Dr. Robert J. Bunker is Director of Research and Analysis, C/O Futures, LLC, and an Instructor at the Safe Communities Institute (SCI) at the University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy. His past experiences include: Minerva Chair/Later Adjunct Prof, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA; Futurist in Residence, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA; and Fellow, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army.                   

How do you assess the evolving nature of Mexican drug cartels in terms of their organization, operations, and adaptability?

We have multiple levels of players: The two global reach cartels, Sinaloa/CDS and Jalisco/CJNG; the middle/smaller range cartels; and then cartel fragments, like Gulf & Zetas drug gangs. 

Cartels rise and fall over time, though CDS has had the best longevity and cohesion over time, with CJNG the more recent rising star. 

The constant factor since the 1990s is that the cartels have been fielding more capable operational forces—though the dismantlement of Los Zetas set this process back a bit. They had their own narco radio network for C2. 

CJNG presently has operational forces with improvised armored vehicles, mounted infantry wearing body armor, infantry small arms--including RPGs & .50 Cal Barretts--and drones for ISR, which are also weaponized with an aerial bombardment capability. 

We are also starting to see CJNG improvised land mines and even mortars sporadically starting to appear. The use of car bombs--basically IEDs in vehicles for anti-personnel purposes--has also been cyclical along with basic IEDs. 

So I’d say overall we continue to see evolutionary change over time as the dominant cartels become more proficient in their operational capabilities. Los Zetas may have had some military-based capabilities given their Mexican SF origins that are still ahead of where even CJNG or CDS presently are in their force structures. 

What insights can you provide regarding the connection between Mexican drug cartels and potential threats to U.S. national security?       

The primary threat is public health and safety. They are introducing tons of illicit narcotics onto our streets and backroads, from urban through suburbs to rural areas. 

Our citizens are dying outright from numerous fentanyl related overdoses, along with being addicted to the various types of narcotics provided. 

Also, this places an immense burden on our public health system and results in cycles of poverty and homelessness among many users, along with the erosion of inner-city cores. Look at San Francisco as just one example. 

The secondary threat is corruption of our public institutions along the border with Mexico, and in lower socio-economic regions of the US where narco-dollars can be used to co-opt officials who then become complicit in the illicit narcotics trade. 

Presently, because of strong US political capacity with well-funded police forces, the violence potentials associated with the cartels in Mexico are not a threat to our country. 

This is also because cartel behaviors in the US are much different than in Mexico—inhibitors exist to the range of their activities. 

They do not want to openly bring attention to themselves, or they would be met with overwhelming US law enforcement response. 

Also, the cartels—at least the larger ones—do not want to allow or facilitate foreign terrorists coming into the US. Once again, that would be met with overwhelming US response—but now it would be elevated to the federal level. 

With this said, local lieutenants of fragmented cartels—now basically smaller drug trafficking gangs on the border, may engage in incredibly stupid activities, and may not shy away from such behaviors if paid enough cash. 

How do you view the effectiveness of collaborative efforts between U.S. law enforcement agencies and their Mexican counterparts in countering drug cartels?                    

Its dismal with Andrés Manuel López Obrador now in power. 

He is a populist leader from the authoritarian left. So at the highest level, the effectiveness of the collaboration is suffering. 

Also, AMLO is getting closer and closer to the military, which is fiercely loyal to him, by economically rewarding their top leadership. This is really detrimental to public institutions, which he does not trust.                    

The basic issue is that Mexico is a low political-capacity state, which prior to democratic reform directly profited and controlled narcotics trafficking via its political elites. 

The breaking of the PRI’s multi-decade lock on the political system—while great for democratic reform—has resulted in the cartels becoming unfettered. This has vastly increased their wealth and the size of their para-military forces, and resulted in waves of violence to be unleashed across regions of Mexico as the various cartels fight it out over the illicit narcotics trade. 

In the process various cities and regions within Mexico are no longer under federal control. The term we use for this phenomenon is that of a ‘criminal insurgency’ being unleashed on Mexico. 

The AMLO administration will not acknowledge that such a dire domestic security situation exists in Mexico. 

Would designating Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations be an effective tool?

I go round and round on this. We already have OFAC (US Treasury Department) sanctions being applied against specific cartels and their designated leaders. But more tools are needed in my mind. 

I never liked the reality of Los Zetas members back in the day being able to freely move around in the US. 

The problem is the FTO designation may be too encompassing, and may trigger unwanted second order effects that immediately sour relations with the Mexican government. This gets us into drone strike targeting narratives. 

Also the cartels are not seeking to wage violence or engage war in the US, [such as by] targeting our government as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have done. 

The only option would be then to create a new type of designation for specific cartels and their leaders and  members. But we end up with a whole new siloed government bureaucracy in doing so. 

I've never been tasked to conduct research on this, so I really don't have an answer at this time. What I can say is the FTO designation would not be a viable approach. Those who want to use it are typically engaging in political grandstanding, or appealing to their political base. They are not looking at this from a viable policy or strategy perspective.  

What are some critical areas where further research or policy development is needed to address the challenges posed by the cartels?                  

The general consensus is that the rule of law in Mexico needs to be strengthened. This means law enforcement and the courts need better funding, salaries, and training for starters. 

The successful prosecuaon levels for homicides in Mexico are beyond a joke. We are talking about 2% or so. Also, the corruption levels among state agents—from the lowest up the ladder—are, on the other hand, extremely high. 

This goes back to Mexico being a low political-capacity state. 

Not enough revenue is coming into the governmental coffers, so shortcuts are taken. Like under-salaried police who are expected to self-fund by accepting bribes so that they have enough money to feed their families. This goes up the chain of authority to higher level state agents who also engage in such practices. 

Now throw illicit narcotics trafficking into the mix. The vast amounts of money involved—along with the threat of violence—results in ability of the cartels to utilize ‘silver or lead’ (plata o plomo) to hollow out Mexican public agencies and institutions. 

We have underpaid agents of the state offered bribes to look the other way, or risk violence being directed at them and their families. They take the money, of course.  

This means if you really want to deal with the challenges posed by the drug cartels in Mexico we need to address Mexico’s low political capacity (the deficit of revenues that can be directed for public goods and services). 

Add the fact that some person or group will profit from illicit narcotics trafficking in Mexico—this used to be the state in the PRI days. 

With the cartels now profiting they have grown in power and are destabilizing the Mexican state. This process has been taking place for a few decades now. 

Both of these problems are structural in nature and presently intractable. 

On the US side we have to not only recognize and deal with the issues in Mexico when we face cartel challenges, but accept that we also have our own problems. 

First, and foremost, is that we have millions of citizens who are users of illicit narcotics, so we are generating the demand for the products. 

Also, we have a domestic gang infrastructure--street, prison, and outlaw-motorcycle--that has emerged over the decades, which represents the backbone behind the retail sales of illicit narcotics to those citizens. 

Finally, the US has little control over its Southern border with Mexico. Free trade and NAFTA are more important economically to our country than having a fully-secure border. 

A cartel can easily sacrifice a few loads through a port of entry--which overwhelms our response capability and, in the process, gives us a publicity win in the news--in order to allow the rest of the product to then make it over the border. 

If we in the US are serious about responding to cartel activities in the homeland, then we have our own structural and intractable problems that we have to address, just as Mexico does.