What lessons is China learning from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and is its military ready for such a large-scale event?

Dr. Bonny Lin, director of the China Power Project and senior fellow for Asian security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, led a discussion on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities and logistics on July 19.

It’s a timely topic, Lin said.

Col. George Shatzer | U.S. Army War College

“For many of us observing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we’re seeing how much logistic problems have impacted Russian military operations. China is similarly watching,” she said. “The problems that Russia encountered in Ukraine have likely reinforced the agency to further improve and strengthen its logistics. This will likely build on efforts already underway, including China’s establishment of its joint logistics support force in 2016 as part of sweeping policy reforms under Xi Jinping.”

Panelists at the Zoom event included Joshua Arostegui, a Department of Defense senior analyst; Lonnie Henley, professorial lecturer at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and retired defense intelligence officer for East Asia at the Defense Intelligence Agency; Major James Roger (J.R.) Sessions III, a DOD analyst; Col. George Shatzer, director of strategic research and analysis at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College; and Dr. Joel Wuthnow, senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National for Strategic Studies at National Defense University.

Several of the speakers at the July 19 event had taken part in a U.S. Army War College conference on this topic held March 31 through April 2 at the Army Heritage and Education Center and at USAWC’s Collins Hall in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Lin noted that the speakers were expressing their own personal views, which do not necessarily represent the views of their particular institution, the Department of Defense or the United States government.

Shatzer noted the War College’s conference series began in 1990. The focus this year was the People’s Liberation Army’s logistics and sustainment, a decision made before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“Sometimes those two terms, logistics and sustainment get confused or used interchangeably. But there is a critical distinction within U.S. military doctrine, at least,” he said. “Sustainment is the broader provision of critical supplies, functions and services to maintain operations until hopefully mission accomplishment. Logistics is just one of the critical aspects of sustainment. Others include personnel, services, health care, even financial support.”

The PLA’s logistics don’t receive as much as attention as its combat capabilities, Shatzer said.

“And as the PLA continues to build and modernize its combat forces, it's important to examine if the capabilities meant to support combat operations are also being developed. Because, as General (Michael) Flynn said in his keynote remarks, logistics is the oxygen of battle. And that’s really such bright imagery,” he said. “I think it gives the point across. Imagine if two fighters couldn’t breathe, the fighting wouldn’t last long. Or imagine if one fighter could breathe freely and the other was constrained some way. The advantage for the other fighter would be obvious.”

The conference included several panels, as well as the instruction of papers. The topics included national level logistics, joint force logistics’ support to theater commands, mobilization support to logistics and sustainment, service level logistics, PLO Army logistics, the PLO Navy and at-sea sustainment capabilities.

Also discussed was the army’s air combat operations sustainability, logistics in remote regions and overseas, its growing air power projection capabilities in the Western theater, particularly along the border with India. The last paper examined logistics and sustainment issues in the PLA base in Djibouti.

“So as you can tell, it was a full slate,” Shatzer said. “I think it was a really good event overall.”

The common thread was studying if China has the experience and practical understanding for a major military operation over time and distance. Making a plan on paper or holding training events is one thing.

“But until a military has to fight against a deadly thinking enemy, deal with the fog and friction of modern war, it’s tremendously difficult to know if systems such as sustainment will be able to bear the heat and weight of actual combat,” the colonel said.

Wuthnow said his assignment was to provide a high-level look at the organizational transformation of PLA logistics.

“So over the last decade, the PLA itself has undergone a monumental organizational change under the leadership of Xi Jinping,” he said. “Logistics has been somewhat overshadowed by some other changes: the creation of the theater command system, the creation of the strategic support force and other changes. But it’s quite significant, I think, for the reasons that George laid out, that sustainment logistics are quite critical enablers of warfighting for any military, including the PLA.”

Shatzer, who was the primary organizer of the spring conference, it’s been illuminating to watch the Russian reaction to its early stumbles in Ukraine, and contrast to how China would react to a similar occurrence.

“If we look at and if we look at the way the conflict in Ukraine has unfolded to date, I think most observers would say that Russia made the decision to go in to Ukraine and it would take a lot to throw them off of that and have them reverse course,” he said. “Once they made the decision to commit, they were going to commit until they achieve their objectives. So initially, when Russia tried some operations that maybe it wasn’t that well suited to, at least historically anyway, in terms of longer-range operations, trying to do a more kind of lightning strike, decapitation perhaps into Kiev and a couple of supporting places, that didn’t work out for them.

“And they had something to fall back on,” Shatzer said. “And what they fall back on now is a pattern of operations that they’re very comfortable with historically and arguably their forces better structured for, that kind of grinding use, like a lot of fires and making incremental gains over time. And they seem like they’re relatively better able to sustain that.”

If China made such a military commitment, by invading Taiwan or in another area, it also would be very committed to seeing it through, he said. Its most recent combat activities were in Korea in the 1950s and supporting North Vietnam in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.

“But what I worry about a little bit is China’s modern military experience is relatively limited compared to that of Russia,” Shatzer said. “What does the PLA have to fall back on if in the first few days or few weeks their initial operations don’t work well? I’m not sure that even the PLA knows what its style of fighting ought to be, its mode of operations ought to be that they can’t comfortably fall back on and continue to prosecute operations.”

That lack of experience could be troubling for China — and other nations, he said.

“And so, again, if the PLA stumbles early on — interesting is such an insufficient word — it’ll be very challenging I think to understand where China goes from there,” Shatzer said. “Because they will have made such a deep, kind of an emotional, personal commitment to achieving their objectives that it could have tremendously profound effects on the security of the region. But that’s kind of something that I was thinking about in terms of the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and what China may be taking away from it.”