In light of ongoing tension between the United States and China, an international affairs academic has published a book that studies the countries' strained relationship at length, particularly what has the U.S. done right, what went wrong and what can be done about it?
Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs and former U.S. deputy assistant for national security affairs, has written "Getting China Wrong," published June 7 by Polity, an academic publishing company focused in politics, sociology and social theory.
Friedberg spoke June 8 at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) book event on why he researched decades of Chinese strategy, described as the "most perceptive and sober" Chinese study in decades by event host, CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies Jude Blanchette.
"The reason we are where we are is because China had a superior counter-strategy that effectively defeated ours," Friedberg said at the event.
The author argues that the U.S. and its allies misunderstood the Chinese Community Party's (CCP) long-term strategic goals.
Friedberg says he was spurred to write the book in response to 2018 coverage of Chinese power by Foreign Affairs magazine. The author noted important continuities in Chinese strategy since 1949 “to maintain the absolute monopoly of political power of the CCP” and to build that power into a major, if not the lead, global power. Despite variations in strategy, these two goals have been the constant for decades, Friedberg said.
Although the agenda behind that strategy was predominantly Marxist, Leninist and Maoist over the decades, Friedberg says that current CCP leader Xi Jinping has somewhat shifted the country’s sails toward nationalism.
“The regime has had a set of policies for maintaining domestic control,” Friedberg says. “A mix of repression, cooptation and indoctrination. Sometimes there’s more of one, sometimes more of another. It’s pursued economic policies that do involve some mix of party, state and market, and sometimes the blend is different.”
Does Jinping’s marginally looser approach represent a shift in Chinese fundamentals? The continuity behind the country’s strategy for decades, Friedberg says, indicates no; repression and nationalism can move on the same upward trend.
The author adds that all of China’s important recent policy changes, including a shift toward more assertive and aggressive foreign policy, began in the latter part of former leader Hu Jintao’s rule, which would have been the late 2000s through 2012.
Jinping represents the views of a significant body of the upper levels of the CCP, Friedberg states, noting, “I think [Jinping] is there because he promised a way of securing the party and continuing the growth of Chinese power.”
It’s impossible to determine how similar the trajectory of Chinese power would be if someone other than Jinping was in office, Friedberg says. He notes, however, it should have been obvious that the nation’s policy was not headed in the direction that the United States assumed it was, toward “becoming a responsible stakeholder, a status-quo satisfied power, moving progressively toward a truly market-based economy and liberalizing politically.”
He added, “To me that was highly unlikely, almost ruled out. The spectrum of possibilities was somewhat narrower and within that I think you could have had variation, but I don’t think there would have been anyone emerging that believed China should be a multiparty democracy.”
The West didn’t theorize China’s direction out of thin air, however, and there was evidence that could be interpreted as such, Friedberg explains, but he likened the laxing in internal control and boom of NGOs in the early 2000s to being “experiments in cooptation attempts to deal with the growing demands of an increasingly complex society, which were perceived quickly to not have worked.”
One potential historical analogy is the early Cold War, but it’s difficult to hypothesize that without also referencing the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, especially with current tensions regarding Taiwan.
Using the Cold War as a simile, the Soviet Union experienced slow economic and national growth and long periods of stagnation and frustration until it ultimately reached a point of failure.
“I think we may be headed toward something similar with China,” Friedberg says.
The author also expressed concern about knee-jerk military intervention on the U.S.’ part, with which the host concurred. Action is necessary and possible, but should be intentional and thought out.
“That conversation in D.C., much to my frustration, immediately goes to invasion scenarios,” Blanchette says. “It immediately goes to how many beach landing sites the [People’s Liberation Army] has. I tend to think that Beijing is thinking about Taiwan first in a political context of which military capabilities are a tool in the tool kit.”
Friedberg advises that enduring more tension and friction will be necessary in order to achieve a more satisfactory equilibrium. Demarcation, in his opinion, is not going to be possible. He is concerned that the U.S. is not doing enough to help Taiwan strengthen its defenses.
“If we allow ourselves to be pushed back by the nearest hint of the possibility of conflict, we’re going to get into a worse and worse position,” Friedberg said. “My concern now, as regards to the likelihood of conflict, is more about the CCP leadership miscalculating the resolve of the United States than it is about our somehow provoking them into doing something that they might not otherwise do.”
