The audio file for this briefing is available here.
MODERATOR: Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Dubai Regional Media Hub, filling in this morning and this evening for our colleagues in our Asia Pacific Media Hub. I would like to welcome our participants dialing in from the Asia Pacific region and around the world for this on-the-record briefing with Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an update on the PRC, Taiwan, and U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific. The Assistant Secretary will take questions from participating journalists after his opening remarks.
I will now turn it over to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for his opening remarks. Sir, the floor is yours.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you, Sam, and good evening, everyone. It’s good to have so many of you on this call. I wanted tonight to continue the conversation we’ve been having about the PRC’s provocative behavior in and around the Taiwan Strait and then answer your questions. We think it’s important to engage with all of you to provide timely updates and accurate information on developments in the Indo-Pacific region. We’ve heard from many in the international community that they have an interest in upholding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific region, and we’re glad again that you could join us for this discussion.
Let me begin with my top line, namely the PRC has used the visit of the U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives, a visit that is consistent with our “one China” policy and is not unprecedented, as a pretext to launch an intensified pressure campaign against Taiwan and to try to change the status quo, jeopardizing peace and stability across the strait and in the broader region. The PRC overreacted, and its actions continue to be provocative, destabilizing, and unprecedented. The PRC launched missiles into the waters around Taiwan. It declared exclusion zones around Taiwan that disrupted air and maritime traffic. It has sought to disregard the center line between the PRC and Taiwan — which both sides have respected for more than 60 years as a stabilizing feature — with historic numbers of military crossings. The PRC surrounded Taiwan with more than a dozen warships. Even today, several warships remain around Taiwan. And it has imposed sanctions on Speaker Pelosi and her family and taken coercive economic measures against Taiwan.
These actions are part of an intensified pressure campaign by the PRC against Taiwan, which we expect to continue to unfold in the coming weeks and months. The goal of this campaign – excuse me – the goal of this campaign is clear: to intimidate and coerce Taiwan and undermine its resilience. We anticipated the PRC might take these steps, and we expect that they will continue to react in the time ahead. Beijing also recently sanctioned Lithuania’s deputy minister for transportation and communications for visiting Taipei, and it has threatened to take similar action against any country or government representative who might travel to Taiwan.
The entire Indo-Pacific region and the international community have an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. It’s the primary route for ships from China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan heading to Europe, the United States, and all markets along the way. Almost half of the global container fleet – 48 percent – and 88 percent of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passed through the Taiwan Strait this year.
This issue is not about bilateral U.S.-China dynamics. It’s not about being asked to choose between Washington and Beijing. We have been clear publicly and privately with the PRC about what has and has not changed. Our approach has remained consistent for decades and across administrations. We remain committed to our “one China” policy guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side. We do not support Taiwan independence and we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.
While our policy has not changed, what has changed is Beijing’s growing coercion. The PRC’s words and actions are deeply destabilizing. They risk miscalculation and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Maintaining peace and stability across the strait is not just a U.S. interest; rather, it is a matter of international concern critical to regional and global security and prosperity. The United States has conveyed to the PRC in every conversation that we do not seek and will not provoke a crisis. At the same time, the United States has held firm to our longstanding key objectives: preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific region. This is a question of what’s in the region’s interest and what is in the international community’s interest, and we are asking everyone to help preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
We have and will continue to keep the lines of communication open with Beijing. However, Beijing has shut down some key communication channels and cooperation across several vital issues that affect the entire region, including climate change and transnational crime. The inclusion of climate cooperation on this list of areas in which the PRC has ceased cooperation speaks to the irresponsibility of Beijing’s actions. Beijing is not punishing the United States with these actions, but rather the world, particularly the developing world.
We will continue to take calm but resolute steps to uphold peace and stability in the face of Beijing’s ongoing efforts to undermine it, and to support Taiwan in line with our longstanding policy. We will act responsibly, steadily, and resolutely. We’ve reinforced our ironclad alliances, as we did on August 9 with a joint air force exercise with Japan near Okinawa, and will continue to do so. We will continue to fly, sail, and operate anywhere and everywhere international law allows, consistent with our longstanding commitment to freedom of navigation, and that includes conducting standard air and maritime transits through the Taiwan Strait.
