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“THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E421-E424 on March 19, 1998.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
______
HON. C.W. BILL YOUNG
of florida
in the house of representatives
Thursday, March 19, 1998
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues the following report on my trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina from March 6-8. At your request, I had the honor of leading a delegation of ten Members on an inspection trip to the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from March 6-8. You asked us to review the current military operations and international assistance efforts involving Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav republics.
We had an informative and productive trip, including meetings with President Bjilana Plavsic of the Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Republic); the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; the Commander of NATO Stabilization Forces in Bosnia; other senior U.S. military and diplomatic personnel; U.S. troops in the field; senior military commanders from other nations participating in the Stabilization Force; and representatives of a variety of international assistance programs. On behalf of the other Members of the delegation, I am forwarding with this letter a detailed report which summarizes our activities and observations.
Of course, I am available to discuss this trip as well as the significant policy questions associated with our involvement in Bosnia should you find it useful. In the meantime, I want to thank you again for providing this opportunity to me and our colleagues who made this trip.
Congressional Delegation Trip Report March 5-9, 1998
Members: Representatives C.W. Bill Young, Tom Sawyer, Neil Abercrombie, Henry Bonilla, Tillie Fowler, Eddie Bernice Johnson, David Minge, Charles Bass, George Nethercutt, Allan Boyd.
Purpose: At the request of the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the delegation was asked to inspect and review the current deployment of U.S. and NATO forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the status of U.S. and international civic and economic recovery efforts.
Itinerary: As shown below.
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Date Places visited Officials met
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March 5............ Depart Washington, D.C... N/A March 6............ Budapest, Hungary........ Deputy Chief of Mission,
U.S. Embassy; Defense
Attache, U.S. Embassy;
Liaison Officer to U.S.
Embassy, U.S.
Stabilization Force
(SFOR) March 7............ Sarajevo, Bosnia......... Supreme Allied
Commander, NATO;
Commander, U.S. Army in
Europe and
Stabilization Force
(SFOR); U.S. Ambassador
to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Deputy Commissioner,
United Nations; High
Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR)
Banja Luka, Bosnia....... President of the
Republika Srpska March 8............ Tuzla, Bosnia............ Commander, U.S. Task
Force Eagle
Camp McGovern, Bosnia.... Personnel of the U.S.
1st Armored Division and 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment assigned to
SFOR
Brcko, Bosnia............ Host-nation city and civic group officials; officials of the Office
of the High
Representative for
Brcko; officials of the
United Nations
International Police
Task Force (IPTF) March 9............ Return Washington, D.C... N/A
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Friday, March 6: Upon its arrival in Budapest, Hungary, the delegation met with U.S. Embassy and U.S. military personnel regarding the political, economic, and military outlook for Hungary; NATO expansion (Hungary is one of the three proposed new member nations); and Hungary-based operations associated with the NATO-led Stabilization Force for Bosnia.
Since turning to democracy in 1989, Hungary has pursued domestic and foreign policies emphasizing the establishment of democratic institutions and free market practices, and integration into Western political, economic and security institutions. There have been two national-level democratic elections since 1990 with a third scheduled for this summer. Hungary has encouraged outside investment and is the largest recipient of foreign investment in Eastern Europe, including more than $6 billion from the United States. Hungary has joined the OECD, is slated to formally enter NATO in 1999, and is pressing for membership in the European Economic Community.
The prospect of joining NATO enjoys broad political support in Hungary, although it has not become a prominent issue domestically. Embassy officials believe Hungary fully recognizes its obligations upon joining NATO and note that the government has committed to gradual increases in defense spending which, in several years, will then be in line with the NATO average (as expressed as a percentage of annual government spending).
Since 1989 Hungary has cut its armed forces by two-thirds in size, and its intent is to streamline and modernize that force in order to meet NATO needs, with an immediate goal of learning how to ``think, speak, and act NATO.'' To that end many senior Hungarian military officials have or are planning to attend U.S. military war colleges. Both the Hungarian government and U.S. officials believe this transition to NATO's way of doing business must occur prior to any major equipment modernization effort.
