This week, several U.S. lawmakers have taken steps to scrutinize major technology companies over their involvement with subsea cable systems potentially linked to Chinese and Russian entities. John Moolenaar, Chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, along with Carlos Gimenez and Keith Self, sent a letter to Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon. The letter probes whether these companies' subsea cable systems involve components produced or maintained by entities associated with the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the Russian Federation.
The inquiry follows reports suggesting that PRC-affiliated entities might be servicing Department of Defense digital infrastructure through Microsoft. The Federal Communications Commission has also announced plans to vote on a rule prohibiting PRC-manufactured technology in subsea cables ending in the United States.
The lawmakers are seeking detailed information from each company about their involvement in subsea cable systems since 2018. They request details on construction, repair services authorized for these cables, safeguards against tampering, and more by August 4, 2025. A briefing is also requested by August 8, 2025.
In their letter, the members highlight the strategic importance of submarine telecommunications cables which transmit over 95 percent of intercontinental data. They emphasize that these cables are crucial for global commerce and national security systems. The lawmakers express concern over potential vulnerabilities exploited by foreign adversaries like China and Russia.
The letter notes evidence of coordinated malign activities targeting subsea infrastructure in regions such as the Baltic Sea and Indo-Pacific. These include sabotage incidents attributed to vessels linked to PRC or Russian interests engaging in suspicious activities near high-value cables.
The committees stress the need for U.S. tech firms to adopt adequate safeguards against adversarial entities involved in subsea operations. They urge congressional oversight to prevent foreign access from becoming a backdoor for espionage or disruption of U.S. communications assets.
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