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“THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS” mentioning the U.S. Dept of State was published in the Senate section on pages S14752-S14754 on Nov. 18, 1999.
The publication is reproduced in full below:
THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, as the first session of the 106th Congress comes to a close, I want to remind my colleagues that the aftermath of our nation's largest foreign policy initiative this year and a 78-day air war, will be our nation's biggest foreign policy concern next year.
As my colleagues are aware, I opposed our nation's ``sign or we'll bomb'' diplomacy that ultimately led to the decision to conduct the air war over Kosovo and Serbia earlier this year. Instead, I believed that we should have done all that we could to negotiate a real diplomatic solution. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the conflict, I came to the Senate floor and commented that ``some good always blows in an ill wind.''
The ``good'' that I saw in the ill wind of the bombing campaign was the opportunity for NATO and the United States to provide the impetus for a lasting peace throughout Southeastern Europe. Since that time, my staff and I have spent hours working hard to ensure that some good does blow in and that we do not lose this opportunity to promote peace, stability and prosperity in that region of our world.
To ensure the future of Southeast Europe, it is important to understand its past. Every student of history is well aware that this century's two most horrific wars had deep roots in the Balkans, but few people are aware of the level of violence, bloodshed, hatred and destruction that has been commonplace in the region for centuries. Indeed, the Balkans have been the site of numerous wars and countless battles, and have been fought over by every major regional power since the days of the Roman legions.
Over the last 10 years, regional ethnic tensions have resulted in yet another nightmare for the people of the Balkans. And for the third time this century, Europe, reluctantly, has turned its attention to their southern neighbors.
Their concern can be attributed to self-interest; an attempt to get Southeast Europe to settle down so as to avoid any possible spillover that could bring unrest to their nations, and a genuine concern over the ethnic cleansing and human rights violations in the region. To do this, Europe has involved the international community, and in particular, the United States, which, for the first time in our history, has immersed itself politically and militarily in the region.
Our willingness to get involved and lead should have come earlier. Indeed, when conflicts began in Bosnia in the early 1990's, it was reported that a key foreign policy official of the Bush Administration made the statement that ``we have no dog in this fight.'' History records that nothing could have been further from the truth. According to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in his book, ``To End A War'':
Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the United States; Washington believed that, with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe. Europe's hour had not dawned in Yugoslavia; Washington had a dog in this particular fight.
The overconfidence of Europe and the disengagement of the United States contributed greatly to the tragedy of Slavonia, Krijna and Bosnia-Herzegovina. When we finally realized it was important for the U.S. to get involved, we dealt with, and thus, legitimatized three war criminals--Slobodan Milosevic, Franco Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic--at the Dayton Peace Accords.
Unfortunately, the legitimitization of Milosevic caused us to continue to have a relationship with him at a time when we should have been working with opposition leaders to get rid of him. Then, when he showed his true colors, we were reluctant to be as aggressive as we should have been. We misjudged him, we underestimated him, and now we're paying the price for our mistake.
As a result, we have spent at least $18 billion in operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and elsewhere. We will, no doubt, spend billions more. In addition, we have placed a tremendous strain on the equipment and personnel of our Armed Forces due to our past and present involvement in peacekeeping missions in Southeast Europe. Also, the State Department has paid an incredible amount of attention to the Balkans. And finally, we have complicated our relations with other nations on the international scene--primarily, Russia and China.
A November 1 article written by Elizabeth Sullivan, foreign-affairs correspondent for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, indicates that the Russians harbor resentment and incredulity towards the United States over our assuming an air of moral superiority regarding their actions in Chechnya. They see our attitude as a double standard, which affects our ability to appeal to their better instincts. She writes:
The Kremlin is resolutely turning a deaf ear to U.S. admonitions for restraint in Chechnya. The criticisms have inflamed anti-U.S. feelings in Russia where it's bitterly recalled that NATO's unpopular bombing killed hundreds of Yugoslav civilians. It is the first big display of lost U.S. influence after Kosovo.
It is clear that instability in Southeast Europe has the potential to threaten America's overall interests throughout the rest of Europe. However, a full-fledged integration of Southeast Europe into the whole European community would remove the burden and expense of maintaining a constant peacekeeping force, end years of diplomatic wrangling and political posturing, and more important, end the death and destruction that has plagued the region.