In late 1995 Hungary responded to NATO requests and permitted use of its airbase at Taszar as the major logistics transhipment point for U.S. and other NATO forces involved in the initial deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia. While total personnel and activities at Taszar have dropped with the completion of the initial Bosnia deployment and stabilization of operations, NATO still maintains over 2100 personnel (military and civilian) there, under command of an American major general, as part of the overall Stabilization Force (SFOR). Taszar is the last waystation in, and first waystation out, for U.S. forces involved in operations in Bosnia or Croatia.
Saturday, March 7: The delegation traveled to Bosnia with the first stop in Sarajevo.
The delegation first met at NATO SFOR Headquarters with General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General Eric Shinseki, Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Commander, SFOR; and U.S. Ambassador Rich Kauzlarich. General Clark gave a briefing summarizing the NATO mission following the Dayton Peace Agreement, with particular emphasis on SFOR's continued success in stabilizing the overall security situation, the greater pace of civic and political progress in the past year, and recent efforts to marginalize Serb hardliners.
In questions and answers with delegation members, other key points made by General Clark, General Shinseki and Ambassador Kauzlarich included:
1. While still lagging, there is growing progress on the civilian side of the ledger in Bosnia:
Joint governing institutions are beginning to function;
The new Serb government in the Republika Srpska (``RS'') is more committed to Dayton implementation and has moved to reduce to the influence of Serb hardliners (especially the so-called ``Pale faction'');
The hardline Serb party's representation in the RS parliament dropped from 54 percent to 28 percent in the September 1997 elections;
There has been steady progress in returns of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons;
The media is being restructured under Western supervision and is no longer an anti-SFOR propaganda outlet;
Freedom of movement within Bosnia is returning with agreements reached on a common license plate and on passports;
More indicted war criminals have either been seized or voluntarily turned themselves in;
The Bosnian factions and the International Police Training Foundation (IPTF) have reached agreement on a plan for police restructuring which is now underway throughout most regions of the country.
In summary, Bosnian society is beginning to heal itself. Among the general populace, there is a growing mindset that people are building towards their futures, and not for war. Elections are shifting power from those groups who started the war and who impede Dayton implementation. Progress is being made in establishing freedom of movement, refugee returns to contentious areas such as Brcko are picking up, and initial efforts to reform/retrain police are promising. Yet in all these areas much more remains to be done.
2. General Clark, General Shinseki, and Ambassador Kauzlarich all stated SFOR must stay in Bosnia beyond the previously-announced June 1998 withdrawal date. Recent gains, while positive, are tenuous and will not hold absent continued aggressive efforts to implement the Dayton agreement with SFOR as the guarantor of a peaceful environment.
Current SFOR force levels (33,000 total, 8,500 U.S.) will be maintained through the national elections scheduled for September 1998. If successful, shortly thereafter U.S. forces could be reduced by 20 percent, to 6,900. (There was no discussion regarding contemplated changes in the number of non-U.S. forces.)
General Clark suggested that with sufficient progress in improving the local policing function, SFOR could be downsized even further. There will be six-month reviews to consider additional SFOR downsizing/restructuring. However, non-U.S. financial and personnel support for the International Police Task Force (IPTF), which is responsible for restructuring and retraining local police, remains inadequate.
3. The delegation was advised to be cautiously optimistic regarding recent political shifts in the Republika Srpska, particularly steps taken by President Plavsic and newly-elected Prime Minister Dodik. It is unclear whether they have had a real change of heart regarding reforms or whether these moves are tactical in nature. Nonetheless, their ability to promote change is circumscribed given their current narrow political margin, continued recalcitrance on the part of Serb hardliners, and the sheer weight of problems confronting the RS (the sorry state of the economy, the lack of knowledge, institutions, and outside investment needed to establish a more viable commercial sector, and the continued pervasiveness of corruption, black markets, and bribery.)
4. When asked, both General Clark and General Shinseki declined to estimate how long the presence of U.S. forces would be required, saying it is impossible to predict.
