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“CRIMINAL CODE MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 2009” mentioning the U.S. Dept. of Justice was published in the Extensions of Remarks section on pages E797-E798 on March 26, 2009.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
CRIMINAL CODE MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 2009
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HON. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.
of wisconsin
in the house of representatives
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, the Criminal Code Modernization and Simplification Act revises the criminal code to update, simplify and consolidate many of the criminal provisions in Title 18 of the United States Code. It has been over 50 years since the criminal code was last revised. The existing criminal code is riddled with provisions that are either outdated or simply inconsistent with more recent modifications to reflect today's modern world. I introduced this Act in both the 109th and 110th Congresses. This new version incorporates criminal laws enacted during 2007 and 2008.
This measure is intended to continue the dialogue and process for rewriting the criminal code, with the hope that other Members, the Senate, the judiciary, the Justice Department, criminal law professors, and other interested professionals will provide input and seek to develop a more comprehensive re-write.
With the increasing federalization of local crimes, there is a need to review and revise Title 18 to ensure that such federalization is minimized and tailored to appropriate crimes where State and local prosecutions may not adequately serve the public interest. Federal prosecutions constitute only seven percent of the criminal prosecutions nationwide. We need to ensure that the federal role continues to be limited and that the State and local offenses are not subsumed within an ever-expanding criminal code.
Through the years, the criminal code has grown with more and more criminal provisions, some of which are antiquated or redundant, some of which are poorly drafted, some of which have not been used in the last 30 years, and some of which are unnecessary since the crime is already covered by existing criminal provisions.
This bill cuts over 1/3 of the existing criminal code; reorganizes the criminal code to make it more user-friendly; and consolidates criminal offenses from other titles so that title 18 includes all major criminal provisions (e.g. drug crimes in title 21, aviation offenses and hijacking in title 49).
To the extent possible, and for the most part, I applied a policy-
neutral intent, meaning that changes were made to streamline the code in an effort to assist policymakers, practitioners (judges, prosecutors, probation officers) and other persons who rely on the code to implement criminal law enforcement and compliance. However, two general policy changes were made: (1) attempts and conspiracies to commit criminal offenses are generally punished in the same manner as the substantive offense unless specifically stated otherwise; and (2) criminal and civil forfeiture and restitution provisions were consolidated unless a more specific policy was adopted for a crime.
Creating a Uniform Set of Definitions for the Entire Title--In reviewing the code, there were instances where terms were defined differently. In most cases there was no evident policy basis for different definitions. To eliminate this problem, a common set of definitions was established in the first section of the revised code.
Revising the Intent Requirements--The Supreme Court has consistently criticized Congress for imprecise drafting of intent requirements for criminal offenses. In numerous occasions, improper drafting has lead to confusion in the courts, requiring further modifications to clarify Congress' intent.
Courts and commentators alike have denounced the use of ``willful'' in statutes because of the word's inherent ambiguity. The term
``willful'' can have different meanings in different contexts and thus is a vague term defying uniform definition. Therefore, because the Government has a duty to provide clear notice to the public regarding what behavior constitutes a crime, use of the ``willful'' language in statutes should be avoided.
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the term ``willful . . . is a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its context.'' Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). See also United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933) (``Aid in arriving at the meaning of the word `willfully' may be afforded by the context in which it is used.''). The looseness of the definition is demonstrated in the many different interpretations of the word
``willful'' in federal statutes.
Courts have described ``willful'' as meaning a high degree of culpability, such as a bad or evil motive. E.g., United States v. Harris, 185 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (``[T]he act to be criminal must be willful, which means an act done with a fraudulent intent or a bad purpose or an evil motive.''). But cf., e.g., Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir. 1951) (holding that ``such an evil purpose of criminal intent need not exist'' for a ``willful'' violation). The term can mean that a person must have actual knowledge that his actions were prohibited by the statute. E.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1994) (interpreting ``willful'' to require ``both `knowledge of the reporting requirement' and a `specific intent to commit the crime,' i.e., `a purpose to disobey the law.' ''
Courts and commentators have decried the confusion that follows use of the word ``willful'' in statutes. The lower courts repeatedly cite the fluctuating meaning of the term ``willfully,'' which has ``defied any consistent interpretation by the courts.'' United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1978). Judge Learned Hand criticized use of the term ``willful'' in statutes: ``It's an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, ``willful'' would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.'' Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Sec. 2.02, at 249 n.47 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(citing A.L.I. Proc. 160 (1955)). Indeed, the drafters of the Model Penal Code, for example, deliberately excluded the term ``willfully'' in the definition of crimes, stating that the term ``is unusually ambiguous standing alone.'' Model Penal Code Sec. 2.02 explanatory note at 228 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 2005).
The revised criminal code employs a straight-forward approach--where possible, the term ``knowingly'' is used to define the requisite intent for every crime, except for those criminal offenses that require some additional, and more specific, intent. Each offense starts with
``knowingly'' and then adds, if necessary, some additional intent requirement (e.g. specific intent crime).
The term ``knowingly,'' means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident. It would be incorrect to suggest that the term means that the actor must realize that the act was wrongful. See e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), the Court explained: [T]he term ``knowingly'' does not necessarily have any reference to a culpable state of mind or to knowledge of the law. As Justice Jackson correctly observed, ``the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law;'' United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 835-37 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gravenmeir, 121 F.3d 526, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 187, 194-95 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1717 (1995).
Under the doctrine of ``willful blindness,'' a defendant may have knowledge of a fact if the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. United States v. Hauert, 40 F.3d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1822 1995)
(ruling that the older ``ostrich'' instruction is not error, but not preferred); United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979). United States v. Dockter, 58 F.3d 1284 (8th Cir. 1995).
Eliminated Criminal Offenses that Have Not Been Used in Last 30 Years or Are Subsumed by Other Criminal Offenses--As described below and for each section, the revised code eliminated sections that had not been used by the Justice Department. Even in the absence of any significant use, some offenses were kept even if they were not used but for policy reasons need to be maintained to deter the commission of the crime
(e.g. Assassination of a Supreme Court Justice).
Also, in reviewing the existing code, there were many specific crimes that were already covered by more general provisions. Typically, the more specific provisions were added to the code after the general provision was enacted, and there was no substantive difference in the newer and more specific offense.
This project required significant resources and assistance from the Legislative Counsel's Office, and in particular, Doug Bellis, the Deputy Counsel of that Office, and Caroline Lynch, Chief Republican Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, both of whom devoted substantial efforts to preparing this bill and should be commended for their extraordinary efforts.
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