducing, the Buy American Improvement Act, focuses on the Federal Government's responsibility to support domestic manufacturers and workers and on the role of Federal procurement policy in achieving this goal. The reintroduction of this bill, which I first introduced in 2003, is part of my ongoing efforts to support American workers and manufacturing.
The Buy American Act of 1933 is the primary statute that governs Federal procurement. The name of this law accurately describes its purpose: to ensure that the Federal Government supports domestic companies and domestic workers by buying American-made goods. Regrettably, this law contains a number of loopholes that make it too easy for government agencies to buy foreign-made goods.
My bill, the Buy American Improvement Act, would strengthen the existing law by tightening its waiver provisions. Currently, the heads of Federal departments and agencies are given broad discretion to waive the act and buy foreign goods with little or no accountability. We should ensure that the Federal Government makes every effort to give Federal contracts to companies that will perform the work domestically. We should also ensure that certain types of industries do not leave the U.S. completely, thus making the Federal Government dependent on foreign sources for goods, such as plane or ship parts, that our military may need to acquire on short notice.
With unemployed workers in the U.S. facing a double-digit unemployment rate, the highest rate since 1983, it is critical Congress back efforts to support American workers. Many unemployed American workers are currently facing persistently long periods of unemployment; data from the Department of Labor showed that in October of this year, over 35 percent of unemployed workers had been without jobs for at least 27 weeks. Since December of 2007, the number of unemployed workers in the U.S. has grown by over 8 million, with manufacturing and construction workers being particularly hard-hit. We need to do all we can to promote fiscally responsible Federal policies that support the creation of American jobs to help get the unemployed and Funderemployed back to work. A strong Buy American Act should be part of the Federal effort to create and retain American jobs.
During another period of economic upheaval in the 1930s, Congress passed a series of laws designed to promote job growth in the U.S., including the Buy American Act of 1933, 41 U.S.C. Sec. 10a-10d. The Buy American Act requires the Federal Government to support domestic manufacturers and workers by purchasing American-made goods. Over the years, other domestic sourcing legislation has been passed to help support American industry, including the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. Sec. 313, which applies to Federal transportation funding. In addition, Congress included domestic sourcing requirements in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5, earlier this year because it recognized the importance of supporting American workers and American industry. My legislation would help American industry by making it more difficult to waive the Buy American Act and help ensure the Federal Government does all it can to support American workers.
I have a long record of supporting efforts to help taxpayers get the most bang for their buck and opposing wasteful Federal spending. I don't think anyone can argue that supporting American jobs is
``wasteful.'' We owe it to American manufacturers and their employees to make sure they get a fair shake. I would not support awarding a contract to an American company that is price-gouging, but we should make every effort to ensure that domestic sources for goods needed by the Federal Government do not dry up because American companies have been slightly underbid by foreign competitors.
The gaping loopholes in the Buy American Act and the trade agreements and defense procurement agreements that contain additional waivers of domestic source restrictions have combined to weaken our domestic manufacturing base by allowing--and sometimes actually encouraging--the Federal Government to buy foreign-made goods. Congress can and should do more to support American companies and American workers. We must strengthen the Buy American Act and we must stop entering into bad trade agreements that send our jobs overseas and undermine our own domestic preference laws.
By strengthening Federal procurement policy, we can help to bolster our domestic manufacturers during these difficult times. As I have repeatedly noted, Congress cannot simply stand on the sidelines while tens of thousands of American manufacturing jobs have been and continue to be shipped overseas. While there may be no single solution to this problem one way in which Congress should act is by strengthening the Buy American Act.
______
By Mr. REID (for himself, Mr. Ensign, Mrs. Feinstein, and Mrs.
Boxer):
S. 2891. A bill to further allocate and expand the avaiability of hydroelectric power generated at Hoover Dam, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 2891
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009''.
SEC. 2. ALLOCATION OF CONTRACTS FOR POWER.
