The U.S. is competing with China over printed circuit boards, a critical piece of the technology stack. These essential components are found in everything from smartphones to missile systems, and most other modern electronics. David Schild argues that America has neglected this layer of the supply chain, resulting in strategic vulnerabilities that could have consequences for economic competition and national security.
Schild is executive director of the Printed Circuit Board Association of America, the only advocacy organization focused on revitalizing domestic PCB and IC substrate manufacturing. He has worked in aerospace and defense, including roles at TRW, United Technologies, and Raytheon.
Schild explains that “every semiconductor rests on a printed circuit board,” and describes them as complex systems made of “glass, copper, gold, precious metals… and complex engineering.” Despite their importance, they receive less attention than semiconductors, even though they are required for virtually every modern electronic system.
The lack of attention has coincided with a dramatic shift in global production. In 2000, the United States had roughly 2,200 PCB manufacturers and produced about 30 percent of global supply. Today, fewer than 150 factories remain, and U.S. production has fallen to just four percent. Meanwhile, “about 80% of the world’s supply is now in Asia,” and “60% of the world’s supply is in mainland China,” he says.
Schild attributes China’s dominance to deliberate government policy rather than market forces. “American companies are not losing to Chinese companies, they’re losing to the Chinese government,” he says. Subsidies, low-cost loans, and state-backed industrial zones have helped Beijing capture global market share and consolidate production.
This creates three major risks. The first is dependency on a strategic competitor for a foundational technology used in critical infrastructure, defense systems, and consumer products. The second is security. Because PCBs are engineered components, “can we be sure… that we can trust how they’re functioning, who they are or are not talking to?” he asks. The third is innovation. “When you outsource manufacturing, research and development also goes with it,” he says, warning that the United States risks losing control over future generations of the technology.
Those risks become even more pronounced in a crisis scenario. A disruption in Asia—whether from conflict around Taiwan or other geopolitical shocks—would immediately impact American supply chains. “I think you would see an immediate impact on the American consumer and on the critical systems that depend on these technologies,” Schild says.
Even within the defense industrial base, vulnerabilities remain. While core military systems are subject to strict sourcing rules, loopholes tied to “dual use and commercial off-the-shelf technology” allow foreign components to enter sensitive systems. “There is a way sort of under the ITAR fence,” he says, in terms of how globalized supply chains can introduce risk even without malicious intent.
Schild also highlights a lack of surge capacity in domestic manufacturing. Most remaining U.S. PCB facilities are already operating near full capacity, supporting high-end defense and aerospace programs. In a major conflict requiring rapid production increases, the United States would struggle to scale. “What we don’t have right now is a surge capacity,” he says.
To address these challenges, Schild supports targeted industrial policy. A proposed measure, the Protecting Circuit Boards and Substrates Act, would combine direct investment with a tax credit for purchasing American-made boards. “A tax credit levels the playing field… and it allows American companies to choose American suppliers,” he says.
He also calls for broader policy changes, including expanding domestic sourcing requirements for critical systems such as air traffic control, power grids, and data centers. “There is a real strategic incentive… to see that the components for those systems are built in the United States,” he says.
Tariffs, he argues, can help but must be applied carefully. He describes the best use of tariffs as “a scalpel and less as a broadsword,” noting that while tariffs can make domestic production more competitive, they can also raise costs for the equipment needed to build factories in the United States.
“Industrial policy and national security are inextricably linked,” Schild says. Without action, the United States risks falling behind in technological innovation and military readiness.
The stakes, in his view, extend beyond economics. America’s ability to produce and control critical technologies has historically shaped the outcome of global conflicts and defined its role on the world stage. Rebuilding that capacity, he argues, is essential to maintaining both security and leadership in the decades ahead.
