The assertion that a U.S. "consensus" on China policy has emerged is increasingly questioned. Both the Trump and Biden administrations concur that China aims to surpass the United States as the leading global power, marking a rare continuity in foreign policy between the two administrations. Bipartisan agreement exists in Congress regarding Beijing as Washington's primary geopolitical rival. Over the past decade, the U.S. has implemented measures to counter China's military advancements, restrict its access to high-tech components, and strengthen alliances in Europe and Asia.

However, this purported consensus overlooks significant debates within the U.S. policy community concerning three main areas:

1. Analytical: How should the U.S. characterize China's competitive challenge?

2. Historical: Was previous U.S. policy towards China flawed?

3. Prescriptive: What should be the objectives of current U.S. policy towards China?

These discussions gained prominence following an essay by Matt Pottinger, former deputy national security advisor under Trump, and Mike Gallagher, former co-chair of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

Insisting on a consensus may hinder comprehensive consideration of America's policy options as it navigates prolonged tensions with China. The complexity of China's economic trajectory further complicates these debates.

China's economic growth faces challenges such as demographic decline and reduced foreign investment flows, with projections indicating a drop to 3.3% annualized growth by 2029 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite these hurdles, China continues to make significant progress in developing advanced technologies crucial for global energy transition.

Proponents of the "peak China" hypothesis believe heightened risks are imminent as Beijing might act aggressively to secure its core interests before its relative power declines vis-à-vis Washington—most notably through potential military actions against Taiwan.

Conversely, those who view China's rise as ongoing fear it may erode the U.S.-led order but do not see it overtaking American preeminence due to domestic challenges and external constraints from neighboring countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and Vietnam.

Historical perspectives also influence current policy recommendations. Some liken today's dynamics to Cold War-era competition while others find World War I's lead-up more relevant or argue that past great-power rivalries offer limited guidance for contemporary U.S.-China relations.

The debate extends into whether historical policies were misguided—whether Nixon’s opening to Beijing in 1972 was an error or if integrating China into global structures inadvertently created a formidable rival.

Economic interdependence with China is another contentious issue intensified by recent events like COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; opinions diverge on whether decoupling or de-risking strategies would best serve American interests without harming its economy.

Regarding Taiwan's defense strategy against potential Chinese aggression, some advocate abandoning dual deterrence for strategic clarity while others maintain that preserving peace requires vigilance against all conflict triggers beyond just invasion threats.

Ubiquitous competition with China also raises questions about prioritizing regions where American influence should be asserted versus adopting selective engagement strategies given China's substantial economic power compared to past adversaries like Soviet Union.

Finally, determining what America seeks from its relationship with China—whether aiming for outright victory in strategic competition or managing coexistence—is crucial amid disagreements over history lessons learned and future trajectories influenced by evolving policies under Xi Jinping’s leadership or potential successors.