Ryan Hass | Director at John L. Thornton China Center | The Brookings Institution website
On January 3, the United States carried out a military operation that resulted in the transfer of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from Caracas to Brooklyn. The long-term effects of this action on China-Venezuela relations are still uncertain. In a negative scenario for Beijing, China could lose access to Venezuelan oil, fail to recover loans estimated at $10-$12 billion, lose important space infrastructure in Guárico and Bolívar, and face increased costs supporting Cuba’s government. On the other hand, if the situation stabilizes with a functioning Chavista regime, China may maintain its partnership and possibly increase oil imports while criticizing U.S. actions as unlawful.
Despite these possibilities, developments between China and Venezuela are unlikely to shape China's overall approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Trade between the two countries reached only $7 billion in 2024—about 1.3% of China's total trade with LAC nations. More broadly, U.S. military intervention is not seen as an effective method for reducing Chinese influence in the region. Chinese companies have significant control over key infrastructure throughout South America, and at least 47 agreements between Chinese state media and LAC news outlets have allowed Beijing to influence public discourse.
The LAC region is an important supplier of commodities critical to China's growth—including minerals, agricultural products, and energy resources. In December 2025, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, presenting plans for deeper cooperation and promising support for regional autonomy relative to the United States.
However, compared to other regions such as Asia or Europe, Latin America remains less central in Beijing's strategy. As renewed U.S. attention focuses on the Western Hemisphere under the so-called “Trump Corollary,” PRC activities in Latin America may encounter resistance from both Washington and local governments concerned about potential retaliation from the United States. If this rivalry causes Washington to divert attention away from areas more strategically important to Beijing—especially Asia—Chinese officials might see this as beneficial.
Political objectives lead China's agenda in Latin America. The 2025 policy paper opens with a “Solidarity Program” centered on Taiwan, global governance reform, and opposition to U.S. dominance. It promotes an expansive view of Beijing’s “One China” principle as essential for cooperation with LAC countries. Since most of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies are in Central America and the Caribbean, persuading these nations to switch recognition is a top priority for Beijing; it also asks them to support reunification efforts regarding Taiwan.
The document also seeks LAC backing for reshaping international financial institutions and moving away from reliance on the U.S. dollar while opposing what it calls “hegemonism” without naming specific countries.
Economically, China promises expanded collaboration across various sectors including trade, finance, energy resources, agriculture, and technology—a relationship highlighted by $518.47 billion in trade with Latin America during 2024 (a 6% annual increase). However, this partnership has also caused tensions due to its focus on extracting resources such as lithium or copper and displacing local industries through increased Chinese exports—issues acknowledged by Beijing in its latest policy paper.
Latin America continues to be a secondary priority for Xi Jinping’s administration compared with Asia or Africa. For example, out of Xi's 202 bilateral meetings between April 2024 and mid-January 2026, only 18 involved leaders from LAC countries; by contrast there were far more engagements with Asian (71), African (51), or European (50) counterparts. Senior Chinese officials seldom visit Latin American nations outside multilateral events: just 19 high-level trips since 2023 versus 71 visits made to African countries during that period.
Qiu Xiaoqi—the Foreign Ministry’s special representative on Latin American affairs—has handled over half these visits himself; elsewhere such envoys focus mainly on conflict mediation or special projects rather than broad regional management responsibilities.
China's principal diplomatic forum for LAC relations—the China-CELAC Forum—is held at ministerial level only; its African equivalent operates at head-of-state level since 2006.
Gao Bo from the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences commented: “For a long time, China has prioritized its strategic relations with Asian and African countries over those with Latin America.”
Xi Jinping reinforced his focus on Asia during his address at the CCP’s Central Conference on Work Related to the Periphery in April 2025—a sign that border regions remain most significant within China's foreign policy priorities.
The United States’ updated National Security Strategy outlines a new “Trump Corollary” that extends principles from the Monroe Doctrine: it aims to prevent non-Hemispheric powers like China from acquiring control over vital assets or deploying threatening capabilities within the Western Hemisphere while treating competition elsewhere largely as economic rather than security-related.
This shift could work against U.S interests if it diverts resources away from Asia—potentially benefiting China even if it means some losses in Latin America itself—for instance by increasing naval deployments near Cuba but limiting presence elsewhere like Indo-Pacific waters.
Recent developments include Argentina suspending PRC plans for a large radio telescope under U.S pressure—a setback given China's interest in maintaining space facilities across multiple LAC locations which can aid telemetry operations related to Taiwan contingencies.
Additionally BlackRock led an effort in March 2025 aimed at buying out Hong Kong-based CK Hutchinson’s port holdings—including five ports in Latin America—to address concerns about Chinese ownership near strategic points like Panama Canal; however COSCO (a state-owned shipping company) insisted on retaining majority control thereby stalling progress amid broader global implications tied even to chokepoints like Malaysia’s Strait of Malacca.
Ultimately success of any new U.S doctrine will depend upon whether sufficient investment can match or exceed what China offers—and whether Washington can sustain engagement both within Western Hemisphere as well as regions prioritized by Beijing such as Asia itself: “If the United States were to cripple the PRC’s standing in Latin America but relinquish its own influence in Asia in the process,” writes Henrietta Levin of CSIS,“history would remember the ‘Trump Corollary’ as a Pyrrhic victory.”
The John L. Thornton China Center is part of the Brookings Institution and specializes in research related to international relations including independent analyses about U.S.-China ties (source). Led by Ryan Hass according to official information, it provides publications accessible online (source) while collaborating with Tsinghua University for joint dialogues (source).
Henrietta Levin stated: "For a long time, China has prioritized its strategic relations with Asian and African countries over those with Latin America."