We will continue to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. That includes supporting Taiwan’s self-defense and maintaining our own capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize Taiwan’s security, economy, or its society. And we will continue, consistent with our “one China” policy, to deepen our ties with Taiwan, including through continuing to advance our economic and trade relationship. And, for example, you may have noticed just this evening we’ve announced an ambitious roadmap for trade negotiations with our partners in Taiwan. And we will ensure that our present posture and exercises account for the PRC’s more provocative and destabilizing behavior, with a view towards guiding the situation in the Western Pacific towards greater stability.
I will stop there. Thank you very much for listening to my opening statement, and I very much look forward to your questions.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink. We will now begin the question and answer portion of today’s call. We have many callers with us on the line today, so we will try to get through as many questions as we can.
Our first question is a pre-submitted question and it comes from Kym Bergmann, who is the editor of the Asia Pacific Defence Report & Defence Review Asia. Kim Asks, “Sir, on the question of Taiwan, are there concrete measures that the U.S. and allied nations can do to reduce tensions with the PRC or do we have to reconcile ourselves to these displays of force?” Over to you, sir.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you very much for the question. Look, what I have tried to make clear through my opening comments and I hope to make clear throughout our conversation this evening: the United States is squarely focused, as it always has been, on maintaining peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific region, and with regard to Taiwan, with maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. That has been the core of America’s “one China” policy from the very beginning, that focus on peace and stability and an insistence on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait disputes.
But as I have tried to lay out when it comes to the cross-strait situation and the current irresponsible and provocative actions that we’ve seen China take, we’ve responded with a number of measures. We’ve communicated clearly to our Chinese counterparts that we do not seek escalation and we will not provoke it. At the same time, we have demonstrated resolve by making absolutely crystal-clear we will continue to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act with regard to assisting Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense. We will continue to fly, sail, and operate anywhere that international law allows, including by conducting routine transits through the Taiwan Strait. We – as we just announced this evening, we’ll continue to take steps to expand our robust economic relationship with Taiwan.
And as I think you’ve seen over the last couple of weeks, we have also worked closely with partners in the international community who have spoken out again in support of the maintenance of peace and stability and have spoken out to criticize China’s provocative and irresponsible actions. And I’m thinking in particular of the G7 statement that was issued, the trilateral statement between the United States, Japan, and Australia, powerful statements that we’ve seen issued by the EU, by ASEAN, and others. And I think that you’ll continue to see the United States together with likeminded partners take a range of steps designed to demonstrate our commitment to peace and stability and our opposition to steps by Beijing to undermine those actions.
But I do also want to underscore we have maintained open lines of communication with Beijing. We’ve also communicated clearly and candidly our concerns and interests, and we intend to continue to do so. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Great, thank you, sir. Our next question is from the live queue and comes from Stacy Hsu from Taiwan Central News Agency. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Stacy Hsu, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thank you for taking my question. So far the Biden administration has yet to send any sitting government official to visit Taiwan. The Taiwan Travel Act encouraged high-level mutual visits, but given how PRC reacted to Speaker Pelosi’s visit, would this further deter the Biden administration from sending one official to Taiwan in the future? Thank you.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Stacy, thank you very much for your question. And let me just really underscore that with regard to Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the Speaker very much had the right to travel to Taiwan. The Speaker is the head of a co-equal, independent branch of government and it was her decision to travel. But again, it was her right to do so. And that travel by the Speaker was very much within precedent and in no way should have been a cause or a pretext for China to take the irresponsible and aggressive actions that it did.
I can assure you that the United States across the board remains committed to our unofficial but robust and important partnership with Taiwan, and that includes a broad range of areas of interaction, and I think you’ll continue to see that cooperation going forward. That includes the announcement by USTR tonight of our formal launch of our negotiations under the U.S.-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative. And I can also assure you that our channels of communication with our partners in Taiwan remain open and active and robust, and I’m confident that they’ll continue to remain that way. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Our next question is also from the live queue and comes from Ryo Kiyomiya from the Asahi newspaper. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Ryo Kiyomiya, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thank you so much. My question is about Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and Chinese reaction to the Speaker’s visit to Taiwan was much harsher compared to previous U.S. congressional delegations to Taiwan. Some analysts say that this visit was done after a sensitive moment for China. Do you think this visit was done at the appropriate time, and what do you think is the long-term impact of this visit on security in East Asia? Thank you.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you very much for your question. Let me try to underscore and reiterate some of the points that I made earlier. I think it’s really important to focus on what has changed and what has not changed. What has not changed is America’s “one China” policy. What has not changed is our approach to our important and robust but unofficial partnership with Taiwan. And what has not changed is regular congressional travel to Taiwan.
