China's evaluation of the effects economic sanctions have had on Russia and its own strategies should it be the target of broad-based sanctions was discussed recently by experts on the subject.
The U.S. and the European Union (EU) targeted Russia's financial and energy sectors with sanctions in response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. The roundtable discussion Tuesday, "Chinese Assessments of Countersanctions Strategies," brought together experts to parse recently translated primary-source documents by Chinese economists.
The event was co-hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Economics Program and Interpret: China, an open-source CSIS project utilizing newly translated Chinese documents to inform discussions on U.S.-China relations. Panel participants were Martin Chorzempa, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; Barry Naughton, So Kwan Lok chair of Chinese International Affairs at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California San Diego; and Maria Shagina, Diamond-Brown senior research fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The discussion was hosted by CSIS Freeman Chair Jude Blanchette and moderated by Gerard DiPippo, senior fellow with the CSIS Economics Program.
Blanchette explained that the discussion was theoretical because the translated papers do not represent official Chinese thought and policy, and they are only a portion of what China has studied. The articles’ authors also convey some biases in their assessments.
China refers to sanctions as being part of the “weaponization of global public goods,” Chorzempa said in describing the tone of the Chinese narrative on the matter. “So their idea is that sanctions have been used more and more (since World War II) … and that’s been enabled by the hegemonic position of the United States, the U.S. dollar and the U.S. financial institutions.”
That philosophy was shared by Russia, a country that in 2014 made aggressive moves toward “de-dollarization” as part of its “fortress Russia” approach, Shagina added.
Even with its reliance on exporting gas and oil, Russia still wasn’t prepared for the pain that would come with multilateral sanctions, according to the panel. China, however, with its stronghold on global manufacturing, is better positioned to stand against any sanction attempts, the panelists agreed.
“I’m really struck by the precondition that all of this is happening within the context of long-term rivalry between China and the United States for dominance,” Naughton said. “I think we tend to look at financial sanctions and say, ‘This is a policy within the matrix of the global economy.’ I think they look at it and say, ‘This is one action among many potential threatening actions that the aging hegemon, the United States, is throwing at us.’”
China’s evaluation of how sanctions might affect that country is important with regard to Taiwan and what the global response might be should China assert dominance over its smaller neighbor.
The panelists concurred multilateral sanctions against China would be unlikely, as too many countries depend on it from the standpoint of manufactured goods and supply chain matters.
Chorzempa assessed the counter-strategies the Chinese papers detailed as being more defensive than offensive in nature. Thus, the notion of the U.S. going it alone in imposing sanctions against China could be problematic.
The panel's conclusion was that China is in a better position to withstand sanctions but nevertheless is working to minimize their effects.
The State Department's Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation is responsible for implementing and enforcing sanctions intended to counter national security threats posed by particular countries.
