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“Text of Senate Amendment 6453” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the in the Senate section section on pages S6556-S6559 on Oct. 11.
The State Department is responsibly for international relations with a budget of more than $50 billion. Tenure at the State Dept. is increasingly tenuous and it's seen as an extension of the President's will, ambitions and flaws.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
SA 6453. Mr. REED (for Mr. Graham (for himself and Mr. Menendez)) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 5499 proposed by Mr. Reed (for himself and Mr. Inhofe) to the bill H.R. 7900, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military activities of the Department of Defense and for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1550. IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND TERRORISM
MONITORING ACT OF 2022.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran established the AMAD Project with the intent to manufacture 5 nuclear weapons and prepare an underground nuclear test site.
(2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran has advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing serious threats to the security interests of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners.
(3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, Iran, were revealed to the public by the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
(4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.
(5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities.
(6) The United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929
(2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of and imposed additional sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program.
(8) In September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran, years after construction started on the plant.
(9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly had enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent.
(10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic missile.
(11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles.
(12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency detected radioactive particles, which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.
(14) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile struck an Iraqi military base where members of the United States Armed Forces were stationed, resulting in 11 of such members being treated for injuries.
(15) On June 19, 2020, the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing ``serious concern. . . that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under the Additional Protocol to two locations''.
(16) On November 28, 2020, following the death of the head of the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran vowed to ``to continue the martyr's scientific and technological efforts in all the sectors where he was active'' in the ``nuclear and defense fields''.
(17) On April 17, 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity.
(18) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity''.
(19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war game that included conventional navy, army, air force, and air defense forces testing cruise missiles, torpedoes, and suicide drones in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.
(20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran commenced a 5-day drill in which it launched a number of short- and long-range ballistic missiles that it claimed could destroy Israel, constituting an escalation in the already genocidal rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Israel.
(21) On January 13, 2022, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force claimed that the military launched a solid-fuel, mobile satellite launch rocket, with implications for development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
(22) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels, backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 missiles at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
(23) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air interceptors of the United Arab Emirates shot down a Houthi missile fired at the United Arab Emirates during a visit by President of Israel Isaac Herzog, the first-ever visit of an Israeli President to the United Arab Emirates.
(24) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile, named ``Kheibar Shekan'', which has a reported range of 900 miles (1450 kilometers) and is capable of penetrating missile shields.
(25) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which struck near a consulate building of the United States.
(26) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex.
(27) On April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating that there are ``serious concerns'' about
``possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran''.
(28) On May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 pounds, of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon.
(29) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance cameras installed by the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in the country.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Department of State has used evidence of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program to secure the support of the international community in passing and implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program, with evidence of a nuclear program prior to 2003;
(3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
(4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than cooperative with international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their ability to inspect nuclear facilities across Iran;
(5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance missile programs, which are a threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
(6) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to support proxies in the Middle East in a manner that--
(A) undermines the sovereignty of regional governments;
(B) threatens the safety of United States citizens;
(C) threatens United States allies and partners; and
(D) directly undermines the national security interests of the United States;
(7) the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in assassination plots against former United States officials and has been implicated in plots to kidnap United States citizens within the United States;
(8) the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged in unsafe and unprofessional maritime activity that threatens the movement of naval vessels of the United States and the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime chokepoints in the Middle East and North Africa;
(9) the Islamic Republic of Iran has delivered hundreds of armed drones to the Russian Federation, which will enable Vladimir Putin to continue the assault against Ukraine in direct opposition of the national security interests of the United States; and
(10) the United States must--
(A) ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capability;
(B) protect against aggression from the Islamic Republic of Iran manifested through its missiles program; and
(C) counter regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner that minimizes the threat posed by state and non-state actors to the interests of the United States.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Comprehensive safeguards agreement.--The term
``Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.
(3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(4) Task force.--The term ``task force'' means the task force established under subsection (e).
(5) Unmanned aircraft system.--The term ``unmanned aircraft system'' has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.
(e) Establishment of Interagency Task Force on Nuclear Activity and Global Regional Terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish a task force to coordinate and synthesize efforts by the United States Government regarding--
(A) nuclear activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies; and
(B) regional and global terrorism activity by the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies.
(2) Composition.--
(A) Chairperson.--The Secretary of State shall be the Chairperson of the task force.
(B) Membership.--
(i) In general.--The task force shall be composed of individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of and appointed to the task force by the head of one of the following agencies:
(I) The Department of State.
(II) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(III) The Department of Defense.
(IV) The Department of Energy.
(V) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(ii) Additional members.--The Chairperson may appoint to the task force additional individuals from other Federal agencies, as the Chairperson considers necessary.
(3) Sunset.--The task force shall terminate on December 31, 2028.