Recently, I met with a number of Ambassadors from the Balkans region in the LBJ room here in the Capitol. They made it very clear to me that they are ready to work together. I was pleased that they realized they have a symbiotic relationship--a relationship that must be cultivated in order to bring about peace and implement a modern, free-market economy. The Holy Spirit was definitely present in that room. There was an aura of enlightenment among those leaders, and we must capitalize on the momentum of this cooperative spirit if we are to successfully bring the region into the broader European fold.
Consider that not so many years ago, no one would have thought that European political and economic cooperation, let alone union, was possible. After all, two world wars had been fought in the trenches and on the fields of Europe, fostering tremendous ill-will among many nationalities.
Today, those feelings have largely dissipated. Germans, French, Italians--all share the same currency. They cross national boundaries freely. They work cooperatively to solve economic problems because it is in their collective best interest. We are seeing that in terms of competition right now. The Ambassadors I met with see this cooperation and wish it for their nations, but, they are also quite frustrated with the lack of speed by the international community in responding to the humanitarian and economic needs of the region.
The NATO air war triggered immense human suffering which has not yet been fully remedied. Here are some facts:
The refugee exodus from Kosovo decimated the economies of surrounding nations, especially in Macedonia. Macedonia's reaching out to help their fellow man was done at a great sacrifice to their economy and the quality of life of their people.
In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), there are still 500,000 refugees from Slavonia, Krijna, and Bosnia. Another 150,000 were displaced during the Kosovo bombing.
In Kosovo, the international community has had to deal with 700,000 refugees who have returned after the conflict. 500,000 of these refugees are still officially considered ``internally displaced persons,'' without any place to call their own.
Kosovo has turned into an armed camp where soldiers from numerous countries are forced to keep the peace and prevent further bloodshed.
The lack of an effective internal police force has led to virtual chaos, where organized crime and illegal drug trafficking is said to be rampant and a cause of great concern among its citizens.
On this last point, a senior official from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, told me that the reason there is no effective police force in Kosovo is because there aren't enough qualified or even interested individuals willing to join the force. The official told me that if the crime problem in Kosovo isn't checked, it will spread to the entire region and into the rest of Europe.
Indeed, this point was illustrated again in the November 1 Elizabeth Sullivan article for the Cleveland Plain Dealer. She wrote:
The scope of the gun, drug and prostitute trade fanned by the Kosovo conflict is also becoming clear. [Last week] Italian and Swiss police busted a ring that allegedly smuggled millions of dollars in Swiss weapons to Kosovo, and Albanian prostitutes out to Italy, using humanitarian aid as a cover.
The growing crime problem was definitely a topic of concern for the Ambassadors I met with. I was amazed that they considered organized crime and drugs their No. 1 or No. 2 concern to be addressed. Think of that, organized crime and drugs as their No. 1 or No. 2 concern in the region.
The fact of the matter is, the bombing has had a terribly destabilizing effect on the region, and a very real impact on the humanitarian situation and basic human existence as well, one that has not been widely reported to the American people. The T.V. cameras are gone now. You know how it is: out of sight, out of mind, and we have moved on to other issues.
Although it's hard to grasp the extent of the problem, for the last several months, the U.S. has been working through the United Nations and the International Committee for the Red Cross to deal with the needs of the region. Both the UN and the Red Cross claim that they will be able to keep people fed, clothed and sheltered through the upcoming winter. Yet, I have received a number of credible reports in recent weeks which indicate that in fact we will witness a humanitarian catastrophe in the region in the months ahead because of a lack of shelter, heat, food and medical care.
I am aware that there are individuals in the foreign policy community who are opposed to providing significant assistance to the people of Serbia. They believe that humanitarian suffering will lead to political discontent which will, in turn, lead to a popular movement that will bring about the removal of Slobodan Milosevic. I disagree.
With the exception of South Africa, crippling sanctions have not successfully brought about a change in political leadership. Just look at Saddam Hussein in Iraq. We don't know what is going on there anymore.
