The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced new sanctions against 21 individuals and entities, as well as one vessel, for their roles in supporting Ansarallah, also known as the Houthis. The measures target networks that have transferred oil products, procured weapons and dual-use equipment, and provided financial services to the group. According to the Treasury, these actions are intended to disrupt financial links between Iran and the Houthis.
“Treasury is taking action to cut off nearly two dozen individuals and entities involved in transferring oil, procuring weapons, and providing financial services for this Iran-backed terrorist organization,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will use all tools at its disposal to expose the networks and individuals enabling Houthi terrorism.”
The designations were made under Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorism. The U.S. Department of State previously designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in February 2024 and later as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2025.
Despite international sanctions, Houthi-controlled networks reportedly generate over $2 billion annually through illicit oil sales. Iranian-owned or affiliated companies based in Dubai provide both sold and free monthly shipments of oil to the Houthis. Companies such as Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, Adeema Oil FZC (owned by Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani), Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC, Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC (owned by Imran Asghar), Janat Al Anhar General Trading LLC (formerly Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C.), Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives, New Ocean Trading FZE, among others based in Yemen or UAE, were identified for facilitating these transactions.
Houthi leaders are accused of charging high prices for oil derivatives within Yemen while using proceeds for personal gain or military operations. Zayd ‘Ali Ahmed Al-Sharafi is cited as using his businesses to import/export oil for Houthi authorities while evading sanctions via ties with Janat Al Anhar.
In addition to oil revenue streams, logistics firms like Wadi Kabir Co. for Logistics Services (with branches in Yemen and Oman) have allegedly coordinated weapons smuggling operations on behalf of the Houthis. In 2022, Wadi Kabir was implicated in an attempt to smuggle anti-tank guided missiles from Oman into Yemen; this shipment was intercepted by Yemeni government authorities.
Other entities such as Rabya for Trading FZC (Oman-based), Al-Ridhwan Exchange and Transfer Company (Sana’a-based), along with their leadership figures including Ameen Hamid Mohammed Dahan and Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi were sanctioned for facilitating payments related to arms procurement or maintaining accounts used by Houthi institutions.
Aviation-related designations include Barash Aviation and Cargo Company Limited (Barash Aviation) and Sama Airline—both established with help from businessman Muhammad Al-Sunaydar—to acquire aircraft potentially used for smuggling or generating revenue through passenger service from Sana’a International Airport. These airlines attempted partnerships with convicted arms dealer Viktor Anatolijevitch Bout during aircraft acquisition efforts.
Further designations target shipping companies: Albarraq Shipping Co., its director Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari, ship captains Ahmad Ismail (ALBARRAQ Z), Ahmad Adriss (SARAH), Ahmad Bseis (ATLANTIS MZ), Ranveer Singh (AKOYA GAS), Alexander Yurovich Pshenichnyy (VALENTE)—all cited for delivering petroleum products after relevant authorizations had expired or on vessels already subject to sanctions.
All property belonging to designated persons within U.S. jurisdiction is now blocked; transactions involving them are generally prohibited without OFAC authorization. Entities owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons are also covered under these restrictions.
Violating these sanctions can result in civil or criminal penalties; foreign financial institutions may face secondary sanctions if they knowingly facilitate significant transactions on behalf of those designated today.
“The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish but to bring about a positive change in behavior,” states OFAC guidance regarding removal from its lists.