(f) Assessments.--
(1) Intelligence assessment on nuclear activity.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment regarding any uranium enrichment, nuclear weapons development, delivery vehicle development, and associated engineering and research activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(B) Contents.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description and location of current fuel cycle activities for the production of fissile material being undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--
(I) research and development activities to procure or construct additional advanced IR-2, IR-6 and other model centrifuges and enrichment cascades, including for stable isotopes;
(II) research and development of reprocessing capabilities, including--
(aa) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
(bb) extraction of medical isotopes from irradiated uranium targets;
(III) activities with respect to designing or constructing reactors, including--
(aa) the construction of heavy water reactors;
(bb) the manufacture or procurement of reactor components, including the intended application of such components; and
(cc) efforts to rebuild the original reactor at Arak;
(IV) uranium mining, concentration, conversion, and fuel fabrication, including--
(aa) estimated uranium ore production capacity and annual recovery;
(bb) recovery processes and ore concentrate production capacity and annual recovery;
(cc) research and development with respect to, and the annual rate of, conversion of uranium; and
(dd) research and development with respect to the fabrication of reactor fuels, including the use of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium; and
(V) activities with respect to--
(aa) producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
(bb) conducting research and development on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
(cc) uranium metal; or
(dd) casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium;
(ii) with respect to any activity described in clause (i), a description, as applicable, of--
(I) the number and type of centrifuges used to enrich uranium and the operating status of such centrifuges;
(II) the number and location of any enrichment or associated research and development facility used to engage in such activity;
(III) the amount of heavy water, in metric tons, produced by such activity and the acquisition or manufacture of major reactor components, including, for the second and subsequent assessments, the amount produced since the last assessment;
(IV) the number and type of fuel assemblies produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including failed or rejected assemblies; and
(V) the total amount of--
(aa) uranium-235 enriched to not greater than 5 percent purity;
(bb) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 5 percent purity and not greater than 20 percent purity;
(cc) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 20 percent purity and not greater than 60 percent purity;
(dd) uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity and not greater than 90 percent purity; and
(ee) uranium-235 enriched greater than 90 percent purity;
(iii) a description of any weaponization plans and weapons development capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including--
(I) plans and capabilities with respect to--
(aa) weapon design, including fission, warhead miniaturization, and boosted and early thermonuclear weapon design;
(bb) high yield fission development;
(cc) design, development, acquisition, or use of computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices;
(dd) design, development, fabricating, acquisition, or use of explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources; and
(ee) design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use of precision machining and tooling that could enable the production of nuclear explosive device components;
(II) the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deploy a working or reliable delivery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead;
(III) the estimated breakout time for the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and deploy a nuclear weapon, including a crude nuclear weapon; and
(IV) the status and location of any research and development work site related to the preparation of an underground nuclear test;
(iv) an identification of any clandestine nuclear facilities;
(v) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains locations to store equipment, research archives, or other material previously used for a weapons program or that would be of use to a weapons program that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency;
(vi) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in an undeclared or clandestine facility;
(vii) an assessment of activities related to developing or acquiring the capabilities for the production of nuclear weapons, conducted at facilities controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, including an analysis of gaps in knowledge due to the lack of inspections and nontransparency of such facilities;
(viii) a description of activities between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries with respect to sharing information on nuclear weapons or activities related to weaponization;
(ix) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a description of--
(I) the type of missile;
(II) the range of such missiles;
(III) the capability of such missiles to deliver a nuclear warhead;
(IV) the number of such missiles; and
(V) any testing of such missiles;
(x) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned aircraft system or other military equipment capable of delivering a nuclear weapon;
(xi) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies has engaged in new or evolving nuclear weapons development activities, or activities related to developing the capabilities for the production of nuclear weapons or potential delivery vehicles, that would pose a threat to the national security of the United States, Israel, or other partners or allies; and
(xii) any other information that the task force determines is necessary to ensure a complete understanding of the capability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and manufacture nuclear or other types of associated weapons systems.
(2) Assessment on regional and global terrorism of the islamic republic of iran.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment regarding the regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(B) Contents.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including training, equipment, and associated intelligence support, to regional and global non- state terrorist groups and proxies;
(ii) a description of the lethal support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including training and equipment, to state actors;
(iii) an assessment of financial support of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Middle Eastern non-state terrorist groups and proxies and associated Iranian revenue streams funding such support;
(iv) an assessment of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian-supported groups to members of the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the United States throughout the Middle East and North Africa;
(v) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran against members of the Armed Forces, diplomats, and military and diplomatic facilities of the United States and the associated response by the United States Government in the previous 120 days;
(vi) a description of attacks by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States partners or allies and the associated response by the United States Government in the previous 120 days;
(vii) an assessment of interference by the Islamic Republic of Iran into the elections and political processes of sovereign countries in the Middle East and North Africa in an effort to create conditions for or shape agendas more favorable to the policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(viii) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of Iran against former and current United States officials;
(ix) a description of any plots by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States citizens both abroad and within the United States; and
(x) a description of maritime activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and associated impacts on the free flow of commerce and the national security interests of the United States.
(3) Form; public availability; duplication.--
(A) Form.--Each assessment required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex for information that, if released, would be detrimental to the national security of the United States.
(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of an assessment required by this subsection shall be made available to the public on an internet website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(C) Duplication.--For any assessment required by this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may rely upon existing products that reflect the current analytic judgment of the intelligence community, including reports or products produced in response to congressional mandate or requests from executive branch officials.
(g) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Identified Nuclear, Ballistic Missile, and Terrorism Threats to the United States.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the initial assessment under subsection (f)(1), and annually thereafter until December 31, 2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the task force, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging with partners and allies of the United States regarding uranium enrichment, nuclear weaponization, and missile development activities and regional and global terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(2) Contents.--The diplomatic strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran--
(i) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; and
(ii) has denied access to sites that the International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to inspect during previous 1- year period;
(B) a description of any dual-use item (as defined under section 730.3 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations or listed on the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group or any successor list) the Islamic Republic of Iran is using to further the nuclear weapon or missile program;
(C) a description of efforts of the United States to counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project political and military influence into the Middle East;
(D) a description of efforts to address the increased threat that new or evolving uranium enrichment, nuclear weaponization, or missile development activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
(E) a description of efforts to address the threat that terrorism by, or sponsored by, the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
(F) a description of efforts to address the impact of the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran on sovereign governments on the safety and security of United States citizens, the diplomatic presence of the United States in the Middle East, and the national security interests of the United States;
(G) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government approach to use political, economic, and security related tools to address such activities; and
(H) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to address such activities.
(3) Updated strategy related to notification.--Not later than 15 days after the submission of a notification to Congress that there has been a significant development in the nuclear weapons capability or delivery systems capability of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
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