To emphasize this point, Professor Julie Mertus of the Ohio Northern University wrote an excellent piece which was recently published in the Washington Post. Professor Mertus specializes in international law. Here is what she has to say:
How does a freezing and hungry Yugoslavia advance U.S. policy goals? Certainly Milosevic will not be hungry this winter. The idea is that the pain and suffering among the lowest strata of society will ``trickle up'' to the higher echelons. Protests by discontented citizens will lead to policy changes and perhaps even the removal of Milosevic. The problem is that humans do not behave this way. Cold, dispirited citizens do not take to the streets. Rather, they draw up inside their own homes and try to survive. If the going gets tough, they try to exit, often leaving the country. Only the few with hope continue to fight, and even they cannot persist for long when they are isolated from supportive networks.
Our sanctions policy has allowed Milosevic to blame Serbia's faltering economy, declining humanitarian situation and international isolation on the West. He has been able to deflect the ire of the Serbian people who have little access to independent media.
We must pursue specific courses of action that will help us get rid of Milosevic once and for all.
No. 1, we must continue to squeeze Milosevic so that his allies inside and outside the Serbian government will see that he is vulnerable and his hold on power is tenuous. Milosevic is an indicted war criminal, and we have to make his allies understand that his fate is their fate. In other words, leave now, or pay later.
No. 2, we should work with our allies to announce a detailed humanitarian and economic aid package that would be available to the people of Serbia once Milosevic is removed. The importance of this kind of package to the success of democratization was underscored recently when several of us met with the leaders of the anti-Milosevic force right here in the Capitol.
They talked about how important it was we have a clear, defined package that says, if he goes, here is what we are willing to do.
No. 3, we should provide as much assistance as we can, including such things as heating oil, food, clothing and direct financial assistance, as soon as possible to the Serbian opposition groups, particularly the mayors, who are struggling to bring about democratic change.
No. 4, we should continue to support President Djukanovic of Montenegro with whom I met two weeks ago. He is a bright and energetic leader and a key ally for peace and prosperity in Southeast Europe.
No. 5, we must undertake a massive effort to overrun Milosevic's monopoly control on Serbia's mass media. Milosevic's distorted information must be countered with the truth; a commodity we must get to the Serb people whatever way possible.
As I mentioned earlier, I held a meeting recently with a number of ambassadors and senior embassy staff from the nations of Southeast Europe to get their reaction to the Stability Pact initiative. And they were honest; they said things were not going well. They were very clear that it was essential that the United States be at the table to provide leadership and contribute our fair share.
Without our presence, they are not confident that our NATO allies will make good on the promises they made at the end of the war. And, quite frankly, I think it is up to us to make it clear to our European allies that we expect them to adhere to their commitment.
We are going to be at the table. We are going to have leadership. We are anteing up, and it is time for you to ante up and make good on your promises.
The best way I can summarize the attitude at the meeting I had with the ambassadors, and the meeting I had with the Serbian opposition leaders is a word in Serbo-Croatian--``edemo''--which means, ``let's get going!''
On balance, I believe there has been some real progress made on a number of fronts in our policy towards Southeast Europe in recent months. The Stability Pact is moving ahead--albeit slowly and indeed need of some additional leadership, particularly ours. The policy toward sanctions seems to be finessed a bit and real work finally is being done on the ground in the region to deal with humanitarian concerns. I am pleased the administration is starting to soften up on this a little bit.
The administration is meeting with Serbian opposition leaders and financial support is beginning to trickle into the movement. Southeastern European nations are beginning to think regionally with the understanding they have a symbiotic relationship in their efforts to promote and develop their economies. That is wonderful.
Although in many respects, things are much better off today than they were after the war, the momentum has to be increased significantly, and that is the challenge of this Congress and this administration.
The administration, working through the State Department, bears the responsibility of bringing about real change in Serbia and honoring the commitments the United States has made to friendly governments in Southeast Europe. Congress has an obligation to provide oversight and support to the administration's policies towards the restoration of peace and stability in the region.
To that end, I look forward to working with my colleagues in the next session of Congress to loosen some of the restrictive language that was placed in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill, language that the State Department claims has made it difficult, and continues to make it difficult, for them to do the kinds of things they would like to be doing in Southeast Europe.
The Senate has already made a positive start with the recent unanimous passage of the Serbia Democratization Act. I believe we need to build on that progress.
Southeast Europe is strategic to our national interests and key to our efforts to maintain peace in the world. Until the nations of Southeast Europe are welcomed into the broader European community, those efforts will remain unfulfilled. The United States must provide the leadership because we do ``have a dog in this fight.''
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). Without objection, it is so ordered.
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