What has changed, unfortunately, is Beijing’s use of coercive and provocative actions aimed at coercing and intimidating Taiwan. And as I indicated in my opening remarks, we believe that Beijing has used the Speaker’s travel as a pretext to further intensify those provocative and coercive steps aimed at Taiwan. And unfortunately, our concern is that we believe that Beijing will continue to take steps to place pressure on Taiwan.
So, again, our approach is going to be strong, resolute, but steady. We think that’s what’s in our interest. We think that’s what the international community demands. We will continue to focus on the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and on ensuring that cross-strait differences are resolved peacefully, and we will continue to do so even in the face of Beijing’s, again, irresponsible and provocative actions. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Our next question, also from the live queue, comes from Will Glasgow from The Australian. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Will Glasgow, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thanks very much, and thanks very much, Assistant Secretary, for speaking to us. You said – you spoke a little bit about the outlook from here, but you expect this is going to continue – “this” is the PRC’s military activities around Taiwan – in the weeks and months ahead. I wonder, can you just be a bit more precise on what the U.S. – the U.S. – well, the U.S. Government consensus is or analysis is on that outline – on that outlook? I mean, we’ve got some dates coming up: the party congress probably in November, maybe the Xi-Biden summit in Bali; we’ve also got the PRC national day on October 10, Taiwan national day on October – sorry, PRC on October 1 and Taiwan’s on October 10. Is it all going to run until well after then? How far into the future is this going to run?
And also, do you think it’s the U.S. view that what happened immediately after Pelosi’s visit, the blockade and the missiles, is that the high point of the military actions from Beijing or is the U.S. braced for even worse, that, again, on all those dates we might see something that surpasses that? Thanks very much.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you very much for your question. Again, I’ll just reiterate that what has changed here not just in the recent weeks, recent days following the Speaker’s trip, but really over the last couple of years, we’ve seen a clear and steady uptick in the Chinese activities designed to pressure and intimidate Taiwan, and that includes record numbers of ADIZ incursions and now record numbers of center line crossings and record numbers of ships around Taiwan, and of course you noted, of course, the unprecedented and particularly irresponsible missile launches.
And I think, Will, when our analysis is they’re trying to use this as a pretext, this builds upon a pattern of increasing pressure and coercion directed at Taiwan, and simply analyzing what China has been saying and doing vis-à-vis Taiwan and what it has been previewing is likely to be announced at the upcoming party congress causes us concern that this pattern of pressure and coercion almost certainly will continue to grow.
So I’m not going to predict the future in terms of precise numbers and where the high point and low point might be. I will simply say that, unfortunately, we see this as part of a growing pattern of coercion. It almost certainly will continue. And that is why I’ve tried to make clear here this evening we’ll continue to be vigilant, we’ll continue to maintain our presence and our operations in the region, and we intend to fulfill our commitments both under the Taiwan Relations Act and our commitments to helping to maintain peace and stability both across the Taiwan Strait and across the Indo-Pacific region. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Our next question, also from the live queue, comes from Cyril Ip from the South China Morning Post. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Cyril Ip, your line is open.
QUESTION: Thank you so much. Sure, thank you so much. My question, Assistant Secretary, is about the sizable population in Taiwan who are vocally against Speaker Pelosi’s visit as evidenced by the protests around her hotel. How will you address them and their view that Washington is responsible for the unnecessary chaos in the (inaudible).
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you very much for your question. Again, I’ll reiterate what I said earlier. I just hope that all of us can be very clear about what has changed and what has not changed. The U.S. “one China” policy that has stood now for more than four decades has not changed. What has not changed is regular U.S. congressional travel to Taiwan, including travel by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, which also has precedent in the past.
