As the inauguration of William Lai, Taiwan's next president, draws near on May 20, there is a growing anticipation of news analyses forecasting heightened tensions and potential conflict. This is due to Lai's self-proclaimed identity as a "pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence." Given Beijing's stern warning against Taiwan independence, many predict that Lai's inauguration could signal upcoming turmoil.
However, such predictions are likely inaccurate. Lai is not an extremist fixated on Taiwan independence. Rather, he is a seasoned politician who has built his career around becoming Taiwan's president. Now that he has reached this pinnacle, his focus will likely shift towards winning reelection. To achieve this, he will need to appeal to the majority of Taiwanese voters rather than a small fraction who favor radical steps towards either independence or unification with China. Indeed, less than 6 percent of Taiwan’s voters support immediate moves towards either independence from or unification with the People’s Republic of China.
Lai was elected with a modest mandate, securing 40% of the popular vote in contrast to his predecessor who received 56% and 57% in the 2016 and 2020 elections respectively. Had it not been for the three-way race in Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, Lai might not have won. His party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), lost in the Legislative Yuan while its main rival, the Kuomintang (KMT), won most legislative seats albeit without an absolute majority.
Interestingly, President-elect Lai lost significant support among young voters despite his youth and charisma. He represented continuity which did not resonate well with many young voters disillusioned by eight years of DPP rule. They feel burdened by limited job opportunities, unaffordable housing costs and bleak future prospects. For these increasingly influential voters in future elections, maintaining status quo is far from appealing.
Therefore, over the next four years, Lai's primary task will be to improve living conditions and future prospects for Taiwan’s younger generation. To achieve this, he will need to push through social and economic reforms in Taiwan’s divided legislature. He also needs to address Taiwan’s energy challenges and bolster its technology sector in an increasingly competitive global market. This could be his best—and perhaps only—route to reelection.
Another critical question voters will ask in the next election is who can ensure Taiwan's safety amid China’s growing threat. While Taiwanese voters are aware of increasing security risks in the Taiwan Strait, they are not panicking. Lai will aim to maintain this calm by demonstrating stability and the ability to secure more global support for Taiwan’s security. Over 80% of Taiwanese voters favor maintaining the status quo with China.
Lai's likely political rivals in the next presidential election will argue that they are better equipped to manage cross-Strait tensions. Beijing too will have an incentive to amplify their arguments. Chinese leaders would prefer Lai and his party lose the 2028 election as they believe that Lai does not present an opportunity to bring cross-Strait relations closer or pull Taiwan towards unification with China. They understand that if Lai is perceived as reckless and dangerous, his chances of retaining power diminish significantly. It can be expected that Beijing will try to portray Lai as pushing Taiwan dangerously close to war.
However, it is important not to mistake Beijing’s propaganda for reality. In fact, Lai has pledged continuity of policy on cross-Strait relations with outgoing president Tsai Ing-wen, who is internationally recognized for her principled, steady approach on cross-Strait relations which has garnered significant global support for maintaining peace and stability.
Lai has retained nearly all of Tsai’s closest advisors in his administration. Tsai’s foreign minister Joseph Wu will serve as secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC), Wellington Koo, Tsai’s NSC secretary-general, will become minister of national defense and Bi-Khim Hsiao, Tsai’s trusted envoy to the United States, has been elected vice president. Taiwan’s current representative in Washington, Alexander Yui, a highly respected career diplomat, will remain in place to ensure continuity. In other words, the top officials in Lai's administration are experienced and capable of managing the situation.
Beijing will undoubtedly make life difficult for Lai. They do not want him to succeed and will seek opportunities to drive wedges between Taiwan and its key partners including the United States, Japan, Australia, India and European powers. Beijing will try to convince Washington and others that Lai's statements and actions indicate his underlying ambition to pursue de jure independence. They will attempt to pressure the United States into restraining Lai to avoid conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing will also aim to create divisions within Taiwan by supporting Lai's political rivals while undermining him. They will use incidents as opportunities to increase military pressure around Taiwan just as they did following then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan. This tactic of using incidents to alter conditions around Taiwan is likely to be a central feature of China’s approach over the coming years as it allows them to create an image of progress towards limiting Taiwan’s independence from Beijing.
China is likely to increase military pressure on Taiwan in the coming years given its significant investment in military options for resolving cross-Strait differences. These expanding capabilities will be felt most acutely in Taiwan. However, the United States government continues to assess that conflict in the Taiwan Strait is “neither imminent nor inevitable.”
Lai inherits a serious set of challenges. He needs discretion and finesse rather than bold strokes if he wants to implement an ambitious domestic agenda while continuing to attract global support for Taiwan’s security. Based on my own experiences with Lai dating back to his time as mayor of Tainan, I am confident he understands this reality.
Some analysts will draw parallels between Lai and disgraced former president Chen Shui-bian. Like Lai, Chen promised steadiness in governance but after two years of being stonewalled in his efforts to govern from the middle, he pivoted towards stoking Taiwan nationalism and catering to his “deep Green” base of supporters for reelection in 2004. Although politically expedient for Chen, it was deeply damaging for Taiwan’s security as it forced Washington to publicly articulate the limits of its support for Taiwan.
Lai is aware of this history and has shown no interest in repeating it. China’s military strength is far greater today than during Chen’s tenure and Washington's willingness to articulate limits in its support for partners who disregard American security interests is real.
Lai deserves to be judged on his own merits with an open mind. He will make mistakes as all leaders do. But Lai is not the caricature that Beijing wants to create of him. This bears reminding as Lai’s inauguration approaches on May 20.