At one point General Clark stated, somewhat off-handedly,
``I don't see this as a 5-10 year problem . . . SFOR is getting a little smaller, somewhat less expensive . . . If
[this September's] elections are successful, we should be able to get even smaller.''
At another juncture, General Clark said that the U.S. component of SFOR is ``now down to the equivalent of three combat battalions . . . it is not that much of a burden anymore . . . we can meet our military requirements elsewhere.'' He conceded that in the event of a major conflict elsewhere that the U.S. role in SFOR would need to be revisited.
General Clark also cited the need for the just proposed emergency supplemental for Bosnia, totaling $489 million. He said these costs could not be absorbed and that they couldn't be offset from within existing Department of Defense funds.
5. All three officials pointed to economic reconstruction as an essential element of any long-term strategy. Both General Shinseki and Ambassador Kauzlarich indicated the lack of jobs was the biggest impediment to the successful return of displaced persons and refugees. They added that refugee returns also require local security, a function now performed by SFOR and one which eventually must be assumed by the restructured police forces.
6. At various points in the discussion, several members inquired as to the national interests being served by the U.S. deployment. General Clark responded by reviewing Bosnia's strategic location and problems posed for Europe by the Bosnian war, as well as the fissures which were opening up within NATO during the 1993-1995 timeframe when UNPROFOR was the international presence in Bosnia. General Clark portrayed NATO as being on the brink of disintegration over disagreements over what to do about Bosnia. The French and British were on the verge of withdrawing their forces from UNPROFOR, until the U.S. stepped forward in 1995 with its bombing campaign against the Serbs and then sponsorship of the Dayton negotiations. General Clark also said now that the U.S. is in Bosnia, as part of NATO, a precipitous American withdrawal would call into question U.S. credibility and ability to live up to its commitments. In addition, at one point he said ``We can't be successful in NATO if we aren't successful in Bosnia.''
Following this meeting, the delegation moved to the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo and met with U.S. Ambassador Kauzlarich and other State Department officials. Joining this meeting in progress was American Jacques Klein, the Deputy High Commissioner of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR).
Ambassador Kauzlarich reviewed the embassy's various missions, which include:
Facilitation of refugee return process at a workable pace, and in a fashion which promotes reintegration of ethnic groups;
Working with the Federation and the RS to restructure their law enforcement institutions, including police restructuring and orientation towards demonstratic policing, and transformation of the judicial system;
Advancement of democracy, by working towards free and fair elections and implementation of the results, and also pressing for a free and independent media;
Promotion of reconstruction, by helping to facilitate investment, assisting the governments in creating a legal framework for a viable national economy, and also by promoting American products as well as open markets to ensure U.S. companies market access;
And strengthening of peace and stability, by assisting Federation military integration (former Muslim and Croat armies), support for the ``Train and Equip'' program, and by facilitating the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal.
The Ambassador reviewed the ``train and equip'' program with the delegation and offered his opinion that besides working to redress the Muslim/Croat military disadvantage vis-a-vis the Serbs, it had important side benefits. These include helping keep out Iran and other interests who had supported the Muslims or Croatians during the war. It also provides a forum whereby the Muslims and Croats are learning to work together, not only at the military level but also at the political level which is essential if the Federation government is to become a success.
The delegation then had the opportunity to question both the Ambassador and Jacques Klein. In response to queries, Mr. Klein explained the goal of being able to gradually withdraw U.S. forces by disengaging them from many functions over time as civilian institutions develop or are reestablished.
Mr. Klein then expressed his view as to some of the larger geopolitical issues involved in Bosnia. Simply stated, he said, Europe does not want a Muslim-dominated state in the region and a viable Serbia and Croatia are viewed as needed to prevent that from happening.
He then drew attention to the large Yugoslav refugee population in Germany, whose eventual return is needed because they will bring money, skills, and some measure of stability back to the region.
