The People’s Republic of China and Russia continue to emphasize their historical roles in World War II through large-scale military parades and official commemorations. These events, held on significant anniversaries, are not only displays of military strength but also vehicles for shaping collective memory about each nation’s wartime contributions.
In Russia, the annual Victory Day parade in Red Square highlights the country’s role in defeating Nazi Germany, with displays that include both modern and WWII-era weaponry. In China, President Xi Jinping established a tradition of holding major parades to commemorate the victory over Japan and fascism, such as the event planned next week marking the 80th anniversary.
Both countries use these commemorations to promote narratives that position themselves as central actors in achieving victory during WWII. The approach is described as a “memory war,” seeking to challenge Western accounts that highlight U.S. and Western European involvement. The aim is threefold: to assert greater recognition for Chinese and Soviet sacrifices, draw attention to postwar Allied agreements like the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, and argue for a version of international order rooted in these arrangements rather than what is often referred to as a liberal world order.
China’s view emphasizes that its fight against Japan began well before U.S. involvement in 1941, asserting that its sacrifices have been underappreciated by the West. This narrative supports China’s territorial claims over Taiwan and disputed islands in the East and South China Seas by referencing Allied wartime declarations. According to official Chinese statements:
“Taiwan’s restoration to China in 1945 is a victorious outcome of WWII and an integral part of the post-war international order. A series of instruments with legal effect under international law, including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, all confirm China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, which is solidly rooted in history and the law.”
Senior Chinese officials have reiterated this position publicly, invoking these documents as legal justifications for territorial claims.
There remains a fundamental divide between Chinese and Western interpretations of which postwar agreements are legally binding. While China treats the Cairo Declaration (1943) and Potsdam Proclamation (1945) as primary references supporting its claims—including over Taiwan—the United States views the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) as carrying more weight under international law. Notably, neither government representing China at that time—the People’s Republic or Republic of China—was invited to participate in negotiating this treaty.
This divergence shapes ongoing tensions between China and Western countries regarding regional security arrangements and perceptions of legitimate international order.
China has worked closely with Russia on messaging around WWII commemoration since at least 2012. Both governments describe preserving “the fruits of victory” from WWII as vital for global stability. Official discourse has consistently highlighted Soviet contributions alongside those of China; recent remarks by Xi Jinping state: “China and the Soviet Union were the principal theaters of that war in Asia and Europe respectively... The two countries served as the mainstay of resistance against Japanese militarism and German Nazism, making a pivotal contribution to the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War.” Russian President Vladimir Putin echoed this sentiment upon accepting Xi's invitation to attend China's September 3 parade.
Academic discussions within China further link these historical documents with current sovereignty claims. The narrative is not purely political; it reflects genuine public sentiment seeking acknowledgment from abroad for China's suffering during WWII. As Peking University scholar Dai Jinhua notes: “Asians are considered [by Western scholars] to be not as qualified … which means the Rape of Nanking is nothing special, nothing to be surprised about... while ... Hiroshima ... are [seen as] more deserving to be recorded.”
Within Taiwan itself, debates continue over historical interpretation. While both major parties refer to Allied declarations when asserting territorial claims over disputed islands or Taiwan's status, there is less emphasis on public commemoration compared with mainland China due to regional sensitivities.
China's upcoming parade on September 3 serves both domestic purposes—reinforcing national unity—and an international one: reminding other nations about China's role in WWII while defending its view on postwar order. Recent reports indicate President Xi invited world leaders including U.S. President Donald Trump; however, Trump was unlikely to accept due both to diplomatic priorities with Japan and differing perspectives on history.
As long-standing disagreements persist about who contributed most significantly during WWII—and what those contributions mean for present-day territorial rights—these commemorative practices remain deeply entwined with broader questions about power dynamics and legitimacy within today's international system.
