Ryan Hass | Director at John L. Thornton China Center | The Brookings Institution website
As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to drive increased energy demand in both the United States and China, experts are examining how each country will expand its power generation to maintain a competitive edge in technology. The decisions made by Washington and Beijing regarding energy sourcing for AI development are expected to have global implications for markets, infrastructure, and supply chains.
The Global China project recently brought together four authors with different perspectives to discuss how energy demand could affect each country's AI progress. The discussion also addressed whether the United States should allow Chinese investment in American clean energy technology and manufacturing.
Kyle Chan highlighted that while the United States leads in access to advanced AI semiconductors, China has an advantage in energy production. “The United States is already facing an energy bottleneck for building new data centers, some of which require over a gigawatt of electricity—or enough to power a small city,” Chan said. He noted projections from the International Energy Agency indicating U.S. data center electricity demand could more than double by 2030.
Chan pointed out that China's data center electricity demand is also expected to double within five years but argued this growth is unlikely to be a constraint due to China's rapid expansion of overall energy capacity. “China already generates more than twice as much electricity as the United States and has increased its total power generation by nearly 6% per year over the past decade,” he said, citing that much of this increase comes from clean sources like wind and solar.
Samantha Gross emphasized the scale of modern data centers: “Data centers for AI training and applications are much larger than those that came before, requiring as much as one gigawatt of electricity.” She explained that competition for suitable locations will depend on how quickly infrastructure can be built, noting China's speed in construction may offer it an advantage compared with U.S. utilities' traditional long-term planning cycles.
David Victor provided additional context: “Let’s keep perspective: the energy use of AI won’t, by itself, reshape geopolitical competition.” He suggested concerns about rapidly rising energy needs may be overstated if innovation reduces chip power consumption or if projected growth does not materialize.
On international efforts, Chan described China's investments in global energy infrastructure—from solar plants in Saudi Arabia to wind farms in Laos—and Chinese cloud service providers expanding internationally. Meanwhile, he noted that the United States uses its strengths in supplying advanced chips for overseas data centers but may not match China’s ability to build new global energy projects.
Chan added: “Third countries are also likely to pursue a mix-and-match approach,” using Chinese-backed infrastructure with American chips.
Regarding clean energy technology dominance, Chan stated: “China has used industrial policy to become the global leader in a range of clean energy technologies.” He argued low-cost Chinese solar panels and batteries might help address U.S. data center power constraints without posing significant long-term vulnerabilities because they involve upfront investment rather than ongoing supply chains.
Gross commented on possible solutions: “Natural gas looks like a logical choice in the United States… Renewable energy is the faster option for those who didn’t foresee today’s growth.” She acknowledged China’s surplus manufacturing capacity for solar panels and batteries but noted reliance on these products gives China some leverage at least during construction phases.
Victor questioned whether this dominance translates into strategic leverage: “Even a dominant market position doesn’t create leverage if buyers have lots of options.”
Debate continued around potential Chinese investment in U.S. clean tech manufacturing. Chan suggested joint ventures or licensing agreements with safeguards could benefit both sides while protecting national security interests.
Liza Tobin offered caution: “Chinese clean energy investment isn’t analogous to Japanese auto investment… China is different. It harnesses ‘private’ companies to advance [the] Communist Party’s goal… inviting [China] would be like inviting the USSR to codevelop nuclear technology.”
These exchanges reflect ongoing debates about balancing economic opportunity with security risks amid intensifying U.S.-China technological competition.
The John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution specializes in research on U.S.-China relations and offers independent analyses on issues such as these discussions on AI and clean-energy policy (https://www.brookings.edu/centers/john-l-thornton-china-center/). The center collaborates with institutions such as Tsinghua University (https://limpar.locallabs.com/organizations/1ef57e4c-4e0b-4dcc-b69d-6451f8d55c64) and operates out of Washington D.C., providing publications intended for policymakers and public audiences (https://www.brookings.edu/centers/john-l-thornton-china-center/).
Ryan Hass leads the John L. Thornton China Center (https://www.brookings.edu/centers/john-l-thornton-china-center/) which focuses on producing independent policy advice related to international relations between China and other nations.