Mr. Klein remarked upon the Europeans initial response to crises which is always to deny they need U.S. leadership. But Bosnia has only provided the most recent example (over the period of 1991-1995, including the failure of UNPROFOR) of Europe's need for American leadership and capabilities, a point most Europeans will now concede.
Finally, on the matter of war criminals, Mr, Klein suggested they are nothing but thugs. A pro-active, ``get-in-their-face'' policy is needed and will work because when confronted with a professional military, they will always back down.
The delegation then traveled to Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska, where it met with Bjilana Plavsic, the President of the Republika Srpska.
President Plavsic began with an opening statement and then responded to questions from members of the delegation. In her opening statement, the President cited her priorities as being moving towards democratic procedures and also improving the economy. She stated ordinarily economic improvement would be the top priority but that without greater democracy, they couldn't fully realize the necessary economic improvements. She said the previous 50 years (under Communist rule) had left the economy in quite a mess. The President also stressed the need for the Ministry of the Interior and the justice system to work, saying ``there must be a framework for a legal economy.''
She finished by proclaiming ``I as President must have the power to replace people [who resist change], and I will do so.''
In response to questions from the delegation, President Plavsic addressed a number of issues including:
The role of SFOR and its importance: ``SFOR is keeping the peace here. No amount of money is worth peace. If someone started the war there would be no telling what the effects would be . . . They are doing a very nice job, a noble job. We couldn't even consider economic recovery without the presence of foreign armies.''
When she believes the U.S. and SFOR can withdraw: ``I will tell you what I told President Clinton [when he visited Bosnia in December 1997]: `we have started in a good way, but we need your patience' . . . Please help us, it won't last long. When we are offered a chance, the people will see this and grab for it. Remember, Dayton is a creation of the U.S., it is well balanced. Please support what you created . . . Much progress can be lost with impatience.''
On prospects for continued peace: ``Problems must be solved by democratic means. Last June [when hardline Serb elements were on the verge of staging a coup until SFOR intervened] was difficult. Now we have elections, and for the first time in decades people understand they do not have to go to war.''
Regarding the refugee problem: ``The Republika Srpska has 1.2 million people, and 400,000 of those are refugees . . . they must have homes, they must find work. With our new government we can start new industrial and economic processes.''
On war criminals: ``We understand the obligations of Dayton. This is a very sensitive and complex issue. But Dayton isn't just a document, we must accept it . . . You must realize this is difficult for Serbs to do to Serbs. Now within the last 20 days, four men have [voluntarily] surrendered to the Hague. There will be people who recognize the problems of living a life under indictment, and I expect we will see more in the next phase. This is the best way, for Prime Minister Dodik and myself--it is also better for SFOR troops.''
Regarding the upcoming March 15th arbitration decision for Brcko (an unsolicited comment): ``March 15th is Brcko. This could make everything harder, it could be a destroyer. It will only help the hardliners.''
The role Radovan Karazdic is now playing and whether he remains an obstacle: ``There have been great improvements in the last 3, 4 months. There are new institutions in the Republika Srpska responsible for policy. He did have influence before, now he does not. His influence is getting smaller and smaller. People just want to live their lives, it's not right that we should accommodate just one person. I have not had contacts with him in a long time.''
On the ethnic violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo:
``My opinion is not an official one. I am familiar with the Balkans and Kosovo, it is in every Serb's heart. Tito made many mistakes . . . he forced Serbs out of Kosovo and invited Albanians in . . . Kosovo dates back to medieval times, there are many Serb monasteries . . . Kosovo belongs to Serbia . .
. Milosevic should know the police cannot solve this problem over the long haul, this is another example of his bad policies . . . Kosovo, there must be civil rights for all . . . if we do some thing special for one group [evidently referring to Albanian demands for automony], it is wrong.''
When asked if whether she sees a future for multi-ethnic relationships in the RS, in the Federation, in Croatia:
``This is a priority . . . this must be achieved, but certain things must be a pre-condition . . . In 1945, the Communists rose, and the people were not allowed to say `I am a Serb, I am Croatian, I am a Muslim.' For 50 years everything we accumulated was very orthodox. Then Serbs, Muslims, Croatians starting asking questions about who you are. This is something that was not allowed in the United States. People wanted to say who and what they are, and this is what started the war. The Republika Srpska started with this, what is wrong with people stating who we are and what we are.''