So given that fact, it’s clear that what has changed, unfortunately, is China’s willingness to use unprecedented levels of military activity and other forms of coercion to pressure and intimidate Taiwan, and I think it’s important for us to maintain our focus on that. It’s deeply unfortunate and irresponsible that China has chosen to respond to the peaceful travel by a member of Congress in such a destabilizing way. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Our next question is also from the live queue and comes from Ryo Nakamura from Nikkei. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Ryo Nakamura, your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi, thank you. Yeah, thank you. Thank you very much for taking my question. The Biden administration is wanting to compete against China where it should and simultaneously to cooperate where it can. But as you mentioned in the opening remarks that China halted cooperation on climate, the (inaudible) climate – it is very broad – and transnational crime in response to the Speaker’s visit to Taiwan. Do you think the U.S. will be able to resume cooperation with China while the competition is very likely to become more intense in the future? Thank you very much.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Thank you for your question. The United States has continued to make clear under the Biden-Harris administration the features of our China policy. And as Secretary of State Blinken outlined in his speech earlier this year, our general frame for the relationship is invest, align, and compete. Invest in America’s own capabilities and our competitiveness; to align with our likeminded partners in the defense of and in support of the rules-based international order so as to preserve peace and stability; and then to compete in a very direct and clear way.
And again, we do think that competition is the primary defining feature of the U.S.-China relationship, but we have simultaneously made clear that we are very much open to cooperating with Beijing where it is in our mutual interest to do so. Clearly, you mentioned areas such as climate where we believe an issue such as that is not a purely bilateral issue; it’s not an issue where one side should be supposedly doing a favor for the other. This is an area where as responsible great powers it’s really incumbent upon us to work together for the good of the planet. And that’s why we’ve been so deeply concerned and disappointed with China’s irresponsible decision to cease climate cooperation with the United States. Again, that does nothing to punish the United States. It simply punishes the rest of the world, particularly the developing world, and we’ve heard from a number of friends across Asia and particularly in the Pacific who are so vulnerable to climate change how deeply concerning it is that Beijing would take such a response.
I have to say that it’s disappointing if not entirely surprising given that in past instances of tensions, Beijing has taken similar steps to cease cooperation. But as I’ve also indicated this evening, we are committed to keeping our channels of communication with Beijing open so that, at a minimum, we do not have a miscalculation that could lead to some sort of unintended confrontation, and we’ll also keep those channels open so as to explore, again, future cooperation where it is in our mutual interest to do so. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. We have many journalists queueing up in the question queue. We’re almost out of time but I’ll try to get through a couple more questions, sir, if that’s okay with you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: As much time as you need.
MODERATOR: Okay, all right. Well, then let’s go to our next caller in the live queue, and that’s Oliver Hotham from Agence France-Presse. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Oliver, your line is open.
QUESTION: Yes, hi, Assistant Secretary. Hi, Assistant Secretary. Thank you for organizing this. I’m just wondering, within days of Pelosi’s visit, Beijing has already implemented new trade restrictions on Taiwan, and obviously when these types of visits take place it’s really – it’s really Taiwan that gets hurt. Has the U.S. devised any kind of policies to sort of offset this economic hurt? I mean, you mentioned these trade talks that are opening up today, that are opening up soon. Is there anything more on the horizon along that – along those lines?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you for your question. Look, I would say that of course there was the announcement this evening by USTR about how we’re launching the start of our formal negotiations under the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, so certainly that is one measure designed not only to grow U.S. trade volumes and cooperation between the United States and Taiwan but also an opportunity to assist Taiwan in building its resilience and ensuring that we have resilient and secure supply chains between us.
But I think really the crux of your question as I see it, is the fact that Beijing has become increasingly willing to use multiple forms of coercion, including economic coercion, against a range of partners in recent years anytime a country supposedly does something that upsets China. We’ve seen this pattern. Of course, you mentioned most recently here directed at Taiwan, but in recent years and over the past decade we’ve seen China similarly use, in an aggressive and irresponsible way, forms of economic coercion aimed at, for example, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, Lithuania, and many others. And we think that that pattern of behavior – and again, this is simply the latest manifestation of that – that pattern of behavior is one of the reasons why we have worked so hard in a range of fora across not just the Indo-Pacific region but with friends in Europe and elsewhere on, for example, diversifying and strengthening secure supply chains so that increasingly countries and the global economy are not overly dependent on one country and so that they’re also not so vulnerable to this use of economic coercion.