(a) Schedule A Power.--Section 105(a)(1)(A) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)(1)(A)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``renewal'';
(2) by striking ``June 1, 1987'' and inserting ``October 1, 2017''; and
(3) by striking Schedule A and inserting the following:
``SCHEDULE A
Long term Schedule A contingent capacity and associated firm energy for offers of contracts to Boulder Canyon
project contractors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contingent Firm Energy (thousands of kWh)
Contractor capacity -----------------------------------------
(kW) Summer Winter Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 249,948 859,163 368,212 1,227,375
City of Los Angeles 495,732 464,108 199,175 663,283
Southern California Edison Company 280,245 166,712 71,448 238,160
City of Glendale 18,178 45,028 19,297 64,325
City of Pasadena 11,108 38,622 16,553 55,175
City of Burbank 5,176 14,070 6,030 20,100
Arizona Power Authority 190,869 429,582 184,107 613,689
Colorado River Commission of Nevada 190,869 429,582 184,107 613,689
United States, for Boulder City 20,198 53,200 22,800 76,000
------------------------------------------------------
Totals 1,462,323 2,500,067 1,071,729 3,571,796''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Schedule B Power.--Section 105(a)(1)(B) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)(1)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
``(B) To each existing contractor for power generated at Hoover Dam, a contract, for delivery commencing October 1, 2017, of the amount of contingent capacity and firm energy specified for that contractor in the following table:
``SCHEDULE B
Long term Schedule B contingent capacity and associated firm energy for offers of contracts to Boulder Canyon
project contractors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contingent Firm Energy (thousands of kWh)
Contractor capacity -----------------------------------------
(kW) Summer Winter Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
City of Glendale 2,020 2,749 1,194 3,943
City of Pasadena 9,089 2,399 1,041 3,440
City of Burbank 15,149 3,604 1,566 5,170
City of Anaheim 40,396 34,442 14,958 49,400
City of Azusa 4,039 3,312 1,438 4,750
City of Banning 2,020 1,324 576 1,900
City of Colton 3,030 2,650 1,150 3,800
City of Riverside 30,296 25,831 11,219 37,050
City of Vernon 22,218 18,546 8,054 26,600
Arizona 189,860 140,600 60,800 201,400
Nevada 189,860 273,600 117,800 391,400
------------------------------------------------------
Totals 507,977 509,057 219,796 728,853''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Schedule C Power.--Section 105(a)(1)(C) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)(1)(C)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``June 1, 1987'' and inserting ``October 1, 2017''; and
(2) by striking Schedule C and inserting the following:
``SCHEDULE C
Excess Energy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Priority of entitlement to excess energy State
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First: Meeting Arizona's first priority right to delivery of excess Arizona
energy which is equal in each year of operation to 200 million
kilowatthours: Provided, That in the event excess energy in the amount
of 200 million kilowatthours is not generated during any year of
operation, Arizona shall accumulate a first right to delivery of excess
energy subsequently generated in an amount not to exceed 600 million
kilowatthours, inclusive of the current year's 200 million
kilowatthours. Said first right of delivery shall accrue at a rate of
200 million kilowatthours per year for each year excess energy in an
amount of 200 million kilowatthours is not generated, less amounts of
excess energy delivered.
Second: Meeting Hoover Dam contractual obligations under Schedule A of Arizona, Nevada, and California
subsection (a)(1)(A), under Schedule B of subsection (a)(1)(B), and
under Schedule D of subsection (a)(2), not exceeding 26 million
kilowatthours in each year of operation.
Third: Meeting the energy requirements of the three States, such Arizona, Nevada, and California''.
available excess energy to be divided equally among the States.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Schedule D Power.--Section 105(a) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) as paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2)(A) The Secretary of Energy is authorized to and shall create from the apportioned allocation of contingent capacity and firm energy adjusted from the amounts authorized in this Act in 1984 to the amounts shown in Schedule A and Schedule B, as modified by the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009, a resource pool equal to 5 percent of the full rated capacity of 2,074,000 kilowatts, and associated firm energy, as shown in Schedule D (referred to in this section as `Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy'):
``SCHEDULE DLong term Schedule D resource pool of contingent capacity and associated firm energy for new allottees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contingent Firm Energy (thousands of kWh)
State capacity -----------------------------------------
(kW) Summer Winter Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Entities Allocated by the Secretary of Energy 69,170 105,637 45,376 151,013
New Entities Allocated by State
Arizona 11,510 17,580 7,533 25,113
California 11,510 17,580 7,533 25,113
Nevada 11,510 17,580 7,533 25,113
------------------------------------------------------
Totals 103,700 158,377 67,975 226,352
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``(B) The Secretary of Energy shall offer Schedule D contingency capacity and firm energy to entities not receiving contingent capacity and firm energy under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) (referred to in this section as `new allottees') for delivery commencing October 1, 2017 pursuant to this subsection. In this subsection, the term `the marketing area for the Boulder City Area Projects' shall have the same meaning as in Appendix A of the General Consolidated Power Marketing Criteria or Regulations for Boulder City Area Projects published in the Federal Register on December 28, 1984 (49 Fed. Reg. 50582 et seq.) (referred to in this section as the `Criteria').
``(C)(i) Within 18 months of the date of enactment of the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009, the Secretary of Energy shall allocate through the Western Area Power Administration
(referred to in this section as `Western'), for delivery commencing October 1, 2017, for use in the marketing area for the Boulder City Area Projects 66.7 percent of the Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy to new allottees that are located within the marketing area for the Boulder City Area Projects and that are--
``(I) eligible to enter into contracts under section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (43 U.S.C. 617d); or
``(II) federally recognized Indian tribes.
``(ii) In the case of Arizona and Nevada, Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy for new allottees shall be offered through the Arizona Power Authority and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, respectively.
``(iii) In performing its allocation of Schedule D power provided for in this subparagraph, Western shall apply criteria developed in consultation with the States of Arizona, Nevada, and California.
``(D) Within 1 year of the date of enactment of the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009, the Secretary of Energy also shall allocate, for delivery commencing October 1, 2017, for use in the marketing area for the Boulder City Area Projects 11.1 percent of the Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy to each of--
``(i) the Arizona Power Authority for allocation to new allottees in the State of Arizona;
``(ii) the Colorado River Commission of Nevada for allocation to new allottees in the State of Nevada; and
``(iii) Western for allocation to new allottees within the State of California.