Sunday, March 8: The delegation first traveled to Tuzla, Bosnia.
Upon arrival in Tuzla, the delegation proceeded to Headquarters Task Force Eagle, the headquarters for both U.S. forces deployed in Bosnia and for the overall operations in the SFOR zone ``MND-North'' (Multi-National Division North). The delegation first met with Major General Larry Ellis, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, who commands the multinational forces in MND-North.
General Ellis and his HQ staff briefed the delegation and answered questions on current operations in MND-North as well as particular issues of concern. Among the points covered:
MND-North is currently comprised of 13,500 troops, made up of U.S. troops drawn largely from the 1st Armored Division
(7,950 troops), a Nordic-Polish brigade (comprised of 2,800 troops from the Baltic States, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Poland), a Russian brigade (1,425), and a Turkish brigade.
The various armed factions within MND-North have complied with the provisions of the Dayton Accord and the zone has been ``quiet''.
34 of the 40 municipalities within MND-North which held elections in September 1997 have had their results certified by the OSCE. There are several instances where the elections resulted in governments which do not reflect the ethnicity of the local population, a result due to the use of absentee balloting whereby displaced people were permitted to cast votes in their former locales.
The most sensitive area in the region (if not all of Bosnia) remains Brcko, which due to its location (it connects the western half of the RS to the eastern half) and the results of the war is perhaps the most valuable and contested territory in Bosnia. Its pre-war population was 56 percent Muslim and 20 percent Serb; it now is over 90 percent Serb.
The Dayton Accord left the fate of Brcko to international arbitration. In March 1996 the arbitrator extended the date for a final determination to March 15, 1998. \1\ In recent months over 700 displaced Muslim families have returned to Brcko and efforts to restructure local institutions, such as a police force, along multi-ethnic lines have shown progress.
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\1\ On March 15, 1998, the international arbitrator for Brcko, Mr. Roberts Owen, announced he was once again delaying a decision on the territorial status of Brcko, until 1999.
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SFOR retains custody of three media broadcast towers which were seized from Serb control last fall, which had served as active anti-SFOR outlets. SFOR is working with civil authorities to develop an open and free media system.
When queried as to U.S. forces' direct participation in activities such as elections/election support, location of mass graves, and law enforcement, General Ellis stated his forces' role was only incidental, with the primary task the provision of security in the area of operations.
General Ellis reviewed how troops inbound to Bosnia receive tailored training for the unique environment prior to deploying, including a full mission rehearsal. Compared to combat training, the skills required are less demanding but the difficult part is integrating and coordinating tasks which have a significant ``non-combat'' component, such as civic affairs.
Regarding mines, there are over 128,000 remaining in MND-North, with approximately 1,000 being cleared each month. U.S. forces participation in this is restricted to direct mineclearing only when needed to support U.S. operations, and a supervisory/training role for the former Bosnian armed forces.
The delegation then flew to Brcko, Bosnia, where after a visual inspection of the city by helicopter it moved to Camp McGovern, a U.S. base camp just outside Brcko.
While enroute to Camp McGovern, there were several observations:
A coal-fired power plant was observed northeast of Tuzla; according to major General Ellis, it is currently operating at only 20 percent of capacity due to lack of spare parts. Efforts are being made to correct this problem with the plant to be brought to 80-90 percent capacity in several months.
A large open-air market, the ``Arizona Market'' was observed, with hundreds of cars enroute backing up local traffic for miles. General Ellis noted this market, and another (``Virginia Market'') were stood up last year and have enjoyed a significant business. The markets are multi-ethnic and run by local entrepreneurs. The markets have to some degree exasperated local authorities who, due to the lack of government control, have been unable to share in the proceeds.
