The United States' security partnership with Taiwan is notable due to the unique nature of their relationship. While Washington does not recognize the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei as the official government of China, it recognizes the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. Despite this, America maintains substantive ties with Taiwan through a nominally private organization, the American Institute in Taiwan. The next administration will need to navigate this complex partnership carefully, considering Beijing's relationships with both Washington and Taipei.

China poses two primary threats to Taiwan. Firstly, Beijing aims to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC and has developed military capabilities through its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to project power against the island. This includes potential missile and air bombardments. However, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, an amphibious invasion remains beyond the PLA's current reach.

Secondly, Taiwan faces "coercion without violence," a campaign by the PRC to subdue Taiwan without engaging in war. This approach intensified after Tsai Ing-wen's election in 2016 as leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which Beijing perceives as intent on making Taiwan a separate country. To avoid war risks, the PRC employs economic, political, judicial, diplomatic, informational, cyber tactics, and "gray zone" military actions aimed at depleting public confidence and inducing capitulation.

Richard C. Bush outlines seven key issues for this bilateral partnership:

1. **Defense Strategy**: The debate centers on whether Taiwan should adopt a conventional defense or an asymmetric defense strategy that complicates an amphibious landing by exploiting PLA weaknesses.

2. **Resource Mobilization**: Washington has urged Taiwan to increase its defense spending proportionately to meet military threats effectively.

3. **Policy Calibration**: Both Washington and Taipei must calibrate their policies carefully to avoid provoking Chinese leaders into deciding that war is their only option.

4. **Deterrence Commitment**: There is debate over whether America should publicly commit absolutely to defending Taiwan or rely on private warnings at high levels.

5. **Support Against Coercion**: The U.S can assist Taiwan in reducing vulnerabilities against PRC tactics such as cyberattacks while bolstering public confidence primarily through Taiwanese leadership.

6. **Conciliatory Options**: Reflecting on Ma Ying-jeou’s first term suggests there may be more conciliatory policy options towards China that could induce restraint from Beijing.

7. **Impact of U.S Elections**: Future U.S elections will significantly impact the U.S.-Taiwan-PRC dynamic depending on who holds key positions and controls Congress.

Bush concludes that continuity might be expected regardless of election outcomes but acknowledges variability based on specific administrations' approaches toward China's threats.

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