Washington is concerned about TikTok, particularly regarding Beijing’s influence through the platform's parent company ByteDance. Critics allege that TikTok is used to "silence free speech," "undermine democracy," and "promote propaganda." These fears led President Joe Biden to sign a bill requiring TikTok to find a new owner within a year or face a ban in the United States.

TikTok has tried to counter these accusations by storing U.S. user data on American soil through "Project Texas" and limiting the reach of Chinese state-backed accounts. However, interviews with employees indicate the company remains accountable to ByteDance rather than its international leadership. There have been instances where Chinese engineers accessed U.S. user data, despite TikTok's claims otherwise. CEO Shou Zi Chew has stated that the company is "not an agent of China," but Beijing has lobbied on its behalf.

The debate over TikTok raises questions about Beijing’s overseas activities: distinguishing between benign foreign influence and malign interference. A March 2024 report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned of China's "malign influence operations," while an inquiry into Canadian federal elections identified China as a major perpetrator of interference activities.

Foreign influence and interference are distinct concepts. Foreign influence, often termed "soft power," involves transparent, legal activities that do not harm the target nation’s interests. In contrast, foreign interference, referred to as “sharp power,” includes covert and coercive actions aimed at undermining political institutions and silencing critics.

Both democratic and authoritarian countries engage in foreign influence. The United States uses programs like the Peace Corps and USAID for this purpose, while China leverages its Belt and Road Initiative for economic influence. These programs are largely transparent and legal, differentiating them from interference.

However, some Chinese state activities overseas raise concerns about interference rather than mere influence. For instance, China's Confucius Institutes were seen as attempts to gain influence abroad but did not result in significant pro-China viewpoints among students.

When does influence become interference? The united front system complicates drawing a clear line between the two in China’s overseas engagements. Canada provides examples where Beijing’s actions during federal elections met criteria for foreign interference.

China's overseas police service stations represent another form of foreign interference by linking local Chinese security bureaus with diaspora organizations covertly. Transnational repression extends beyond borders to control diaspora members perceived as threats by Beijing.

While there are concerns about TikTok’s operations, banning it may not address broader issues related to data privacy or disinformation effectively. Critics argue that most social media apps engage in invasive practices and banning TikTok could infringe on First Amendment rights without offering meaningful privacy protections.

In response to foreign interference risks, targeted measures should be implemented against specific threats while avoiding anti-Chinese racism. Comprehensive privacy legislation applicable to all platforms is essential for protecting social media users’ data.

Policymakers must distinguish between malign interference needing intervention and benign influence that can be tolerated while communicating this distinction clearly to avoid contributing to racial tensions amid U.S.-China relations characterized by partisan passions and fear.

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