``(E) Each contract offered pursuant to this subsection shall include a provision requiring the new allottee to pay a proportionate share of its State's respective contribution
(determined in accordance with each State's applicable funding agreement) to the cost of the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program (as defined in section 9401 of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009
(Public Law 111-11; 123 Stat. 1327)), and to execute the Boulder Canyon Project Implementation Agreement Contract No. 95-PAO-10616 (referred to in this section as the
`Implementation Agreement').
``(F) Any of the 66.7 percent of Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy that is to be allocated by Western that is not allocated and placed under contract by October 1, 2017, shall be returned to those contractors shown in Schedule A and Schedule B in the same proportion as those contractors' allocations of Schedule A and Schedule B contingent capacity and firm energy. Any of the 33.3 percent of Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy that is to be distributed within the States of Arizona, Nevada, and California that is not allocated and placed under contract by October 1, 2017, shall be returned to the Schedule A and Schedule B contractors within the State in which the Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy were to be distributed, in the same proportion as those contractors' allocations of Schedule A and Schedule B contingent capacity and firm energy.''.
(e) Total Obligations.--Paragraph (3) of section 105(a) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) (as redesignated as subsection (d)(1)) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``schedule A of subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section and schedule B of subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section'' and inserting
``pursuant to paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and (2)''; and
(2) in the second sentence--
(A) by striking ``any'' and inserting ``each'';
(B) by striking ``schedule C'' and inserting ``Schedule C''; and
(C) by striking ``schedules A and B'' and inserting
``Schedules A, B, and D''.
(f) Power Marketing Criteria.--Paragraph (4) of section 105(a) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) (as redesignated as subsection (d)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
``(4) Subdivision E of the Criteria shall be deemed to have been modified to conform to this section, as modified by the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009. The Secretary of Energy shall cause to be included in the Federal Register a notice conforming the text of the regulations to such modifications.''.
(g) Contract Terms.--Paragraph (5) of section 105(a) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(a)) (as redesignated as subsection (d)(1)) is amended--
(1) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
``(A) in accordance with section 5(a) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (43 U.S.C. 617d(a)), expire September 30, 2067;'';
(2) in the proviso of subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking ``shall use'' and inserting ``shall allocate''; and
(B) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end;
(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) authorize and require Western to collect from new allottees a pro rata share of Hoover Dam repayable advances paid for by contractors prior to October 1, 2017, and remit such amounts to the contractors that paid such advances in proportion to the amounts paid by such contractors as specified in section 6.4 of the Implementation Agreement;
``(E) permit transactions with an independent system operator; and
``(F) contain the same material terms included in section 5.6 of those long term contracts for purchases from the Hoover Power Plant that were made in accordance with this Act and are in existence on the date of enactment of the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009.''.
(h) Existing Rights.--Section 105(b) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(b)) is amended by striking
``2017'' and inserting ``2067''.
(i) Offers.--Section 105(c) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(c)) is amended to read as follows:
``(c) Offer of Contract to Other Entities.--If any existing contractor fails to accept an offered contract, the Secretary of Energy shall offer the contingent capacity and firm energy thus available first to other entities in the same State listed in Schedule A and Schedule B, second to other entities listed in Schedule A and Schedule B, third to other entities in the same State which receive contingent capacity and firm energy under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and last to other entities which receive contingent capacity and firm energy under subsection (a)(2) of this section.''.
(j) Availability of Water.--Section 105(d) of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a(d) is amended to read as follows:
``(d) Water Availability.--Except with respect to energy purchased at the request of an allottee pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the obligation of the Secretary of Energy to deliver contingent capacity and firm energy pursuant to contracts entered into pursuant to this section shall be subject to availability of the water needed to produce such contingent capacity and firm energy. In the event that water is not available to produce the contingent capacity and firm energy set forth in Schedule A, Schedule B, and Schedule D, the Secretary of Energy shall adjust the contingent capacity and firm energy offered under those Schedules in the same proportion as those contractors' allocations of Schedule A, Schedule B, and Schedule D contingent capacity and firm energy bears to the full rated contingent capacity and firm energy obligations.''.
(k) Conforming Amendments.--Section 105 of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (e) and (f); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), and (i) as subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
(l) Continued Congressional Oversight.--Subsection (e) of section 105 of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a)) (as redesignated by subsection (k)(2)) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``the renewal of''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``June 1, 1987, and ending September 30, 2017'' and inserting ``October 1, 2017, and ending September 30, 2067''.
(m) Court Challenges.--Subsection (f)(1) of section 105 of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a) (as redesignated by subsection (k)(2)) is amended in the first sentence by striking ``this Act'' and inserting ``the Hoover Power Allocation Act of 2009''.
(n) Reaffirmation of Congressional Declaration of Purpose.--Subsection (g) of section 105 of the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 (43 U.S.C. 619a) (as redesignated by subsection (k)(2)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``subsections (c), (g), and (h) of this section'' and inserting ``this Act''; and
(2) by striking ``June 1, 1987, and ending September 30, 2017'' and inserting ``October 1, 2017, and ending September 30, 2067''.
____________________
