Tensions between the United States and China are intensifying as policymakers debate how to prevent conflict over Taiwan while protecting economic and security interests.
Eyck Freyman, a Hoover Fellow and author of Defending Taiwan, argues that a broader strategy can still deter war and preserve stability.
Freyman directs the Allied Coordination Working Group at Stanford University and serves as a nonresident research fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
His early travels in China shaped his focus on the gap between the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party. “I wanted to learn about the world,” he says, describing how he traveled to China and was struck by “the scale of China, the environmental impact, the ambition of the country.” That experience led him to question prevailing assumptions about engagement. “I came away with enormous respect for the civilization, but also a sense of foreboding about the political and geopolitical project that the CCP was undertaking,” he says.
That distinction between people and party is central. “The Chinese people and the CCP are just two very different things,” he says. “We have over a billion people who are striving for a better life… but they’re led by a regime which presents arguably the most formidable challenge to our vital interests.”
Freyman argues that China’s strategy toward Taiwan reflects a coordinated use of national power. “The CCP is using every single aspect of China’s national power, not just military, but technology, diplomacy, law… to bring Taiwan to heel,” he says. That approach, he adds, requires the United States to rethink deterrence beyond traditional military planning.
His book outlines a “middle ground” between war and retreat. “We need to maintain an honorable peace,” he says, emphasizing that deterrence must address multiple U.S. interests at once. Preventing China from dominating emerging technologies is high on that list. “Can we actually imagine what it would be like if an authoritarian communist country were able to seize the advantage in this emerging technology?” he says, pointing to artificial intelligence as a key battleground.
Alliances also play a critical role. “Those alliances are credible only if we can actually come to these countries’ defense,” he says, noting that U.S. commitments in Asia extend beyond Taiwan itself. A Chinese victory, he warns, would trigger broader consequences. “Taiwan is the keystone… if he can flip Taiwan… a set of dominoes starts to fall.”
Freyman argues that military deterrence alone, while necessary, is no longer sufficient. He points to gray-zone tactics such as economic pressure or limited coercion that fall short of outright invasion. Those scenarios could force the United States into difficult decisions without triggering a conventional response.
Political deterrence, according to him, must address that gap. “How do you engage Taiwan so that Taiwan has a stiff spine when they’re tested in a crisis?” he asks. He also stresses the importance of global opinion. “We need to be playing for the hearts and minds of the entire world here,” he says, arguing that international support could shape the outcome of any confrontation.
Technology and strategic stability form another pillar. “We just need to stay in the lead technologically,” he says, linking semiconductor production and AI development to national security. Taiwan’s role in advanced chip manufacturing raises the stakes. “Taiwan produces 99% of the cutting edge GPUs that are used to train the frontier models,” he says.
Economic policy, however, is one of the toughest challenges. Freyman rejects the idea that economic interdependence alone can prevent conflict. “There’s a dangerous misconception that it would work the same against China,” he says, warning that large-scale sanctions could backfire. Instead, he proposes a gradual approach he calls “avalanche decoupling.” “You have to do it in a way that causes minimum chaos, but which gains momentum over time,” he says, suggesting phased tariffs and coordinated action with allies.
That approach creates a more credible form of deterrence, according to him. “If we conclude that the only plan that we have is a financial crisis and a Great Depression, we’re not doing it,” he says. A controlled transition offers a better path. “That is the thing that is more [of a] a credible threat because we might actually do [it].”