So a whole range of tools, dialogues, and policies are designed to advance those interests. But again, I think it’s responding to not just what we’ve seen vis-à-vis Taiwan but, again, China’s use of coercion directed at multiple partners around the world. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Our next question comes from the live queue and it comes from Sha Hua from the Wall Street Journal. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Sha Hua, please go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi. Hi. Thank you very much for providing the briefing. You mentioned that we could look forward to more actions also from some of the U.S.’s allies in – and more sustained action on that front. Can you maybe elaborate a little bit what you mean by that in terms of support for Taiwan?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you very much for your question. And if I understood correctly, it’s what might the United States do together with other partners on this issue. And what I would underscore is that the – I mentioned briefly in my opening remarks, but what we have tried to do is ensure that partners and friends around the world understand just how important peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is to security and prosperity not just in the Indo-Pacific but really globally. When you look at the trade and commercial flows that flow through the Taiwan Strait that I referenced, when you look at Taiwan’s increasingly central role in the global economy, particularly in areas such as semiconductor supply chains, I think you can see just how critically important peace and stability across the strait is.
And so we have worked with a number of partners to just ensure that they understand that, and as I think as you saw in some of the recent joint statements, we have been gratified that I think an increasingly large number of partners are willing to speak out, again, in defense of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. And those statements really continue a trend that you’ve seen over the last couple of years, increasingly at summit meetings between U.S. leaders and partners around the world, whether it be leaders of Japan and Korea or Australia, our meetings with members of NATO and the G7, that they’ve all spoken out, again, to underscore the importance of peace and stability across the strait. And I think the more countries recognize that and speak out and act in defense of that principle, I think the greater our ability to preserve that peace and stability across the strait that is so important, as I’ve tried to outline here. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Great. Our next question comes from Rebecca Choong from Bloomberg News. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Rebecca Choong, your line is open.
QUESTION: Hi there. Just wondering what your response is to China Ambassador Qin Gang’s warning against the U.S. continuing to sail warships through the Taiwan Strait and their promise to respond, and whether you think that ultimately China is seeking to reduce the presence or prevent U.S. Navy vessels sailing through the strait.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you for your question. As I have made clear, as my other colleagues at the White House and at the Pentagon have made clear – excuse me – the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate anywhere that international law allows, and that includes our continuance of routine transits through the Taiwan Strait.
Again, our transits through the strait are routine and longstanding, and they will continue. And it would be deeply destabilizing and irresponsible if China were to try to take steps designed to control or restrict the ability of the United States or others to transit the strait or were to take steps that would threaten the ability of shipping and commerce to go through the strait.
So, again, our focus is on, as we have for decades, taking steps to maintain peace and stability across the strait. And unfortunately, as we’ve seen in this most recent instance, China is increasingly willing to take irresponsible and destabilizing steps that we believe undermine that peace and stability.
But I’d make clear what our policy is, our longstanding policy that has not changed, and I’ve tried to make very clear that we’ll continue, again, to operate in accordance with that policy and in accordance with our longstanding practice and in accordance with what is allowed under international law. Thank you.
MODERATOR: We have time for one last question today and that goes to Martin Pollard from Reuters. Operator, please open the line.
OPERATOR: Martin Pollard, your line is open.
QUESTION: Hello, can you hear me?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Yes, I can.
QUESTION: Hello. So I wondered what – what does the U.S. plan to do if China enters a new normal of regularly crossing the median line?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you for your question. Again, as I’ve reiterated here multiple times this evening, as has been central to our entire approach to the Taiwan Strait for decades now, we are focused on and committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait given how central the strait is to peace and prosperity across the region. And I can assure you that we will continue to act in ways designed to demonstrate that commitment. I’ve outlined here tonight that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate anywhere that international law allows, including in the Taiwan Strait. I’ve indicated that as we’ve done for decades, we’ll continue to meet our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense, and I’ve also indicated that we’ll continue to take steps to grow our important economic relationship with partners on Taiwan as our colleagues at USTR have announced this evening.
So we’ll continue to be steady, consistent, and resolute as we always have been. We will do so even in the face of China’s increasingly provocative and irresponsible actions. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you, sir. Now, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I will turn it back over to you if you have any closing remarks.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Well, thank you. I simply want to thank all of our friends in the media for joining us tonight for this discussion on a very important topic. I very much appreciate your patience and your willingness to participate, and I have benefited from your questions and this conversation. I look forward to continuing this conversation in the future. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. That concludes today’s call. I would like to thank Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us and thank all of our callers for participating. If you have any questions about today’s call, you can contact the Dubai Regional Media Hub at DubaiMediaHub@state.gov. Information on how to access the recording of this call will be provided by AT&T shortly. Thank you and have a great day.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK: Thanks, everyone.
Original source can be found here.