Upon overflying Brcko, the destruction of housing in the outskirts of the city was evident. Some reconstruction was seen with many houses having new roofs, which General Ellis stated had mostly occurred within the past six months.
The bridge spanning the Sava River from Brcko to Croatia was observed, with it having been repaired last fall through insertion of a new span in mid-section. General Ellis noted that rail and barge traffic through the region had also recently resumed.
General Ellis also made some personal observations while enroute to Brcko:
All three parties (Serb, Muslim, and Croat) want SFOR to stay. At this stage, without SFOR fighting would eventually start up again.
Regarding war criminals, he doesn't disagree with the need to see them turned in or apprehended, but that this effort needs to go beyond just Serbs and the Republika Srpska.
The delegation then inspected Camp McGovern and also had the opportunity to eat lunch with the troops. Among the observations at this location:
Camp McGovern is located on the outskirts of Brcko, and in fact sits astride the Dayton-imposed military zone of separation.
Nearly 800 troops are currently deployed there. Forces are primarily from the 2nd Armored Cavalry Division, from Fort Polk, Louisiana, with some armored support from the 1st Armored Division which is home-stationed in Germany. Units from Fort Polk, were deployed last August, as part of a scheduled rotation, just before the September 1997 elections.
Efforts are being made to adhere to a six-month tour length for forces sent to Bosnia. This contrasts with a one-year duration at the start of the mission in 1995-1996.
The base camp features a small shopping area with a PX, a weight room, and a learning center with classes offered either through correspondence or instruction on-site by U.S. nationals on contract to the Army.
Nonetheless, conditions at Camp McGovern are austere, with all forces billeted in tents with wooden floors and a nominal
``tent complement'' of 8 soldiers per tent. However, on occasions of troop rotation or reinforcement this has been upped to as many as 12 per tent. Officers escorting the delegation indicated there has been some discussion about expanding the perimeter of Camp McGovern (a complicated endeavor given the proximity of minefields) in order to slightly increase the potential number of troops who can be stationed there, solely as a precautionary measure depending on future reaction to the Brcko arbitration decision.
Mail service has been good. When possible soldiers are offered access to computers for e-mail and there are opportunities for phone calls out of country.
In random conversations with troops, the delegation found that morale is generally good. There was concern voiced by individual service members about whether ``the folks back home'' understood what they were doing in Bosnia, and also about the effects of repeated deployments on individual family situations.
Members who met with Reservists heard complaints about the administration of the Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance program [which, due to initially faulty actuarial calculations at the Pentagon, continues to require funding in excess of prevously appropriated amounts despite the infusion of over $70 million over the past two years].
Some soldiers from the 1st Armored Division are on their second deployment to Bosnia (having been sent in the initial movement of U.S. forces during late 1995-early 1996 as part of IFOR, the ``Implementation Force.''). These who had served at Camp McGovern on their first tour said there had been considerable improvement in and around Brcko, with the most noticeable change being the return of and visibility of children.
These soldiers observed that recent progress in returning refugees to Brcko is due to careful planning and oversight by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In an effort to restore confidence and build trust, returns to date have been focused on those areas which are ``less difficult'' and have involved only families who can clearly demonstrate they once lived in a particular area or dwelling.
Continuing, these soldiers said unemployment was a huge problem, with the population subsisting largely on international assistance, black market activities, and remittances from displaced persons who had moved abroad such as to Germany.
The soldiers' personal view was that the local population was genuinely tired of the war and its aftermath and wanted to get on with their lives.
The delegation then traveled to a resettlement camp on the outskirts of Brcko (Stari Rasadnik) where it was joined by Ambassador Kauzlarich and met with the group of 12 local citizens.
The local group was divided equally between Muslims and Serbs, including the Muslim ``mayor'' of Stari Rasadnik and six women from a local women's group. In questions and answers with the delegation several points rapidly became apparent:
The group was genuinely thankful for the role being played for SFOR with many expressing the opinion that conditions would rapidly deteriorate should SFOR leave in the near future;
Many of the group had been forced to move to many places through the duration of the war. The biggest impediment to returns and the reuniting of families is the absence of jobs. There had been noticeable improvement in recent months in terms of greater freedom of movement throughout Bosnia;
The mayor portrayed his relations with the Serbs as one of cooperation in trying to resettle the area;
Midway through the discussion, there were several acrimonious exchanges between members of the group at various points, prompted by charges that one side or the other (Serb or Muslim) was responsible for the war. One individual stated
``we cannot forget what one side did to the other.'' This was met by another's response that ``we were the ones who were thrown out, that suffered atrocities, but I have returned home. I am no war criminal.''
When asked what the reaction would be should the arbitration decision give control to Brcko to the Serbs, one person responded ``We can live side-by-side . . . but not together.''
The delegation then proceeded to a brief tour of Brcko by bus, before proceeding to a meeting with representatives of the Office of the High Representative for Brcko (OHR) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF).
While on the tour of Brcko, the delegation briefly crossed over the now-repaired bridge over the Sava River into Croatia. SFOR escorts made several comments while on the tour including:
In downtown Brcko, there was a smattering of political posters featuring President Plavsic and Prime Minister Dodik of the RS. It was explained that several months prior, there were many posters featuring Radovan Karazdic. By all appearances these had been removed;
Within Brcko, it was claimed there are little or no problems with freedom of movement for any of the three formerly warring factions;
The local schools are now open, with both classes and faculties represented on a multi-ethnic basis. This is said to have created no problems.
The delegation then met with representatives of the OHR and the IPTF.
According to Mr. Ian McCloud, Deputy Commissioner of OHR:
The Office of the High Representative for Brcko was expanded and given greater authority in early 1997 after the arbitrator for Brcko, Mr. Roberts Owen, decided to delay his decision until March 1998. OHR was charged with working actively in the Brcko area to return refugees and displaced persons, to achieve a greater freedom of movement (in conjunction with the IPTF), to aid in ensuring democratic processes were established and respected, and to help with economic revitalization. Regarding each of these areas:
Since early 1997, OHR has approved over 2600 homesteads for return to displaced persons, with 755 families having actually returned and taken occupancy.
Freedom of movement within Brcko is pretty well established, and over 400 vehicles daily transit the bridge from Brcko to Croatia. However, Serbs are still not allowed by Croatia to pass over the bridge into Croatia.
Mr. McCloud had an upbeat assessment regarding the implementation of the local elections, saying that the re-establishment of multi-ethnic institutions is starting to
``take'' and is making progress.
Regarding the local economy, Mr. McCloud indicated this was a major challenge as OHR believes there needs to be the creation of 28,000 industrial and supporting jobs in the community to get Brcko back to its pre-war levels of employment.
The delegation was then briefed by Mr. Don Grady of the IPTF (who had come to Bosnia after a career in the United States in local law enforcement, most recently in New Mexico):
In Brcko, the local IPTF-trained and supervised police force is now on the verge of being able to do open policing. The police force has been structured on multi-ethnic lines and has been functioning as a unit since the beginning of 1998.
Mr. Grady explained that in building this police force, the IPTF role centers on training for ``democratic policing'', which perhaps can be best understood when contrasted with the previous role of police in Bosnia, which had inherited the mindset and functions of the internal security forces established over 50 years as part of Communist Yugoslavia.
IPTF training is centered out of Sarajevo, where after individual certification by IPTF, prospective police members are provided what in essence is ``mini-police academy training''. The Intent is to train police to conduct a ``full service police operation'', with jurisdiction ranging from local traffic and petty crimes to more serious phenomena such as organized crime and the black market. For the latter, where offenses cross local jurisdictional lines and also simply require greater resources and expertise, local forces work in conjunction with the ministry.
Mr. Grady summarized his presentation by saying ``I think what's going on here is pretty spectacular . . . it could be a prototype for the rest of Bosnia.'' He did state that the IPTF was well aware of the unique position of Brcko given its being subject to arbitration and that it was working with SFOR, as well as the local police, to ensure there would be coordination in the event of violence.
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